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

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David Gergen

AMERICA'S MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

A year ago America stood astride the world. Its troops were poised to lead an international coalition against Saddam Hussein, its president showed greater mastery over foreign affairs than any chief executive since Franklin D. Roosevelt and its prestige was soaring. In every quarter other nations acknowledged that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as the only functioning superpower and that the ideas it espoused were increasingly triumphant. An influential American columnist, Charles Krauthammer, wrote a year ago in this journal that a unipolar moment had arrived and that a confident United States should learn to accept its new role, aggressively imposing its own vision.

What a difference a recession makes. Few outside the White House talk anymore of creating a "new world order," unless in jest. The United States cannot achieve order in its streets or even in its capital, much less in the rest of the world. Staggered by an economic downturn that has taken a deeper psychological toll than expected and frustrated by a paralysis in its politics, the United States toward the end of 1991 turned increasingly pessimistic, inward and nationalistic. Its secretary of state could still bring recalcitrant leaders from the Middle East into face-to-face conversations, but its president had so much trouble corralling the leaders of his nation's political parties that he began wobbling in foreign policy. From the campaign trail politicians who were misreading the public mood—and who also knew better—began whipping up the winds of a new isolationism. Insistent cries came along that the nation should embrace a new philosophy of putting America first: turn a hard, flinty eye toward economic competitors, said its advocates, and curtail the long tradition of generous idealism in foreign policy. As troubles spread in America, other powers began edging away from its orbit. In Japan the press was intrigued by the sudden popularity of *kenbei*—a feeling of condescension toward America—while in Europe leaders

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gathered in Maastricht without thinking twice about any interest the United States might have in their deliberations.

In a world where the outlook changes as often as the weather the question arises whether we shall ever again see a replay of early 1991, America the ascendant, or if that was the last gasp of a great nation visibly and sourly slipping? Will the United States during the 1990s still seek to build a new international regime, or will it slink away into a new isolationism? Will it remain an agent of openness and change, or will it close both its wallet and its borders?

No one can be certain, of course, but there were enough clues in the months leading up to the Persian Gulf crisis and afterwards to suggest that with the Cold War's end, domestic politics will become a much more significant factor in the formation of foreign policy and will increasingly drive the United States toward a new world role that fits neither extreme. When the recession is over tempers presumably will improve, and Americans will better appreciate that they remain the predominant military, political, economic and cultural force in the world. They will want to stay engaged internationally, they will still be capable of rallying against an international menace like Saddam Hussein and their diplomats will continue to mediate international disputes. As President Bush demonstrated in the Persian Gulf, a resourceful president may also have occasional latitude to organize international coalitions that command support at home.

Yet the tangle of domestic problems is so thick and enduring that economic growth may be disappointing and will exercise a restraining hand on the foreign policy activism of earlier days. While it remains rich, the country will think and act as if it is poor, choosing not to accept as idealistic and expensive a role as it has played in international affairs over the past 45 years. Absent a direct challenge to its national interest Washington will be more reluctant to assert its leadership in quelling dangerous conflicts—a pattern already begun with Yugoslavia. (Ironically, it was an American diplomat from an earlier administration, former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who was making one of the largest contributions toward peace there.) In its economic relationships, especially with Asia, the country will be tougher and more demanding. The standard by which policies will be judged will be much less of "What's in it for the world?" than "What's in it for us?"

In short even though the political candidates who espouse

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"America First" are unlikely to beat George Bush in 1992, their influence will linger. America seems destined to scale back its traditional role of international leadership even as it asserts a harder-edged policy of self-interest. It will be a superpower, but a most reluctant one. And if it fails to resolve its internal crises the face it turns toward the world will become very surly indeed.

II

America's movement away from its former activism in international affairs actually began in the late 1980s, so that the crisis in the Persian Gulf constituted a brief, albeit spectacular, interruption. The change in direction was due in part to the well-understood differences between Ronald Reagan and George Bush.

President Reagan always considered himself a crusader, whether he was pursuing the most massive buildup of armaments in history or the most complete build down of nuclear weapons that history has known. He was determined to roll back the "evil empire" and to knock down the Wall that cemented it together. President Bush, in contrast, shies away from grand schemes, preferring to solve problems and seize opportunities as they ripen. He underestimates his own capacity as a communicator, so that he rarely seeks to mobilize a public march. Yet with an intimate knowledge of other leaders and the world's largest Rolodex, he happily assembles fraternities of nations to achieve concrete short-term goals. The net result is that under President Bush the administration has been eager to act when a specific challenge arises but has had much less interest in thinking through and molding the future. For planning purposes its long-term horizon seems no more than a year. While the disintegration of the Soviet Union commands the president's attention, as does a violation of the old order in the Middle East, little thought is given to forging a new long-term partnership with Japan or shoring up the fragile democracies of eastern Europe. The Bush administration has been far more adept at cleaning up the debris of an old world than building the framework of the new.

But more than the personality of George Bush was involved in America's scaling back during the late 1980s. As the Cold War wound down during the final days of the Reagan administration, most Americans were weary of the commitments their nation had carried for more than forty years and were

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eager to share them more fully with others. Burden-sharing became a battle cry in Congress, as members on both sides of the aisle lobbied for U.S. troops to begin coming home and pushed Europe and Japan to pay for more of those troops' expenses. Feeling hard-pressed financially Americans were also suffering from "compassion fatigue" in their willingness to help developing nations.

A 1989 national poll by the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press found that an astonishing 50 percent of the American public believed that foreign aid had become the largest single item in the federal budget, and they were demanding foreign aid cuts, along with reductions in domestic welfare. In fact foreign aid, including both economic and military assistance, had fallen to 0.21 percent of U.S. GNP in 1990, about three-fifths of what it was during the 1960s, and the United States had sunk to last place among the seven leading industrialized nations in the share of its economy devoted to overseas assistance.

In 1990 the Bush administration asked for only paltry sums to assist the fledgling democracies of eastern Europe; its original request amounted to only $2.60 per Polish citizen. A Democratically controlled Congress forced larger commitments, but even so the U.S. package of $500 million was less than one-twelfth of what Germany provided. South Korea gave more money to Hungary than did the United States, and eastern Europe was treated as a second- or third-tier problem by the State Department.

Once the leader in international population control, America was so internally torn by the abortion issue during the 1980s that under Presidents Reagan and Bush it nearly cut off funds for population-control efforts by the United Nations and International Planned Parenthood. Moreover, despite America's claim that it gave birth to the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s, other nations had to drag the Bush administration into a more ambitious campaign against ozone depletion. Indeed over the past two years America has been widely criticized in Europe and Japan as a major obstacle to a treaty on global warming.

Even in international trade, where the United States was for forty years the principal advocate of a liberal regime, recent trends have been worrisome. President Reagan was a strong apostle of free trade, but a 1989 study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development found that during

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the 1980s most industrialized nations—including Japan—moved toward lower barriers, while the United States had the worst record for erecting new ones. During the Bush administration U.S. Special Trade Representative Carla Hills has pushed tirelessly for a successful General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) treaty, but others in the administration have broadly hinted that the United States will join the move toward regional trading blocs.

III

Saddam Hussein was among those closely watching the first tentative steps toward a reduced American role, and it is not wholly surprising that when he sent his troops into Kuwait in August 1990 he apparently thought the United States would allow him free passage. Had he not menaced Saudi Arabia as well, he might have been right. Indeed President Bush himself told the press the morning after the invasion that he was "not contemplating" the use of U.S. troops despite a Kuwaiti appeal. As stakes became clearer and friends weighed in from overseas, however, the president quickly stiffened and began rallying both his own country and others around the world.

The U.S. response—its largest military mission since the Vietnam War and one that enjoyed enormous support at home—was such a major departure from the country's behavior that it is worth considering the domestic side of the Persian Gulf conflict in greater detail. The success of the White House in mobilizing the country tells a good deal about those kinds of overseas ventures that are still politically tenable for the United States and about the kind of power the president retains. In retrospect there were three features to the gulf crisis that explain why the country was so enthusiastic about the U.S. role in the war.

First, in contrast to most other foreign policy threats Americans could readily see that Saddam's invasion posed a clear and present danger to their own well-being. Most Americans now understand that OPEC's interference with oil prices in the 1970s not only caused two recessions and long gas lines but also marked a turning point in the American living standard. For a quarter century after World War II average wages in the United States were on a steady upward escalator. But after OPEC ratcheted up oil prices in 1973 that escalator came to a halt, and it has been stalled ever since. Thus Americans hardly had to be reminded that if Saddam advanced into Saudi

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Arabia—gaining control over more than 40 percent of world oil supplies—he would disrupt their lives and might cost them their jobs. Never mind that if the United States had a serious energy policy in place it would not seem so threatened. The policy for ensuring a reliable flow of oil from the Middle East to the United States boiled down to four words: send in the troops.

The public was not eager to fight in those early days of August, but it fully agreed with the president that it was worth putting a force on the ground in order to block an Iraqi takeover of Saudi Arabia. Over 70 percent of the public immediately supported Bush when he announced the first deployment, and large majorities backed him throughout the ensuing crisis. Everett Carll Ladd, executive director of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, wrote in September: "In the 45 years since World War II, I can find no other instance when so large a segment of the public has endorsed committing U.S. troops prior to their actual engagement."

Second, the president wisely decided to internationalize the opposition to Iraq. While it was obvious that the United States was calling the shots, the fact that the U.N. Security Council gave its blessing to American policy at each step along the way provided a stamp of international legitimacy—one that was highly influential with the American Congress and public. The fact that other members of the coalition were willing to defray the costs borne by U.S. taxpayers also made the effort much more appealing. Many in the foreign policy establishment, such as former Secretary of State George Shultz, have decried the spectacle of Secretary James A. Baker carrying a tin cup from capital to capital. But had no collection been made, it is highly unlikely that Congress would have authorized the use of force. In their new mood neither the Congress nor the public is willing to go it alone on a major commitment in foreign policy: they insist that friends come along for the ride and pay full fare.

Third, by successfully mobilizing an international coalition and by taking a series of bold decisive steps overseas at critical points during the crisis, the president amassed enough authority to overwhelm all potential domestic opposition. He provided a textbook case of how, in the right circumstances, a skillful president can still use the powers of his office to marshal domestic support for a foreign venture.

President Bush even made it look easy, as he was far more

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preoccupied with managing the international dimensions of the crisis than the array of forces at home. Congress, public opinion and the press were usually afterthoughts for him—problems to be addressed after making difficult military choices about Saddam, people to think about after exhausting his international phone directory. As is often the case with the Bush presidency, domestic management by the administration was sometimes maladroit, too; it rarely inspired with rhetoric, frequently seemed uncertain of purpose and lacked the sure, deft touch the president showed abroad. Yet, by the end of the ground war in late February, Bush had achieved almost as complete a mastery of the domestic scene as of the foreign.

Again and again Bush practically ignored Capitol Hill as he made his decisions. While the administration spoke positively of consultation with Congress, it engaged only in notification—and usually after the fact. The president is an easy, affable man, but he is also secretive and likes to rely upon a closed circle, even within the executive branch. He is disinclined to trust Congress on sensitive foreign policy questions because he thinks it incapable of keeping a secret and, worse, that it is infected with partisanship. Divided government has taken a heavy toll on comity between the branches. In the six months of the gulf crisis, Democratic leaders of the Senate and House of Representatives had less influence upon the Bush White House than Margaret Thatcher, who resigned as British prime minister in November 1990, or Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to Washington.

The pattern of ignoring Congress until the last minute was set in the early days of the crisis. When President Bush announced the first deployment of U.S. troops on August 6, 1990, four days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Senate Majority leader George Mitchell (D-Me.) and Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, both said they learned of the decision after the fact. Because Congress left Washington in early August for its summer recess, it was also out of the picture during a crucial month when the administration was building an international framework for much of what followed. On October 30, 1990, the White House reached a second milestone in the crisis when the president decided to double the U.S. troop commitment. Again Congress was not seriously consulted, and President Bush even

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decided to withhold public disclosure until two days after the congressional elections.

This time Senator Nunn erupted, as he was first informed of the decision only an hour before its announcement and, because he was called on a public telephone at a restaurant, was not even afforded the courtesy of a confidential conversation with Defense Secretary Dick Cheney. Senator Nunn felt the decision contravened earlier assurances he had received that the United States would rely primarily upon air power, and he soon called for public hearings that consequently almost turned the tide of congressional opinion against the president in December. A presidential adviser later admitted that "we screwed up" the consultation process. Democratic opposition was heightened by the president's vulnerability over raising taxes and by off-year election losses, so that in mid-November, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) warned, "If George Bush wants his presidency to die in the Arabian desert, he's going at it very steadily."

Thereafter the White House paid more attention to Congress and to its dwindling support in public opinion polls as it undertook the third stage of the crisis: passage of U.N. resolution 678 by the Security Council, authorizing military force against Saddam unless he evacuated Kuwait by January 15, 1991. The primary purpose of the resolution was to evict Saddam and bind together the international coalition. But as Secretary Baker privately pointed out inside the administration, passage would make it almost impossible for Congress to reject the use of force. In effect the White House was boxing in Congress, leaving it only two options: go along with a huge international coalition against Iraq or pull the plug and let the United States suffer a devastating defeat.

President Bush realized over the Christmas holidays a year ago that he would have to secure a favorable vote from Congress in order to keep the country behind him in a war. But in gaining Security Council backing of the resolution and in continuing to show a willingness to talk with Iraq, he broke the back of his domestic opposition. In the end the vote in both chambers was relatively close, so close that the 52–47 favorable margin in the Senate was the smallest approval rating that body had given to a U.S. military action since the War of 1812. Even when cornered by the president and when U.S. interests were so clearly affected, Congress almost denied the White

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House authority to use force—a fact that underscored how reluctant a superpower the United States was becoming.

The public was much more militant about Saddam Hussein than its elected representatives and thus more prepared to follow the president's lead. To illustrate the difference: in mid-November, after the president announced a doubling of troops, support for his policies slipped badly. Democrats in Congress accused him of rushing into war, but public polls showed that most of his opposition came from people who thought he was moving too slowly to remove Saddam. That hard-line feeling surfaced again at the end of the war, when many Americans felt the fighting ended too soon and that the coalition should have forced Saddam from power.

Just as he had with Congress, President Bush cleverly influenced public opinion at home by first mobilizing support overseas and then taking clear, decisive actions that changed the terms of debate. As Krauthammer noted at the time: "Bush managed to rally a reluctant nation to a successful war not with inspiring words or soaring visions, but with a series of shrewd and forcing actions." In August 1990, when the president imposed economic sanctions, he won enormous public support, yet 56 percent of the respondents told a Gallup poll they opposed sending troops. After Bush then sent the troops—on the assertion that they were part of an international force and were only meant to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia—81 percent expressed approval. That the administration's spokesmen offered a "rationale du jour" for their policies—creating confusion about their ultimate goals—was less important than that Bush, through his actions, established "new facts" that prompted the public to line up behind him.

During the fall of 1990 most Americans were anxious to avoid a shooting war, but after the White House gained passage of resolution 678 and set January 15, 1991, as an endpoint for negotiations, the public's willingness to use force rose sharply, reaching 75 percent in an ABC-*Washington Post* poll on January 9. Similarly, a CBS-*New York Times* poll found in February that only 11 percent of Americans favored a ground attack, but the day after the coalition forces launched their assault, 75 percent approved. The clear lesson is that strong, clear-cut and well-conceived presidential initiatives, especially those taken in partnership with other nations, can transform public opinion in favor of the White House. Public opinion often dictates the outer limits of policy, but in the right

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circumstances and with forceful leadership a president can occasionally break out of its constraints.

It is arguable how much of a lesson the gulf crisis holds for the willingness of the United States to commit its forces to defeat future aggression or to undertake a conventional war. Many believe that the Gulf War is *sui generis*, that the United States would never have intervened but for the unique circumstances of that region and its oil, and certainly would never have fought if Kuwait had grown broccoli. Thus, it is said, the war has no relevance beyond its own terms. Others worry that the war will make the United States more trigger happy, so that if economic difficulties persist, the country may enjoy lashing out occasionally, just as the economic depression of the early 1890s was but a prelude to the jingoism of a "splendid little war" against the Spanish later in the decade.

Both arguments overstate the case. Evidence from public opinion polls and from the political dialogue since the war suggests that the victory did dispel the "Vietnam syndrome" so that Americans are more self-confident about winning future conflicts without major loss of life and therefore may be more willing to fight. But the nation's economic difficulties and reductions in its military strength will both be restraining influences. The upshot from the war, then, is that the United States may threaten military action more often but it is likely to unsheathe its sword only when truly vital interests are at stake.

IV

In the months that followed the Gulf War, President Bush triumphantly rode the crest of victory, but it was probably a shorter ride than he imagined. Public esteem for his competence in foreign policy, as well as for his overall performance as president, rose to extraordinary heights. Not since the end of World War II had so many Americans, some 90 percent, given their president such heartfelt approval. Far more than the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which stirred only modest hurrahs (the viewing audience for American network news programs actually fell when that story broke), the Gulf War seemed to mean a magical restoration of America's greatness. That Saddam remained in power and that the United States at first stayed on the sidelines as his troops smothered Kurdish and Shiite uprisings did little to take the sheen off the war for the public. Six months after the conflict some 75 percent of

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those polled continued to think that the war had been worth it and that the United States had scored a big win.

Democrats in Congress were completely cowed. Four-fifths in the Senate and two-thirds in the House had voted against authorization of force, and many saw their political standing fall sharply in their constituencies. President Bush soon won congressional support on two issues that probably would have failed if members had voted in the dark: approval of fast-track authority to negotiate both a free trade accord with Mexico and to wind up the GATT negotiations and, secondly, extension of most-favored-nation status for China. Anxious not to appear weak on defense, Congress also lowered its voice on the Pentagon budget, giving the president most of what he wanted before year's end and bolstering many of the weapons systems that seemed most promising after the war, particularly SDI.

Robert Gates, whom many in the press counted out because of the Iran-contra affair, was forced to undergo a prolonged, 26-week examination before becoming CIA director (the entire Soviet empire collapsed between the time of nomination and confirmation, he quipped), but the final Senate tally in his favor was a resounding 64–31.

The surprise is that the president, his power at full bloom, chose to exploit his victory for so little beyond the agenda already planned. In foreign affairs President Bush and Secretary Baker did seize the moment to push for face-to-face negotiations between Arabs and Israelis, and success in those talks would obviously become a dramatic accomplishment of the Bush years. Washington also bolstered security arrangements in the gulf and, without saying much publicly, gained assurances of good commercial relations with states in the area in both oil and trade. The war, however, seemed to have little spillover effect upon relations with Europe or with the Soviet Union and, in the case of Japan, contributed to a new deterioration in relations, especially among many Japanese who were offended by U.S. demands during the conflict. The United States also had hoped that the war would lead to a major breakthrough in curbing proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, but momentum on that front had slowed by the end of the year.

On the domestic side a president with such unprecedented popularity could have secured passage of a sweeping new set of initiatives, but President Bush asked only that Congress enact crime and transportation measures submitted earlier, a

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request so modest that it suggested the lack of a serious agenda. Had he chosen, the president could probably have used his new leverage to push through both an economic and energy package. He could, for example, have convinced both the public and his own party that the country needed a sizeable increase in gasoline taxes in order to become more independent of foreign energy sources.

After victories in the Cold War and the Gulf War the president also had an important opening to rebuild a bipartisan consensus in foreign policy. Such a consensus was enormously valuable to U.S. policymakers in the formative years after World War II but was lost, of course, in the jungles of Vietnam. With the Soviet menace disappearing and the United States once again alone at the pinnacle, the Bush administration had an opportunity to articulate a new centrist framework for the 1990s that would have commanded the support of both political parties. Having been on the wrong side of history in the Gulf War, liberal Democrats were in no position to challenge the president if he had called for a strong internationalist policy. Conservative Republicans, no longer preoccupied with the communist threat, were also prepared to follow the president's lead in redefining America's security interests.

In his frequent incantations of a "new world order," President Bush seemed on the verge of setting forth a new set of doctrines for U.S. policy, and the White House even announced that he would give four commencement addresses in the spring of 1991 fleshing out his vision. Because his staff felt that public debate over a new order was spinning beyond control, however, the president gave only one of the addresses and then pulled back, returning to a more comfortable, day-to-day management of foreign affairs. In the early fall he did set forth an ambitious plan for reducing nuclear armaments, which won justifiable praise both at home and abroad. But the "new world order" seemed destined to become no more than a campaign slogan for 1992. A rare moment of opportunity had passed.

By the mid-fall of 1991, only seven months after the crisis ended in the Persian Gulf, domestic problems were building up so quickly that they were wiping away memories of the war, and the president's power was slipping away from him. The political turning point came in November when a little-known Democrat in Pennsylvania shellacked the state's best-known Republican in a Senate race that was widely seen as a referen-

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dum on the Bush administration. Emphasizing a theme of "taking care of our own," Democrat Harris Wofford scored heavily with a television advertisement that said: "We shouldn't put American jobs on a fast track to Mexico or a slow boat to China." Wofford's victory traumatized the White House and convinced Democrats in Washington that they could frontally attack Bush on foreign policy. Democratic presidential contenders, tapping into growing economic fears, denounced the president for spending too much time on foreign affairs while neglecting domestic problems. Their speeches were reminiscent of Congressman Richard Gephardt's call for a new economic nationalism in the last presidential campaign. That appeal met with only limited success in 1988 but in recessionary times was striking a deeper chord within the populace.

Meanwhile the president faced a growing rebellion on his right flank that also spelled trouble in foreign affairs. Patrick Buchanan, a conservative journalist who once worked for Presidents Nixon and Reagan, declared his candidacy against Bush for the GOP nomination with a thunderous appeal for a new isolationism: bring home U.S. troops; stay out of foreign wars; eliminate foreign aid; end support for the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; treat Japan and Europe as economic predators and concentrate on "America First." David Duke, a Louisiana extremist who has become a permanent (and embarrassing) candidate for Republican office, also began to challenge President Bush with appeals to underlying racism and nativism. Neither man will defeat the president, but they will give greater legitimacy to fears and prejudices seething below the surface.

So hot were the political winds blowing through Washington that in the closing weeks before the winter recess, Congress as well as the White House began a series of tactical retreats in foreign policy. After a spirited debate over the country's domestic needs Congress killed the annual foreign aid bill, postponing final consideration until 1992 when election year politics could jeopardize both it and a variety of other overseas assistance programs. Foreign aid, never popular among Republicans in Congress, has depended for survival upon Democratic votes. But in the new economic atmosphere many Democrats want to freeze or reduce it in size.

The constraints upon policy were well illustrated in the fall of 1991 when Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wisc.), chairman of

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the House Armed Services Committee, introduced legislation to divert $1 billion from defense spending to help in a peaceful transition in the Soviet Union. His initiative was first squelched by both Congress and the administration. Only after the CIA and visiting Russian leaders privately warned Congress of impending chaos, including the possible overthrow of both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, did Washington enact a stripped down version of the Aspin bill. Proposals also sprouted in Congress for tougher trade laws, aimed especially at Japan and China, and the likelihood has grown that Congress will become more protectionist in the next few years.

If anything the slump in the economy and in the president's popularity in late 1991 threw the White House into more of a tumult than Congress. Hours after the Wofford election victory in Pennsylvania, President Bush held a dawn news conference to announce postponement of his trip to Asia; his foreign policy advisers complained privately that the "political people" made the trip decision without consulting them. A few days later top officials spread the word that negotiations with Mexico over free trade, a favorite target of American labor, would be slowed and that Senate consideration of a treaty would probably be delayed until after the 1992 elections. The White House also ducked the initial debate over emergency help for the Soviets and refused to say whether it would spend the money allocated by Congress. In December Secretary Baker did call for a greater effort by the industrialized nations to assist the former Soviet republics and invited America's partners to Washington to arrange better coordination. But it was clear that any new funds from the United States would be limited to scraps left over after adoption of an anti-recession package. As if to symbolize the new mood, the year ended as President Bush revived his trip to Japan. But, his bearings lost, the president turned it into an ill-fated quest for managed trade. The opportunity for building a new partnership with Japan was missed, and economic nationalism was clearly in the saddle in Washington.

To an outside observer it must not have seemed the same country that only a few months earlier stood as a world colossus. Indeed how could anyone be sure that if hard times persisted America would ever again be a strong, effective leader in world affairs?

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v

Numerous polls during 1991 indicated that in trying to placate the electorate with their retreats toward neo-isolationism, politicians in Washington were actually misreading public sentiment. As the glow of the Gulf War faded and fears spread about the economy, the polls showed that Americans were indeed becoming discouraged about the nation's future, nervous about protecting their jobs and health care, and anxious that the president end his preoccupation with foreign affairs. There is a fine line, however, between shifting to a greater emphasis upon solving domestic problems and precipitously pulling back from the world, as many politicians advocated. The first course is wise; the second invites catastrophe. While most voters want government to do more to help them economically and less to help others overseas, they have not yet embraced full-blown isolationism, protectionism or nativism. It is the politicians who have often strayed to the other side. The "America First" theme on the campaign stump means something different to most voters than it does to candidates like Buchanan and Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa).

Opinion surveys show that a majority of Americans, at least for now, would like the United States to remain actively involved in international affairs but want others to share more of the burden and also want the United States to be more hard-nosed in advancing America's economic interests. The Potomac Associates, headed by William Watts, has asked a series of questions since 1964 designed to test internationalism versus isolationism in U.S. public opinion. A survey in October 1991 found that 54 percent of those sampled qualified as total internationalists, compared to 14 percent who were total isolationists. The results reflected only modest changes since 1985 and were much less isolationist than in 1976, when defeat in Vietnam had brought a more serious inward turn (the 1976 results: 44 percent internationalist, 23 percent isolationist). Similarly the Gallup Organization has for the past 44 years asked Americans whether they want the country "to take an active part in world affairs." Some 60–70 percent have responded positively, and this past fall 71 percent said yes—the highest figure recorded in 26 years.

Most Americans realize that American prosperity and job security have come to depend heavily upon trade. Over 40 percent of U.S. economic growth in the past four years and the

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creation of at least two million jobs are attributable to increases in U.S. exports.

In the wake of the Gulf War public support has also increased for solving international problems through the United Nations and other international bodies, rather than relying upon unilateral American leadership. A *Time* magazine poll in March 1991 found that 75 percent were opposed to the United States playing world policeman. Americans Talk Issues, an organization that has plumbed opinion about security questions more deeply than anyone else in recent years, found that 80 percent of the public thought the United Nations should take the lead when aggression occurs. A survey in October 1991 by the CBS-*New York Times* news organizations found two-thirds approved of the United Nations, the highest level of support in surveys they have taken since 1953. Clearly Americans want to shed their role as chief and almost sole protector of international order, but they recognize that the world still has problems—terrorism, thuggery, environmental degradation—and they are more prepared than in the past to cooperate in multilateral solutions.

The Soviet threat has disappeared so quickly that it is difficult to gauge public sentiment on defense spending. The polls suggest that the mass public, apparently still wary of another Saddam or a takeover by hard-liners in Moscow, is more cautious than elite opinion in supporting deep defense cuts. A CBS-*New York Times* survey in October 1991 found that 52 percent wanted to keep defense spending the same, far more than thought it should be cut. However, other polls, including a survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, have found that most Americans also want sharp reductions in U.S. troop levels in Europe and elsewhere overseas.

The most striking changes in American public opinion are the growing fears that the United States is rapidly losing its economic dominance and that Japan is overtaking it. When CBS asked respondents in 1989 which country would be the number one power in the world in the next century, 47 percent named the United States and 38 percent singled out Japan. When CBS-*New York Times* surveyors posed the same question in October 1991, only 25 percent chose the United States and 58 percent named Japan—a 41 percent swing in only four years.

While most Americans tend to place primary blame upon themselves for their reversal of fortune and profess admira-

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tion for the Japanese, they also believe that the Japanese and others are getting ahead through unfair economic practices. As a consequence, they are demanding that their government become less assertive in protecting others and more assertive in protecting the United States, especially its economic interests. The public told pollsters from the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations that the most important priorities of U.S. foreign policy should be, first, protecting jobs of American workers; second, protecting the interests of American workers abroad; and third, securing adequate supplies of energy. Defending allies, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and advancing human rights were seen as less important. Helping to spread democracy to other nations was 15th on a list of 15 priorities.

VI

Most analyses of U.S. security in a dramatically changing world begin with a tour d'horizon of the threats and opportunities beyond American shores and extrapolate from that a prescription for policy. The events of 1991 suggest that to a far larger extent than during the Cold War, political dynamics within the nation will define its foreign policy. A recession, sinking public confidence in government and a depleted federal treasury had as much influence over policy toward the end of the year as Saddam Hussein had at the beginning. Unless more Saddams appear out of the overseas mist to endanger the nation's vital interests, the continuing, deep-seated domestic problems of the United States are likely to make it more reluctant as an international leader but more assertive in its nationalism.

Constraints upon financial resources for foreign affairs will become even more severe in the next several years. Adding up its defense expenditures and its economic and military assistance to other nations, the United States now spends about six percent of its GNP to protect the international order. That figure has been steadily declining from a peak of nearly seven percent in 1985 and was expected by the Bush administration to fall to about 3.7 percent by the mid-1990s, the lowest level since 1939. With domestic pressures mounting for steeper cuts in defense and foreign aid, however, it is probably more realistic to assume that the figure will fall to three percent during the 1990s. Under such constraints the United States will have great difficulty undertaking any expensive new

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initiative in foreign affairs unless it is an emergency measure to protect the homeland. Even now, as the democracies of eastern Europe grow more fragile, Washington talks of cutting rather than increasing U.S. assistance. Only a handful of Democrats, such as presidential candidate Bill Clinton of Arkansas, have bucked the tide, calling for more support of democracy movements. The unwillingness to provide more than token assistance to the peoples of the former Soviet Union will almost surely continue, as will the desire to leave western Europe with responsibility for quelling conflicts in nearby countries to the east. Nor can one expect the United States to be an active leader in preserving the global environment, curbing the population explosion or addressing poverty in developing nations. It is a measure of how much the U.S. role has changed that in the late 1940s, against the popular will, President Truman could successfully launch a Marshall Plan that equalled 1.1 percent of American GNP, but that anyone who talks of a new Marshall Plan for anything today—even to rescue the nation's cities—is regarded as a village idiot.

While discouraging, the reluctance to be an active superpower still leaves room for constructive action in the near term, especially for actions undertaken in cooperation with other nations. A newly elected president, whether Bush or his Democratic opponent, would carry enough support into 1993 to erect a multinational security and economic system in the Pacific, so long as responsibility and costs were both small and shared. The executive branch also retains enormous latitude at home to negotiate peace settlements in places such as the Middle East and Cambodia, though Congress might balk at any further extensions of American military guarantees. As noted earlier the public would also like to see a strengthening of the United Nations and would no doubt support the formation of a U.N. rapid deployment force as well as new multinational efforts to curb proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. A proposal for the United Nations to impose a tax on international arms sales—with proceeds to go for humanitarian purposes—also enjoys public support. While the labor movement is gaining strength in its opposition to free trade with Mexico, the White House should also be able to convince the public and in turn Congress that an agreement will ultimately create more jobs in the United States and will thus serve America's self interest.

If the nation fails to address its more fundamental domestic

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needs, however, this window of opportunity for constructive internationalism will gradually close. Both the will and the capacity of the nation to undertake new commitments, even ones embedded in multinational arrangements, will diminish sharply if the U.S. economy stagnates during the next five years. There is thus some urgency to move ahead in laying the foundations of a new enlightened foreign policy while the public will still support it. But there is even greater urgency to address the internal crisis of the United States.

Unless the nation embarks upon a comprehensive program of domestic renewal, the United States within a few years could become so deeply mired in its own troubles that its politics will turn even more embittered, xenophobic and inward. The specter of neo-isolationism that raised its head in late 1991 will then be but a precursor of worse to come, as reluctance to act as a leader turns into outright refusal, and international politics becomes a bare-knuckled brawl.

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Lawrence Freedman

ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW WORLD

The United States has attained an international preeminence beyond challenge. As leader of the West during the years of confrontation with the Soviet bloc and, most recently, of the international coalition ranged against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, it is now well placed to define both the character of this new stage in international history and the West's role within it. Yet that task is proving to be extremely difficult and perplexing. Events since the conclusion of the Gulf War have qualified confidence in the ability of the United States and its allies to shape the future according to their values and interests. The task has become too frustrating and unrewarding. It has to be justified by a sense of responsibility as much as strategic necessity, but the nature of the responsibility still lacks clarity.

This is the year in which President Bush will need to justify an activist foreign policy if he is to be reelected. He must do this against those in his own party who are raising old isolationist banners and Democratic opponents who sense a popular theme in the proposition that, with the evaporation of the Soviet threat, it is now time to concentrate on the multiple domestic problems of the United States. The peace dividend is still eagerly anticipated, along with the associated and enticing prospect of a quiet life.

II

West European leaders profess to worry about an increasing introspection in American policy. They know that if events take a dramatic turn for the worse they will find it difficult to manage on their own. Yet there is also the thought that without the Soviet threat European security problems might be manageable without calls on Washington for assistance. That was the implication of the agreements on defense and foreign policy reached at the December 1991 European Community (EC) summit at Maastricht. These were carefully

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framed so as not to suggest an alternative to the Atlantic connection, but they did allow for a greater range of continental problems to be handled by the Community before handing them over to other institutions.

Maastricht also indicated another reason why a west European response to American introspection might be equivocal: the members of the Community are going through an introspective phase themselves. On the one hand, the language of the Maastricht communiqués holds out the possibility of eventual EC membership to the newly liberated east European states. At the same time a not-too-implicit motive of the 12-nation Community is to maintain speedy progress toward full economic, monetary and political union and keep this project firmly on track—the risk being derailment caused by growing disruption in the east.

In the past the United States warned its European allies about the dangers of parochialism and urged the West as a whole to follow a more global approach to security questions. That was a more straightforward proposition when the West confronted a strategic opponent also capable of operating on a global scale. Following the loss of such an opponent no organizing principle has been identified as a replacement. Nonetheless the United States continues to put forward a global vision as the basis for the next stage of international politics.

The slogan for this vision is the "new world order," proclaimed by President Bush during the early stages of the gulf crisis. He asserted that a set of opportunities for more harmonious and cooperative international affairs—made possible by the end of the Cold War—had been put at risk by Iraq's act of blatant illegality. Despite the mockery and cynicism to which this slogan has been subjected, it seems as if it will last. To the current American administration it still conveys an appealing sense of international progress. It has become equally useful for critics: the persistence of old political vices is highlighted by reference to the virtue promised by "new"; selectivity when taking decisive action in support of international law is shown up by the universalist promise of "world"; while the prevalent disorder in so many regions contrasts neatly with the hopes for stability implied by "order."

Certainly if the "new world order" is supposed to mean the triumph of liberalism and free markets, the rule of international law and an era of peace and prosperity, then the

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performance will be found wanting against the ideal. There are, however, two other interpretations that require more careful attention. The first is that the slogan reflects a presumption that international institutions and, in particular, the United Nations, will be taking a more active and important role in global management. This is reflected in many of the specific proposals put forward by the Bush administration to turn the vision of a new world order into a reality. In this sense the gulf experience may have been misleading.

The nature of that challenge to the most elemental principle of international law required an international response, and one was forthcoming. The United Nations worked as well as it ever had, and the crisis was followed by continued international supervision of Iraq, an international effort on the Arab-Israeli dispute and discussions among the five permanent members of the Security Council on the arms trade. The international stakes in future conflicts, however, may not be so self-evident and external involvement less easily attainable, except when the belligerents have exhausted themselves and are ready for a peacekeeping operation. Indeed the most striking feature of the global scene is its complex and untidy nature, so defying attempts to make sense of it through neat categories and simple formulas.

This suggests—on the second interpretation—that the phrase "new world order" is merely descriptive, requiring no more than acceptance that the current situation is unique and clearly different in critical respects from the one that obtained just a few years ago. Instead of self-serving optimism, this use requires recognition of the need for some framework to help make sense of the "new order" and guide efforts to shape it.

A starting point for this attempt should be recognition that the current situation represents as much a continuation of the post-1945 trend of decolonization as a sharp break with the Cold War. Traditional balance of power models are not much help, for there is now a marked lack of a clear strategic imperative to inform the policies of the remaining great powers. The major policy question increasingly concerns the appropriate approach for the relatively prosperous and ordered societies of the West toward poverty and disorder elsewhere. Without a strategic imperative the United States will feel increasingly able to limit rather than extend its international liabilities.

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III

The previous order was frequently described in terms of bipolarity. The two poles were the superpowers to which all other states were obliged to relate for security purposes. Because neither pole could defeat the other, their antagonism could not be resolved and so acquired a sense of permanence. The global reach of both superpowers, and their tendency to interpret developments in all regions in terms of their underlying antagonism, resulted in bipolarity coming to be held as the defining feature of the contemporary international system.

In Europe, where it was first established, bipolarity depended on a military equilibrium between two opposed forms of social organization. The unusually rigid balance of power produced by bipolarity provided a welcome contrast with the much more fluid balances of previous eras, which had ended in catastrophic wars. Bipolarity, however, was upset as a result of the dynamics of internal change in a key component. The postwar order contained the seeds of its own destruction, for it depended on the continuity of a system—the communist bloc—that was not only repressive but also chronically inefficient.

So long as the bipolar political framework appeared durable, security focused on the military aspects of the equilibrium. There was good reason to believe that fear of nuclear war was an important source of stability. It encouraged toleration of an inconclusive standoff as opposed to high risk attempts to resolve the fundamental ideological conflict. In this way nuclear weapons helped to regulate the consequences of dynamic change. But they could do nothing about the internal threats to the Soviet state; its subsequent breakup poses the greatest challenge yet to the regulatory system for nuclear weapons, a context rarely mentioned in all the voluminous literature on nuclear stability. That literature tended toward an apolitical version of stability, based on the need to remove incentives for first strikes or the possibility of accidental launches. Confidence in bipolarity had been reinforced because of a preoccupation with the wrong source of instability.

The determination in both Washington and Moscow to prevent the logic of confrontation from leading to a catastrophic conclusion meant that the bipolar system depended on tacit cooperation and understandings as much as pure antagonism. Outside Europe bipolarity's influence had been

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declining steadily. For a while bipolarity was pervasive and shaped the politics of many regions, but gradually this became less true as a result of the inexorable processes of decolonization.

The 1950s saw the first celebration of "nonalignment" as an explicit attempt to escape from the logic of bipolarity. In the 1960s more regimes were released from colonization and, with others, sought to assert their independence from "imperialism." By the 1970s this trend had been consolidated and was reflected in such developments as the rise of OPEC and the presumption that the East-West confrontation was being superseded by one based on the even greater geographical simplification of "North-South."

The superpowers, meanwhile, were learning the hard way about the dangers of involvement in particular regional conflicts, where each believed it must block a strategic advance by its adversary. In a misguided attempt to take advantage of American hesitation following the Vietnam disaster, the Soviet Union supported a series of notionally left-wing regimes, none able to assert its authority effectively and most a drain on Soviet resources. This culminated in the Afghanistan intervention, which persuaded Moscow thereafter to steer clear of further such commitments. Although the introduction of superpower rivalry into regional conflicts was seen to carry the risk of escalation to something much worse, in practice growing superpower caution meant that this risk declined.

Bipolarity continued to make sense only in Europe, but even there it was coming under severe pressure. At first it appeared that if anything the West would break first as a result of the hard-line policies of the Reagan administration; the determination of West Germany to protect its relations with the East; and the drive by the more enthusiastic members of the EC to create an institution fully competent in defense and foreign policy, as well as trade. However in the mid-1980s, the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union acknowledged the stagnation of the system over which he presided. Mikhail Gorbachev was offering the slogans of perestroika and glasnost, which were designed to promote a reformist option.

The belief in the West that the significance of "new thinking" in the Soviet Union had to be judged against the military balance meant that the security debate tended to be cast in familiar terms. Until the failed Soviet coup of August 1991 it

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was still possible for NATO officials to frame strategy in terms of the dangers of a resurgence of traditional Soviet power.

The Western debates of the early Gorbachev years—over, say, whether successful perestroika would mean simply a more efficient Soviet threat—seem astonishing now if only because of the lack of understanding about the utter rottenness of the state socialist system. The results of reform were predictable: if the centralized command structure was asked to pretend to be a free market, then the outcome would be neither a center nor a market; if the leading role of the Communist Party could not be guaranteed, then it would have no role at all; if the Warsaw Pact were to be held together by consent rather than coercion, then consent would not be forthcoming—and the same also turned out to be true for the Soviet Union itself. In the end the collapse of both political self-confidence and economic control at the center triggered the end of the last European empire.

The start of the 1990s has thus witnessed the culmination of the decolonization process that began at the same time as the Cold War and has now pushed it to one side. Fifteen years after the last Western empire—the Portuguese—collapsed, the post-1945 Soviet acquisitions were liberated, with the finale coming in an implosion of the old Russian Empire. Similar fragmentation is occurring in other postcommunist states, most painfully in Yugoslavia, but potentially also in Czechoslovakia.

From an oasis of stability in an unstable world, Europe has become among the most turbulent of continents. Old states are falling apart and new ones are being created, all sharing economic fragility but varying greatly otherwise in culture, tradition and potential international weight. There is the prospect of isolated famine and mass migration. In some areas violence is becoming endemic and routine. A long-locked cupboard, packed full of old worn ideologies and prejudices, has suddenly burst open. In this way problems that once seemed quintessentially "Third World" are becoming common in Europe. Meanwhile the former Third World is also influenced by these developments.

IV

The conclusion of the postwar program of decolonization transforms all the categories with which international politics are habitually discussed. States that were once bound together by a shared anticolonial impulse now find other issues more

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salient. The banner of "nonalignment" has lost its meaning; the most profound trend has been toward "realignment." Nor does there seem to be much point in talking about the Third World; not only does it contain so many disparate and often conflictual elements but the second world has collapsed. Of the old geopolitical labels only the "West" seems to have any relevance, because the grouping to which it refers still coheres and a high value is placed on close cooperation among its members. One question for the West is whether coherence can be sustained when this quality is so lacking elsewhere.

Bipolarity is an obvious victim of changed circumstances, but so also is the representation of the international system upon which it was based—that of a magnetic field governing the political behavior of the individual state units. With bipolarity all states were drawn to one of two poles, acknowledging that the level of attraction was weak in a number of cases and that other states, through nonalignment, sought to resist the pulls.

Its continuing influence is suggested by the attempt to proclaim a "unipolar" world led by the United States. The United States remains a superpower in military terms, but it occupies a less than commanding role in the international economy. Hence, the unipolar model is dubious; it mistakes the implosion of the Soviet Union for the rise of the United States. But nor do we have multipolarity of the sort mooted in the 1970s, which posited Chinese and possibly OPEC additions to the power structure, with Japan and Western Europe increasingly asserting themselves independently of the United States.

If the magnetic field has been transformed, it is because there are now a number of poles, but grouped closely together so that for many parts of the globe their pull is only faint. The critical consequence of the decline of the Soviet pole is that there is now nothing to attract those states once oriented in its direction; there is no counter pull for those states hitherto suspended somewhere between East and West. All these states must now reorient themselves toward the West, but the Western poles may not be strong enough to provide the necessary sense of direction and political purpose.

The West is now composed of three distinct poles—North America, the European Community and Japan. Contrary to the speculation of some of the gloomier international theorists these still appear to be sources of attraction rather than

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rejection. Each of these poles acts as a regional magnet—the United States for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, Japan for East Asia, and the EC for central and eastern Europe and, to some extent, North Africa.

In each region political life appears no longer as a dialectic between imperialism and national liberation, or capitalism and socialism, but of order and disorder, with the relatively orderly states by and large characterized by liberal democracy and market economies (although one must take care in disentangling cause from effect here) and the disorderly suffering from fragile economies and often deep social and political tensions.

For each Western pole the main priority lies in its own region, where it will feel the most direct effects if disorder takes too strong a hold. This explains the American preoccupation with Central America. It also indicates the challenge for the EC in its encounter with the neighborhood to the east, where there was a rigid order in the past but where now there is increasing instability.

A number of regions lie outside the immediate influence of a Western pole. Some of these are generally well ordered and fully integrated into the international community but others, such as the bulk of Africa, are not. These disconnected areas represent the major losers in the new order, because their appeal to the West has to be made largely on the basis of altruism rather than self-interest. They can no longer play the superpowers off each other. And the ideological basis of the South's earlier demands—for a radical shift of wealth and power from the North—has been weakened by the declining credibility of all socialist interventionism following the failure of its greatest experiment and the continued vitality of the Western economies.

Those countries that sought a socialist route to development found this was a recipe for large, inefficient corrupt bureaucracies and for foreign support for grand capital projects (dams, steel plants and such), but not the growth of enterprise. When they did battle against multinational companies and "selfish" Western countries, they lost. When, for instance, oil producers succeeded temporarily in turning the terms of trade against the major industrial states, they soon realized that their new wealth created a stake in the economic health of those

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industrialized democracies, and they had to moderate their demands accordingly.

The South was never a coherent power bloc with a capacity for serious coercion; it was a rhetorical construct. Anticolonialism was undoubtedly a potent rallying cry, but the experience of colonialism is now more than a generation away in most countries and even further in many others. There is no obvious ideology to take its place, nor for that matter obvious remedies for the multiple problems these countries confront. Institutions in which they could once expect a sympathetic hearing are also now becoming oriented toward the West. During the Gulf War there were regular expressions of unease over the way the United Nations had been co-opted by the Western powers. With diplomatic energy and spare economic resources being directed toward postcommunist Europe, a sense of frustration at international neglect and indifference is growing.

Confused Interests

In practice Western policy toward the former South may be just an extreme version of a developing policy toward the former communist bloc. If there is no pressing need to accept responsibility for the problems of Africa or south Asia, why need it be any different in the Balkans?

The current decolonization is unique in one key respect. When independence was achieved from the old European empires a high priority was given to developing distinctive non-Western political and economic institutions. Now in postcommunist Europe the Western powers provide the inspiration and the model for the decolonizers; it is state socialism that is being rejected.

There is no doubting the Western interest in a successful transition from socialism to capitalism: it is not only ideologically flattering but also opens up new markets and possibilities for growth in the global economy. The spread of democracy should provide a net plus in terms of the management of both regional conflict and conflict within individual states. Failure in this project, if it leads to widespread destitution and conflict, will impose severe strains on the West, with one emergency following another: distress on a massive scale, growing indebtedness, various types and levels of violence, refugees and so on.

What is unclear is at what point such developments might

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raise "vital" interests for the West. The terrible problems faced by many postcolonial states elsewhere are deeply regretted in the West but not to the point where they are accorded a high policy priority. To what extent will mere proximity increase the sense of obligation to the postcommunist states? There is no evident strategic reason, relating to a fundamental threat to the continuity of Western states, why these interests should be deemed truly vital.

This observation has an encouraging as well as a discouraging aspect to it. The lack of a strategic imperative explains why the current situation is different from that of the first decade of the century, with which it is often compared. Then—as now—there were Balkan problems, but then—unlike now—the dominant strategic issue was the tendency of the great powers to enhance their position in the continental balance through intervention, thereby producing the deadly combination of active alliance formation and political instability. There is now no incentive to forge new alliances or take on extra security commitments in any serious form. This lack of interest in expanded commitments figures prominently in the debates within NATO on future membership. NATO is exploring ways of addressing the security concerns of postcommunist states but, in practice, its major contribution to the new order is to freeze the Western alliance system in its 1989 pattern, thereby reducing the risks associated with both an extension of security commitments and of existing allies becoming rivals for strategic influence. The problem in terms of the security concerns of the postcommunist states is not one of excessive great power interest in their affairs but of insufficient interest and confused signals.

The old colonial powers learned about decolonization the hard way. Once they determined that this was an irresistible force and acknowledged that in most regions of the world they were far from immovable objects, they relinquished their empires. Almost with relief they slipped back to the apparently more manageable problems of their own regions. This retreat no longer affords escape; the problems have followed yesterday's colonizers to their doorsteps. They can still recognize the symptoms of chronically weak economies and fragile political institutions and still fear getting sucked into intractable intercommunal quarrels.

There is thus a tension at the heart of Western policy. An understanding of the need to dampen growing disorder on

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the one hand; awareness of the difficulty and risks attached to intervention on the other. When the identification of vital interests has become so problematic, then might vital principles become more reliable guides?

Confused Principles

Identification of "vital principles" as a basis for policy is even more difficult than that of "vital interests." Those who have long asserted that an honorable foreign policy must rest on a firm moral foundation may derive hope from the widespread adherence to Western political values following the collapse of the alternative value system based on Marxism.

The first requirement of a more idealistic foreign policy, including pressure on others to be equally principled, is consistency. The traditional failing of this approach has always been its vulnerability to charges of double standards, as the weak are required to live according to a high moral code while the more powerful are able to get away with all manner of terrible things. The West must thus take care to proclaim values to which it is ready to adhere, even when their implications become troubling. For example, it once urged freedom of movement and ideas. The prospect of mass immigration into western Europe has led to a qualification—only ideas will be allowed to move, while people should stay put.

Such contradictions lead to a fundamental problem: the politically confused situation confronting the West is producing a confusion in values. At the moment there is some consensus with regard to the rights of states in relation to each other, that is, nonaggression, and with the rights of individuals in relation to states, that is, basic political liberties. But there is growing confusion with regard to the rights of groups in relation to states and in relation to each other. The starting point is often a humanitarian impulse to assist a persecuted minority. Minorities appearing as the victims of overwhelming state power, such as Kurds and Croats, have their own political agendas, and it is difficult to limit intervention on their behalf to humanitarian concerns without addressing in some way the underlying political conflict. In this way the principle of "noninterference in internal affairs" is increasingly being honored more in the breach than in the observance, and much is being done in the name of self-determination.

Self-determination worked well as an anticolonial concept; its application is less straightforward in the postcolonial era. In

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the early days of decolonization there was considerable sympathy for the view that the problem of minority rights was best tackled through development of secular states that would transcend old ethnic and religious differences. More recently, and perhaps as a result of internal developments within some leading Western states, a pride in a distinctive culture is well understood and its suppression regretted. The more individuals give their loyalty to groups rather than states, the greater the problems of political cohesion unless, hypothetically, every group has its own state, no matter how small or dispersed the group or how feeble its material base. This itself feeds into a debate becoming ever more pointed in western Europe over the meaning of statehood when the reality of everyday life is of interdependence. This can lead to undue emphasis on the symbols of sovereignty, whether they be a currency or nuclear arsenal. An obvious formula might be that natural limits of self-determination are found at the point when it can only be realized at the expense of the self-determination of others, or where it threatens the territorial integrity of a state. Neither the recognition of these points nor their validity is, in practice, straightforward.

These moral dilemmas are starting to infuse most key policy considerations. Many of the initial problems with Western policy toward Yugoslavia, for example, stem from placing a greater stress on holding the country together than on self-determination. This made a civil war more rather than less likely, to the point where eventually there was little of Yugoslavia left to preserve. Yugoslavia's tensions were then aggravated by the West's sudden switching to whole-hearted endorsement of self-determination without thinking through the immediate implications, including those for the now dissolved Soviet Union. Indeed one of the pressing tasks in dealing with the states emerging out of the wreckage of the Soviet Union is to establish guidelines for minority rights.

All this suggests that policy toward postcommunist Europe will reflect an awkward mix of values and interests, an awareness on the one hand that only the West can provide serious assistance with the most desperate problems versus a determination on the other to avoid futile and unwieldy involvements. What are the mechanics of carrying out such an awkward policy mix?

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Confused Instruments

In the immediate aftermath of the 1989 revolutions the debate over how to manage these tensions centered on new structures for European security—as if the natural response to a dramatic shift in the balance of power had to be a shift in the balance of institutions. The more pessimistic participants expected the liberating nationalism of 1989 to turn, in the naturally less stable states, into a narrow chauvinism and interethnic conflict; the more optimistic believed that a security structure could be devised that would identify and diffuse any such tendencies before they caused lasting damage.

The reform of institutions has turned out to be a distraction. The reconstruction of the expanding Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has been slight. The CSCE has been tarnished by failure with its first great challenge in Yugoslavia and by the fact that its major achievement, the treaty to reduce conventional forces in Europe, has been rendered largely irrelevant. Similarly the smaller European Community has devoted months to devising modest improvements to its established capacity for collective action—with a promise of more to come and barely a thought to the principles and interests that will guide this action—while its efforts to cope with the Yugoslav crisis have demonstrated that, even when it operates with determination and some ingenuity, its mechanisms are inadequate to cope with a vicious civil war. NATO, meanwhile, has devoted the bulk of its energies to nothing more than the development of rationales for its continued existence.

In practice the long-term shape of Western policy is emerging through short-term responses to immediate crises, in which the specific values and interests judged most relevant at the time combine to create more general precedents. This has already happened in the Persian Gulf, a crisis that enhanced the role of the United Nations and the principle of nonaggression, and in Yugoslavia, which enhanced but then qualified the role of the EC and exposed the limits on prudent intervention. It may also demonstrate that even in Europe the United Nations remains the organization best geared for peacekeeping operations.

As values and interests become clarified through practice, so too will be the quality of available policy instruments. The disinclination of policymakers to resort to military intervention has already been stressed. On the basis of their experience outside Europe they are well aware of the perils of getting

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sucked into quagmires of regional conflicts where allies are likely to be erratic and corrupt, interests vague and insubstantial, and best intentions wholly counterproductive. The preference is to follow traditional rules of peacekeeping, geared to sustaining a ceasefire already in place, rather than imposing a peace that is less than welcome to at least one side. Good offices might be offered to help reach a political settlement when the parties are ready for one, even though this approach inevitably is biased more toward might than right.

The United States has shown little interest in events in the Balkans and has been more than happy to hand responsibility over to the EC. The Community was initially delighted at this American indifference, because it allowed for a distinctively European solution to a European problem. When the "troika" of foreign ministers (from the past, current and next presidents of the EC's Council of Ministers) was dispatched to Belgrade as the Yugoslav crisis broke in late June 1991, it was described as a "diplomatic rapid reaction force." The subsequent experience will result in greater caution before EC officials embark on similar initiatives and will have reinforced the American view that these crises are best handled at arm's length.

Russia is more likely to be part of the problem than the solution. Before central authority crumbled forever, Gorbachev was ready to send troops into Azerbaijan to protect Armenians. It is doubtful whether Russian President Boris Yeltsin might follow suit, even though the Armenian-Azeri conflict is getting steadily nastier. Not only would there be a reluctance to put Russian troops at risk, but sympathy for the Armenians also seems to be qualified by distrust for various separatist groups that are starting to make themselves felt in all the republics. Russia would likely get involved only if ethnic Russians were at risk. This would immediately turn a local conflict into something much larger. Any assertion of Russian power in this way would revive anxieties among members of its former empire, even if it would be in support of principles that are not in themselves objectionable—thereby complicating Western policy further.

Outside and inside Europe influence will largely depend on economic measures—access to Western markets and various forms of assistance to reward political good conduct. Their denial and possibly punitive sanctions would follow unacceptable behavior. The general presumption that the problems in

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central and eastern Europe are best handled by political and economic measures, with military involvement avoided, suits the EC, for it already has the competence to take decisive political and economic measures. Its economic strength and cohesion provide a major source of leverage over those seeking access to Community markets and, ultimately, membership. For the same reason it suits the United States less, given its evident reluctance to spend large sums on external problems when domestic problems seem so pressing.

Nonetheless there are still major shortcomings to such an approach. The use of economic carrots and sticks for diplomatic purposes has an unconvincing track record. Economic conditionality depends, first, on sorting out the conditions and, second, on agreeing what should be done if these conditions are largely met. Sorting out the conditions simply raises all the problems of Western values and interests. Which is more important, free markets or political liberties? It is not inevitable that they will always go hand in hand. If countries perform badly against economic and political criteria, this does not mean the West can follow a strict policy of economic neglect, as this may aggravate a developing conflict and add to its potentially dire consequences.

As great a risk is that, even if conditions are met, the West will not deliver the economic rewards, and this could sow disillusion. It was one thing to look at how the West could assist Hungary and Poland in their pioneering efforts to liberate themselves from communism; it is quite another to contemplate the whole range of postcommunist states that have sprung up over the past thirty months and the need for significant boosts to each of their economies—especially when the major Western economies are suffering more from shortages than surpluses of capital. Indeed European material (if not rhetorical) support for postcommunist aspirations appears increasingly constrained as the numbers of aspirants, and their individual needs, multiply. At any rate there is little point in large-scale transfers of capital until the economic infrastructure is in place to receive and exploit it.

So while a degree of linkage between political performance and economic support is unavoidable, the basis for policy should be to reinforce positive trends in particular economies through support for investment and trade rather than subsidies subject to political fine-tuning.

This brings us to the most sensitive issue. The Community's

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most substantial bargaining card is the offer of access to its internal market. This will make the most difference to the economic prospects of central and eastern Europe. If the Community is to play the role it claims for itself in shaping postcommunist Europe, it will need both to streamline its procedures for economic crisis management and accept that an imaginative external policy requires an imaginative approach to the Community's own internal structures. As this requirement becomes more pressing there could be an interesting shift in the internal EC political balance. Most recently France and Germany have worked together in favor of an ever-closer union while Britain has acted as a brake. The motives in Bonn and Paris, however, have been quite different. France has sought to protect the Community from the pressures building up to the east and to hold Germany back from using its potential influence in the east to create its own power bloc. Germany, by contrast, knows that it cannot handle the problems of postcommunist Europe by itself and is looking to a closer union to gain support.

At some point this will mean addressing head on the divisive questions of the Community's Common Agricultural Policy and enlargement of EC membership, and here Germany may well find Britain more supportive and France dragging its feet. General political and economic collapse in the east cannot but have a severe effect on the German economy and thus on the plans, recently agreed at the Maastricht summit, for economic and monetary union by the end of the decade. Rather than stability and prosperity being transferred from west to east, there are worries that instability in the east will deflect the west from its chosen path.

V

The Bush administration will argue for the continuing role of the United States at the center of the new world order. My purpose here has been to question whether this role can be as central as supposed. The rationale against active engagement in the problems of postcommunist Europe and, for that matter, the bulk of the non-Western world is likely to remain extremely influential. It might be argued that this is unfair and does slight justice to the range of "new world order" initiatives taken by the United States and its allies: to strengthen the role of the Security Council; to take decisive action in the Persian Gulf to uphold the elemental principle of nonaggression; to

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expedite nuclear disarmament; to control the arms trade; to push forward the Middle East peace process and a settlement in Cambodia; to organize humanitarian relief.

The importance of these initiatives should not be denied, but they need to be kept in perspective. By and large they reflect a hope that the new world order is one that can be managed from the top, and they therefore focus on problems that take on a global character. Thus discussion in Washington has focused on those aspects of the gathering disorder likely to have the most widespread effects, such as a loss of control over nuclear weapons or a dispersal of chemical weapons. On any scale those problems are about as serious as is possible to imagine, and it is sensible to take steps to reduce such dangers as a matter of urgency. But it must be recognized that the most probable scenarios come far lower down the scale, and that the real test of policy may be in responses to vicious but relatively confined conflicts or to evidence of economic and social breakdown that has yet to reach tragic proportions.

From a global perspective, conflicts only become relevant if one side attempts to resolve them by crudely aggressive means or if the spillover becomes impossible to ignore. In the future, because of the Iraqi precedent, an international response to such action is more likely than before. But the management of local conflicts that have yet to reach this stage, or that are much more ambiguous in their origins, is less pressing. If the absence of a profound strategic imperative is the hallmark of the new order, then there will be little incentive to take on new security commitments in any serious form. Old commitments—in the Middle East or Asia—may still be honored but no extra entanglements will be accepted.

A globalist approach makes possible an overview that more parochial approaches may lack, but it also tends to encourage the framing of problems in global terms and the calling of international conferences to agree on solutions. Just as the problems of the Third World appeared hopeless, when considered in aggregate as a global problem, but more manageable when considered as a series of local problems, so a selective approach to postcommunist Europe will be necessary if only to ensure that effort and energy are applied effectively.

The intensive process of fragmentation under way at the moment in Europe undermines any attempt to produce a grand strategy for the whole area; it can do little justice to the variety of conditions in which states find themselves. Each

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state's relative success will depend on a combination of whatever residual natural and economic assets remain following the ravages of communism, as well as on its ability to decide on and implement effective policies. Western support can help—but not in the absence of workable policies. Those states making the most progress on their own will inevitably develop the most valuable relations with the West. In this way the new order will be created from the bottom up.

The yearning for a new order that could match the Cold War in durability and stability, while scoring higher on democracy and economic growth was reflected in the metaphors with which it was discussed. Words like "system," "structure" and "order" conveyed a comforting sense of regularity and design. The aspiration of an engineered stability was reflected in the idea of a "security architecture" to be constructed, with firm "foundations" and strong "pillars."

These attempts to make stability the central strategic value of the new age are doomed to continual disappointment. Any relevant framework must reflect the creative opportunities as well as the dangers inherent in perpetual instability. Policies and institutions are already coming to be judged by metaphors of adaptation and movement: flexibility, versatility, agility, resistance and pressure, pushes and drives.

In all this a crisis fatigue may soon set in, for the process will be frustrating and the results often dispiriting. It is by no means self-evident that the west Europeans have the staying power to handle even a selection of the challenges thrown up by the developing disorder in postcommunist Europe, let alone those left in the rest of the world. They may be tempted to concentrate on an essentially defensive posture rather than actively promote favorable economic and political developments. But they will find it hard to escape the consequences of conflict and distress in the neighborhood, and so an arm's-length approach is less of an option for western Europe than it is for the United States. The evidence thus far suggests that this is the option the United States will be tempted to follow.

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William G. Hyland

THE CASE FOR PRAGMATISM

Last year should have been a time to reflect on the profound changes brought by the end of the Cold War. Instead it turned out to be the year of America's first war since Vietnam. No sooner had the country begun to absorb that amazing victory than events in the Soviet Union turned 1991 into the year that witnessed the end of the personal reign of Mikhail Gorbachev and, indeed, the end of the U.S.S.R. itself. Finally, the nation paused to pay its respects at Pearl Harbor, on the 50th anniversary of the day that would "live in infamy."

December 7, 1941, was the opening battle of the Second World War for the United States. But Pearl Harbor also marked the closing of one historical period and the opening of another. America finally ended its self-imposed isolation from world affairs on that day, and for the next 50 years was to be deeply involved in the global struggle against fascism and then against communism.

That period has ended. It was an odd twist of fate that on the very day America marked the 50th anniversary of Congress' declaration of war against Japan, the leaders of three former Soviet republics gathered in Brest to proclaim the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It was World War II and the destruction of Japan and Germany that opened the way to the aggressive advances of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites and to the Cold War itself. Now that war also has definitively ended. With that dramatic proclamation on December 8, 1991, America was freed from the threats and fears that had driven its foreign and domestic policies for half a century.

It is rare in history that a country can craft a wholly new foreign policy. But within the constraints inevitably imposed by geography and history, the United States now has that very opportunity. Thus it turns out that what only last spring seemed like a shrewd political slogan—a new world order—is quite appropriate. What America is involved in will indeed be quite different, if not completely new. The arena will still be

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global in scope. But what constitutes "order" and how to achieve it are already focal points of debate.

II

Is America turning isolationist? The quick answer is no.

It should not be surprising, however, that such a question arises. The end of the Cold War has liberated the debate about foreign policy; ideas that would have been anathema only five years ago have to be entertained (for instance, withdrawing from the Philippines). There is also America's traditional bias against foreign "entanglements." Economic troubles are easy to blame on foreign countries, especially with a political campaign on the horizon. After decades of internationalism, there is nostalgia for a more "normal" foreign policy. Even some of the old isolationist slogans have been revived.

But times have changed. The isolationism of the 1920s and 1930s reflected a determination to avoid being dragged into another European war. Even then, America was not truly isolated. Washington sponsored the naval disarmament conference of 1921–22 and was actively involved in European affairs through the Dawes and Young reparation plans, and even took the lead in condemning Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1932. The America First Committee was not formed until 1940, as a movement opposed to joining the war on Britain's side; it earned a reputation as antisemitic and pro-German, and disbanded four days after Pearl Harbor.

Those days are long gone. The United States is deeply entangled by the world's economy, by global technology, by international politics and institutions, and by half a dozen security alliances. It would probably take at least a decade of dedicated efforts by both the Congress and the president to extricate the United States from the world enough even to approximate the isolation of the 1930s. The result would be a global crisis of unimaginable proportions in a world of a dozen or more nuclear powers.

If isolationism is not a serious option, however, this does not mean that there will be only marginal adjustments to the basic policies of the Cold War era. The neo-isolationist critique provokes some genuine questions about policy: What is the rationale for a multibillion-dollar foreign aid program? Why are large American forces stationed abroad? What is an adequate defense posture? What are "fair" trading practices? Posing such questions, long thought settled in the Cold War,

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suggests that there will be, and ought to be, genuine debate over the conduct of post-Cold War policy.

Unfortunately that debate has been disappointing and risks degenerating into sloganeering. For example, it is legitimate to urge a shift in priorities to domestic policy. Such a proposal should not have been contentious. With the end of the Cold War, foreign policy automatically became less important and less urgent. Yet as one observer put it: "We have all grown so jaded by the constant proclamations of new eras and new beginnings that we seem to have trouble recognizing the real thing when it finally arrives."[1]

Such skepticism is well founded. In an election year, promises of a peace dividend are especially suspicious. The great budget battle of 1990 drew a sharp line to protect defense spending. Even the president reflected the lingering concern that somehow threats would continue; he claimed that "the challenges of this world are as daunting as Stalin's army was menacing forty years ago."[2]

Opinion polls, however, suggest that a change in the direction of priorities is what the public wants. Even in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, polls showed that the chief concerns of the American people, by a large margin, were domestic. These views merely confirm what has been a long-term trend of the post-Vietnam period. Since the late 1960s foreign policy issues have receded as the most important concerns of the public.[3]

How to strike a balance between domestic and foreign policy requirements was therefore a serious issue. It was trivialized, however, by the charge that President Bush was spending too much time on foreign affairs. One Democratic candidate for president has said: "Our president has devoted his time and energy to foreign concerns and ignored dire problems at home. As a result, we're drifting in the longest economic slump since World War II."[4] It did not help much when the new White House chief of staff, Samuel Skinner, seemed to confirm the charge against the president by announcing that

[1]Leslie Gelb, "Fresh Face," *The New York Times Magazine*, Dec. 8, 1991.

[2]At the NATO summit in Rome, Italy, Nov. 7, 1991; printed in *Dispatch*, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Nov. 11, 1991.

[3]Ralph B. Levering, "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy and American Politics Since the 1960s," *Diplomatic History*, Summer 1989, p. 383.

[4]Gov. Bill Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security," a speech given at Georgetown University, Dec. 12, 1991.

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

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"the baton has been passed" from foreign to domestic policy.[5]

It is quite misleading to frame the issue as a choice between domestic and foreign concerns. The two are traditionally distinct but are not easily fungible, and it is not a question of either/or. This initial phase of the debate, however, has created the impression that some form of isolationism was behind the proposals to shift resources to the domestic account. The president could hardly pass up a chance to attack the new isolationists for their "stubborn fantasy that we can live as an isolated island surrounded by a changing and developing world." Proposals for "disengagement" were interpreted as a call for a "retreat." Fears over isolationism were fueled by the success of Harris Wofford's senatorial campaign in Pennsylvania featuring a protectionist tone, and given a further boost by the colorful candidacy of Patrick Buchanan. Perhaps most bizarre was the adoption of "America First" as one of the slogans of Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder's short-lived presidential campaign.

It ought to be obvious that this country cannot afford to abdicate its interests to the decisions of others. Fortunately no serious observer or candidate is proposing to go that far. Many of the issues raised in Buchanan's campaign and elsewhere, however, are not frivolous, and some impact has already been made by the revival of nationalistic rhetoric. His call for a "new nationalism" strikes a responsive chord with segments of the public. Attacking foreign aid is a hoary shibboleth, but in a recession, it exploits deep-seated popular resentments.

Even the so-called realists have defined the concept of the national interest in more circumspect terms than heretofore: "more discriminating in purpose, less cataclysmic in its strategy and, above all, more regional in design."[6] A wariness of new commitments is also more evident. When Buchanan proposes to reexamine "all the institutions of the Cold War," from alliances to the stationing of permanent American armies abroad to the issue of foreign aid, he is in the company of many major figures in both parties. Indeed, Buchanan aside, a reversal of historical positions may even be in the making: the Democrats are sounding like Harding and the mainstream

[5]Michael Wines, "With No Frills, New Bush Chief Signals Changes," *The New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1991.

[6]Henry Kissinger, "What Kind of New World Order," *The New York Post*, Dec. 3, 1991.

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Republicans are sounding like Wilson—and both parties are sounding a little like Smoot and Hawley.

Fortunately the choice is not between isolationism and internationalism, or nationalism and globalism. There will always be a reservoir of isolationist sentiment in the United States; it is part of our heritage. This inclination was bound to reappear as foreign threats receded. What is new is that these isolationist overtones are heard from both the left and right.

There has also always been a strong Wilsonian strain in American policy. The new dimension is that, with the Soviet Union on the sidelines, the United States is free to intervene on behalf of human rights or democratic freedoms. Moreover the United Nations, in disrepute during the Cold War, has been resuscitated by the vigorous role of the Security Council in the gulf crisis.

Thus there is probably a better chance that a new internationalism may be in the offing than a return to some variant of isolationism; indeed, many observers argue that the real debate is between two categories of international realists. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, for example, writes:

> The isolationism versus internationalism debate is in reality the debate among the various types of internationalism; that which aims frankly to serve the national interest, as conventionally conceived (to protect its territory, wealth and access to necessary goods; to defend its nationals); that which aims to preserve and defend democracy; and a brand of 'disinterested globalism' which looks at the world and asks what needs to be done—with little explicit concern for the national interest.[7]

III

There is a missing element in this debate: an understanding that the current historical period is transitional. This time the cliché is true: this is a new era, but we are only in the opening phases. It is fruitless to search for a politically correct concept of the national interest to justify American foreign policy. Debating in these categories is itself an intellectual hangover from the Cold War.

All of the protagonists—isolationist, internationalist or realist—are quick to prescribe policies but reluctant to analyze the

[7]Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "A Normal Country in a Normal Time," *America's Purpose*, San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991. See also George Weigel, "On the Road to Isolationism?" *Commentary*, January 1992, and Charles Krauthammer, "Which New World Order?" *The Washington Post*, May 17, 1991.

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new circumstances. The character and structure of world politics has already been radically altered. It will take years for the consequences to be absorbed. Take the situation inside the former Soviet Union: the turmoil there makes this a period of transition almost by definition. It will be a decade before European unity is completed, even in its narrowest terms. The U.S. defense posture is only in the preliminary stages of the restructuring that will follow the end of the Soviet threat. And the likelihood is that America will suffer large budget deficits for years. The strongest new force is nationalism. It is rising everywhere, manifesting itself as Islamic fundamentalism, as regionalism, as economic protectionism, in ethnic conflict and revolutionary upheavals.

This transitional phase may last a decade before the outlines of a new world order emerge, and when that happens it will probably be more by trial and error than by design. No overriding principle articulated in advance will be sufficient to handle the burgeoning diversity of the new international agenda. If the choices are only among various concepts of realism, the operational question still remains: For what objectives ought the United States use its still awesome power? No one is arguing that we should not use that power at all, but there is growing debate over both means and ends.

It may well be that no major decisions can be made until after the presidential election. These contests have never been conducive to an orderly discussion about foreign policy, nor are foreign policy matters likely to be the pivotal issues in this campaign (except perhaps for the endless reruns of the congressional debate and vote on the Gulf War). If the 1992 election is not likely to determine the direction of a new foreign policy, the winner will nevertheless have to deal with a world that is already radically different from the campaign of 1988.

IV

For some time it has been obvious that the bipolar division of international politics has ended. The immediate consequence is that many countries, areas and issues that might have seemed vital to American security in the contest with the Soviet Union have suddenly lost their attraction and urgency (the Horn of Africa is a prime example).

Some argue that the end of bipolarity means the emergence of unipolarity, that is, the dominance of the United States in

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reordering the world as it chooses, and in its own image. They cite the Gulf War as proof: only the United States could have organized the coalition and prosecuted the war. Others cite the Gulf War to reach an opposite conclusion: that the United States could organize the coalition only through the cooperation of a diverse collection of powers. The war, thus, inaugurated not American dominance but a new era of international cooperation.

While it is true that the United States remains the only genuine superpower, this is tempered by several factors:

—The United States has emerged from the Cold War in a precarious economic position. Just how precarious is open to debate, but there seems to be a consensus that America has to put its own economic house in order.

—The national mood is more xenophobic because of the recession; the Gulf War already led to demands that other countries bear their share of the burden of a new world order. For the first time in its history, America sought foreign aid to fight a war (a humiliation, but nevertheless consistent with American opinion). Moreover protectionism in trade has much greater support than at any time since the 1930s.

—The breakdown in Cold War alignments has led to three geopolitical changes that overshadow all others for the United States: the emergence of Germany, the liberation of eastern Europe and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. Few changes of such importance have occurred so quickly in peacetime.

—Power has devolved not only to the new economic giants, but to diverse areas and regions, as well as to new institutions. The gatherings of the Group of Seven industrialized nations are a more accurate reflection of contemporary power realities than, say, a NATO meeting or an East-West summit.

In sum and in paradox, the United States does not have anything approaching the freedom of action it enjoyed in the Cold War decades. In the Cold War, even though the lines were sharply drawn, the United States could choose to intervene or not, and much of the world deferred to Washington. Now the political lines are far less distinct, and allies that were almost totally dependent on Washington seek greater autonomy and, like the United States, are under domestic pressures to assert more nationalistic positions. Whereas anticommunism neutralized much dissent, even during the Vietnam War,

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the gulf crisis unleashed a ferocious political debate over the use of force.

The intricacies of the nuclear balance gave the president extraordinary powers. Even in the late 1980s the United States could pour billions into the Strategic Defense Initiative. That freedom for the chief executive ended in 1990 when the growing economic crisis forced the budget agreement to reduce the deficit. Finally, the United States cannot afford to support countries or ventures without regard to the economic consequences. The halcyon days of Marshall plans are long past.

All of this means that for some years the guiding force of American policy will not be ideology or high principles, but a far greater pragmatism. Policymakers will have to placate nationalistic sentiment at home and satisfy several overlapping centers of power abroad. On occasion there will have to be compromises on issues such as free trade, the crusade for democracy, human rights and the rule of law—the very principles of the new world order. Much like the policy of containment, a prolonged pragmatism may be necessary to finally realize those laudable goals.[8]

None of this will be very heroic. No trumpets will call forth divisions under a banner of pragmatism and prudence. There is, moreover, the obvious danger that the means will devour the ends; steady doses of pragmatism and prudence could dilute the final goals that are sought in their name. But the trend toward greater pragmatism is already evident.

Consider, for example, Washington's steadfast refusal to intervene in Yugoslavia. One may well ask what happened to defending independence and resisting aggression, the principles of Operation Desert Storm. Was it difficult to distinguish between Serbia's aggression and Saddam Hussein's? Do not Slovenia and Croatia have a much better claim to independence and recognition than such synthetic states as Kazakhstan and Kirghizia?

Consider Haiti. Surely this was a prime case for vigorous American intervention to restore democracy; do not the long-suffering Haitians deserve U.S. support at least as much as the Kuwaitis?

Obviously no one is beating the drums for intervention

[8]Irving Kristol described such a policy thus: "Our relations with the other nations of the world will be decided candidly on a case-by-case basis." See "Defining Our National Interest," in *America's Purpose*, op. cit.

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because no vital interest is threatened. In Yugoslavia the enemy is not only Serbian aggression but rampant nationalism. In Haiti it has not been so easy to differentiate among the democrats and the dictators. (The same might be said of once-Soviet Georgia.)

The same sense of prudence also governs the debate about aid to the former Soviet Union. A strong case can be made that it is in the American interest to aid Russia. The mayor of Boston, however, defined the context for this issue much better than his fellow Bostonians at Harvard when he suggested that for every dollar sent to the old U.S.S.R., one dollar should also be sent to American cities.

The world of the 1990s will resemble nothing in America's previous experience. The United States will be required to conduct a foreign policy for which there is almost no historical precedent, and to do so with limited resources in an increasingly competitive world in which the threat that held together the various American alliances will have vanished.

v

To examine what this means at an operational rather than a theoretical level, Europe is the proper place to begin, if only because it is America's oldest and deepest commitment.

Well before the Japanese attack in 1941, the United States made a fateful decision that shaped its foreign policies for the next five decades. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that, if America entered the war, priority would be given to defeating Germany first. Since 1941, therefore, the United States has been, first of all, a European power: as the opponent of fascism and then the expansion of the Soviet Union in Europe, specifically in Berlin; as the promoter of the unity of western Europe, including the revival and rearmament of Germany and, far more tentatively, as the liberator of Eastern Europe. The United States became the linchpin in a system of European security arrangements resting on an "entangling" treaty commitment to defend its Atlantic allies and, to this end, deployed a large contingent of American troops, supported by a panoply of American nuclear weapons.

The American alliance with Europe has achieved each of its basic aims: Europe is unified, eastern Europe is liberated and the military threat of the U.S.S.R. has ended.

The United States will remain a European power for the foreseeable future. On neither side of the Atlantic is there any

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sentiment favoring a break. Nevertheless, American influence is declining (and German influence is rising). American involvement in Europe will be thinner and weaker. A selective disengagement by both sides of the Atlantic has already begun. In Washington, at least, there is a sense that the Europeans are moving too far toward a stronger regionalism that will be reflected in more protectionist trade policies, in greater independence of foreign policy (particularly toward eastern Europe) and in the creation of a new defense unit within the European Community (EC). Indeed some American observers claim that the greatest danger is increasing American irrelevance as Europe reshapes its own identity.

On the other hand, Europe is securely democratic, by and large prosperous, built on a functioning free-market system and, if its frequent assurances can be believed, dedicated to a free and open trading system. The most important remaining challenge is how to embrace the new states of eastern Europe. Strengthening western Europe may exclude eastern Europe; if this were to happen, then that area is likely to be dominated by Germany, or it could even become a source of friction between Germany and Russia.

Permitting a new, invisible iron curtain to divide Europe is a recipe for major trouble. But this may already be happening for three reasons: European fears over massive emigration from east to west; limits on the resources available to help the east; and the determination of key countries to deepen the EC before broadening it. American interests in eastern Europe have largely been satisfied with the collapse of the communist regimes, but the United States should try to facilitate a rapprochement between eastern and western Europe, even at the expense of diluting the EC and NATO.

The United States will also have to provide political and psychological reassurances that Germany will not disrupt the European balance. Fortunately, the Bonn of the 1990s is not the Weimar of the 1920s. Unified Germany is embedded in a structure of alliances and institutions; its democracy has deeper roots, and its external ambitions and grievances have been satisfied. There is no "stab in the back" legend or any case for irredentism. Thus there is no reason for the United States to maintain large troop units in Germany as a pseudo-occupation force.

In sum, America can afford to disengage from the detailed management of the alliance, because in Europe there is still a

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solid coalition of friendly powers, favorably disposed toward the United States. "Let Europe be Europe" would not be a bad policy, provided it applies from the Atlantic to the Urals.

VI

Letting Russia be Russia, however, cannot be a sound policy. The United States cannot disengage very far from dealing with the new governments, because several of those entities in some form or other are still nuclear powers. This fact alone will involve the United States intimately in the formulation and conduct of policies of the larger new republics.

The most difficult aspect for Americans is to recognize that on most issues we are on the sidelines. What is happening in Russia is not a struggle over market economics, as many in the West believe, but the play of historical forces that have been at work for more than four centuries.

It is naïve to expect that what will emerge in this Eurasian land mass will be a collection of democratic, market-oriented and benign states. The new Commonwealth in Minsk is worthy of Potemkin. Most of the new republics are weak, have little basis for legitimate statehood, and some may not even survive. What is critical is the future of Russia and Ukraine, the only two states of any real consequence for the United States.

One can hope that Russia will break with its history and firmly implant the roots of democracy. But more likely is the eventual revival of an autocratic state, probably well armed and potentially hostile toward its neighbors.

The question is whether Russian dominance will be reasserted by force of arms or whether some condominium or accommodation will be reached between Ukraine and Russia. In any case, it is naïve to believe that the successor states, including Ukraine, will give up all of their nuclear weapons to a well-armed Russia. It is also foolish to believe that out of chaos and crisis will come a well-ordered market. Russia is not Poland. Economic reform cannot be imposed by Russia on other independent republics. Whatever economic order emerges will be a hybrid, probably with a strong, centrally controlled state sector.

It may be years, if not decades, before Russia will know its fate. If there were ever a case for prudence and pragmatism, Russia is it. Pragmatism translates into restraint in rushing aid for this or that economic scheme or for this or that political leader, including Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Most of the

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money will be wasted, as it already has been. Long-term technical assistance makes sense, but only if it is clearly recognized that the payoff may not be evident for years, if ever. And it is doubtful that American opinion will sustain a long-term program in a period of economic difficulties at home.

Quarrels inside the former Soviet territory are almost certain to continue and perhaps worsen. They will have to be dealt with carefully in Washington. There will be a natural tendency to support Russia because it is the most powerful center. Moreover it is convenient to have a central point to deal with on various foreign policy issues. It is really not up to the United States, however, to be the arbiter between Russia and, say, Ukraine or the five Central Asian nations, or to become the champion of the new Commonwealth.

On the other hand it is not axiomatic that the new Russian state will be antagonistic toward the United States. Washington may well have more in common with Moscow than with Tokyo or Beijing. It is in the American interest, however, that the western republics of the old U.S.S.R. be firmly tied to the European political and security system. A new pan-European organization may be necessary for this purpose.

VII

The case for pragmatism is also strong in Asia. America fought three wars in Asia, but fifty years after Pearl Harbor, and almost twenty years since Vietnam, America still cannot define its proper role there. The problems are the same as they have been for almost a century—our uneasy relations with Japan and China. Usually, we have managed to have good relations with one or the other, and recently with both.[9] But currently our relations with both are in danger of deteriorating.

After World War II the situation in Asia remained dangerous and uncertain well into the 1970s. In this turmoil, to ally with Japan—a truly revolutionary change—became the bedrock of American security policy in Asia. As a result Japan has peacefully achieved its World War II aim of preeminence in Asia—except for a free hand in China. But the price has been to antagonize its principal protector, the United States. The

[9]Robert A. Scalapino, "The United States and Asia: Future Prospects," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1991/92.

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alliance between Japan and the United States is turning sour, given the end of the Cold War, the growth of nationalism on both sides and the reality of their economic parity.

For the first time the disintegration of that alliance now appears possible, though not yet likely. Whereas the American alliance with Europe has deeper cultural and historical roots, the alliance with Japan has been more superficial and dictated by expediency on both sides. This poses major long-term uncertainty for American policy, perhaps of the most far-reaching and potentially dangerous sort. America does not need Japan, but neither does Japan need America (except perhaps against China). Nevertheless both sides should have an interest in putting this relationship on a new basis that can withstand the pressures and temptations of economic nationalism. It is difficult to believe that such an important relationship will founder on a trade deficit. Unfortunately, racism on both sides may prove to be the decisive factor. It already aggravates legitimate debates over trade and economics.

China is also a major uncertainty. It has been buffeted by the Cold War more than any other Asian country except Vietnam. During the Second World War, China was accorded great power status by both Roosevelt and Stalin. By 1950 China was at war with the United States, almost a pariah; a decade later it was virtually isolated, having broken with the Soviet Union. By the 1980s it had clearly returned to the ranks of the great powers. Indeed its vote in the Security Council was critical to the prosecution of the war against Saddam Hussein.

With the end of communism in the Soviet Union, however, China is far less valuable as an ally to the United States (except perhaps against Japan). On the other hand, the United States offers no protection for China against an infection of glasnost from Russia. The geopolitical arguments that favored close relations between Washington and Beijing are losing their force. In an era of democratization and liberalization, China remains an anomaly. Finally, it faces a change in its top leadership that is likely to have a profound impact. No one seems confident of any prediction about China's future after the reign of the Long Marchers comes to its inevitable end.

Every so often it has seemed as if the United States were on the brink of a new era in Asia or the Pacific that would finally bring an end to the Eurocentrism in American foreign policy. This was a favorite theme during the Reagan years. But that seems less and less likely. The grim prospect is that both China

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and Japan are potential antagonists of the United States, though not enemies. Even that extreme case cannot be excluded, if Washington does not resist humiliating these proud nations with self-righteous demands for free trade with Toyko and human rights in Beijing. Can we legitimately expect the leaders in either of these countries to overturn their social and economic orders to placate foreigners? In any case, to antagonize both Japan and China would be a grave geopolitical mistake.

VIII

The other area most affected by the end of the Cold War is the Middle East. Here, too, pragmatism rather than principle is beginning to govern the conduct of the parties involved in the conflict, as well as the United States, the only outside power of any consequence in this area.

Washington is gradually weakening its close identification with Israel, conciliating the Arabs and trying to entice the Palestinians into some sort of settlement. Apparently President Bush and Secretary Baker concluded that victory in the Gulf War created a great strategic opening for Arab-Israeli peace. It neutralized a principal enemy of Israel, Iraq. It revealed the impotence of the Soviet Union as a patron of the radical Arabs, exposed the dependence of the moderate Arabs on Washington and, finally, demonstrated that the United States could defend its interests in the area by force if necessary.

But all of this also meant an adjustment, if not a historic shift, from unqualified support for Israel to a more even-handed policy. This has already been painful and controversial. It will have to pay dividends at the peace table if it is to be sustained. In Europe and Asia the future will be determined by regional and local forces, with or without the United States, but in the Middle East a stalemate is likely to continue, or change very slowly, without some occasional forays of aggressive American diplomacy.

The great danger is that Israel, for the first time in several decades, may become the object of a contentious domestic debate, especially in Congress; the further danger is that beneath the veneer of support for Israel lies a virulent antisemitism. It is beginning to break through in the debate over Israeli settlements. If this aspect does grow stronger, then Israel will instinctively strengthen its resistance at the peace table, and a vicious circle will accelerate. Even in an era of

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pragmatism, the United States (and western Europe) owes a moral debt to the people of Israel.

IX

Looking back over the past fifty years, America has been both lucky and wise. As a young and powerful nation it has enjoyed a rather large margin for error, even as late as 1941. In the face of various challenges, disasters, setbacks and gains both at home and abroad, the United States has proved an amazingly resilient country. Its reward is not only to have survived the Cold War without a nuclear holocaust but to have prevailed in the struggle for freedom. This is no small accomplishment. In this light, the current debate somehow does not seem all that important.

But, as we are being reminded almost every day, history does not end. The real difference between now and 1941 is that the greatest challenges are within our shores, not beyond them. Choices between domestic and foreign priorities are always difficult, but the facts of today reveal the current vulnerabilities of the American position to be much greater at home than abroad. If the United States wants a new world order that reflects traditional American values and principles, then the first place to achieve the goal is in this country. "Put America first" is a dangerous old slogan, but in light of this decade's realities it is not altogether wrong.

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Strobe Talbott

POST-VICTORY BLUES

As 1991 came to a close, the United States was in the grip of an old, somewhat disreputable but distinctly American sentiment: let other countries sort out their own problems; we have enough of our own. This shift in mood followed a familiar pattern. Throughout the twentieth century it has taken wars to engage the United States in the affairs of faraway lands, while peace has tended to bring with it the revival of a national preference for going it alone.

When World War I ended, many Americans and their representatives in Congress turned their backs on the politics of war-torn Europe, thwarting Woodrow Wilson's dream of American leadership of the League of Nations. After World War II President Truman succeeded in galvanizing support for the Marshall Plan and NATO, but only because Stalin had replaced Hitler as the new foreign dragon to be slain, or at least contained.

It was in the name of that new cause—stopping communist expansionism—that American armies set off to Korea and Vietnam. The first venture ended in an armistice, the second in an American defeat. Against the backdrop of those experiences, 1991 was all the more extraordinary in the annals of U.S. foreign policy. In that year the United States won not one but two wars. The war in the Persian Gulf, which lasted just over 40 days, ended in February with the eviction of the Iraqi army from Kuwait. The Cold War, which had lasted more than 40 years, ended with the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact in July, the suspension of the Soviet Communist Party shortly after the abortive coup d'état in August, and, finally, the abolition of the Soviet Union itself along with the resignation of its last leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, on Christmas Day.

Yet in the wake of these spectacular and nearly simultaneous victories, a variety of opinion-makers and political figures argued that the United States should draw back from many of

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Strobe Talbott is Editor at Large and the foreign affairs columnist of *Time* magazine. This article draws from a paper he presented to the Aspen Strategy Group.

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its international commitments and take the opportunity to deal more energetically with the complex problems afflicting American society. By the fall and early winter of 1991 several leading Democrats were accusing the Republican administration of concentrating its attention and the country's resources on foreign affairs to the detriment of the domestic agenda.

To be sure, there were equally eloquent and diverse voices maintaining that as the sole surviving superpower, the United States had both an opportunity and an obligation to remain actively and extensively involved abroad. They acknowledged that the strengthening of America's economy, major improvements in its educational system and a frontal assault on crime, drugs and poverty were necessary to assure American competitiveness and leadership in the world at large. But they also contended that, given American reliance on imports and exports and its stake in a stable, free-trading international system, active participation in the political life and security affairs of other nations was essential.

George Bush was very much of this view. By the end of the year, however, the president and his administration were on the defensive. In a fund-raising speech in Houston, Texas, on October 31—the first official event of his campaign for reelection in 1992—the president complained about what he called "liberal Democratic carping," which he characterized as the belief that "we should retreat into an isolationistic cocoon." In fact the "carping" cut across partisan lines. There were Republicans as well as Democrats—conservatives and centrists as well as liberals—sounding variations on the theme, "Come home, America," a slogan that had first come into use in George McGovern's anti-Vietnam War campaign for the presidency in 1972.

A more specific exhortation was also in the air: "Stay home, Mr. President!" Certainly that was the message Bush was hearing in the public-opinion polls. After being criticized for his frequent trips abroad, he abruptly postponed a November tour of the Far East. While blaming the press of legislative business in Washington and rescheduling the Asian trip at the beginning of the new year, the president left little doubt that he was yielding to political pressure. The Asian tour had originally been intended to foster trans-Pacific goodwill and permit the president to consult with allies on the geopolitics of the post-Cold War era. But by the time he boarded Air Force One on December 30, Bush was virtually apologizing for

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leaving home; and, much to the dismay of his foreign hosts, he had converted the trip into a combination campaign swing and trade mission.

By then he faced a challenge within his own party. Patrick Buchanan, a conservative syndicated columnist and former aide to Ronald Reagan, had entered the race for the Republican presidential nomination with an attack on foreign aid and an appeal for a new focus on U.S. interests. Presenting himself as a latter-day "America-Firster," Buchanan argued that with the Soviet menace defeated, the United States should draw back from the rest of the world.[1]

There was considerable irony in this development. Through the first half of 1991, Bush's reelection had seemed all but certain, largely because of his perceived mastery of foreign policy. Yet as 1992 began, that strength had become a domestic liability.

II

The president and his advisers did their best to use the Gulf War as part of their defense against the criticism that they were excessively concerned with foreign policy. Earlier in the year administration spokesmen from the president down had cited the Gulf War as proof of the relevance and efficacy of American power. They predicted that the "total victory" of the U.S.-led coalition would ultimately be considered a "defining event" in a new era. By the fall, with his status as a foreign policy president itself a potentially troublesome issue in the 1992 campaign, Bush was clearly counting on his success as the commander in chief of Operation Desert Storm to offset his political vulnerability. During a press conference on November 8 in Rome, where he was attending a meeting of NATO leaders, Bush lashed out at his opponents back in Washington, suggesting that if they had their way the United States would have been deprived of one of its greatest triumphs in decades.

But there was a problem: with the passage of several

[1]Buchanan had been expressing this view for some time. See, for example, his chapter in *America's Purpose*, an anthology of articles that first appeared in *The National Interest*. See also Alan Tonelson's cover story, "What is the National Interest?" in *The Atlantic*, July 1991. For an example of what might be called conservative internationalism, see Charles Krauthammer's "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1990–91; that issue also contains Michael Mandelbaum's "The Bush Foreign Policy," which made the case that "the 1990 budget negotiations were as relevant to the long-term future of American foreign policy as the Persian Gulf crisis," a theme developed by Robert Hormats in "The Roots of American Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1991.

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months, the victory in the gulf no longer seemed total; nor was it clear exactly what guiding principles for future American policy the event had defined. It was even being said that, far from serving as a precedent for the kind of mission the United States could be expected to lead in the future, the dispatch of 500,000 American soldiers to help rescue Kuwait from Iraq marked the end—not the beginning—of an era.[2]

This post-victory malaise came about in part because the gulf crisis brought to the surface two conflicting impulses in the American body politic: a tug-of-war between the forces of isolationism and those of internationalism, and an internal conflict among internationalists themselves. On the one hand was an approach to world affairs based on traditional concerns about the way foreign states behave toward each other—regardless of their internal political systems—and about preserving the balance of power: what might be called American realpolitik, or perhaps "the European approach," since it was in the tradition of the policies and pronouncements of Talleyrand, Palmerston and Bismarck. But on the other hand was a recurring American desire to affect the way other governments behave toward their own people, even at the risk of upsetting the balance of power, agitating allies, provoking adversaries and impinging on those bedrock norms of international relations: the inviolability of sovereignty and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states.

To some degree this second impulse had always coexisted uneasily with the first in the United States. President Carter, for example, had made the promotion of human rights in other lands a priority of his administration's foreign policy. But the end of the Cold War created the conditions for a new brand of *moralpolitik*, or at least a more vigorous and far-reaching one: the United States could now throw its considerable weight around far from its own territory and even near the Soviet Union without risking a global nuclear conflagration. In his prosecution of the Gulf War and particularly in his conduct of U.S. policy afterward, George Bush never resolved these different, largely incompatible concepts of internation-

[2]See, for example, Charles William Maynes, "A Necessary War?" *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1991. In an op-ed piece published in *The Washington Post* on Dec. 23, 1990, Henry Kissinger wrote that the Gulf War "marked a glorious sunset to the Cold War world, not a new dawn for the period of American predominance."

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

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

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alism and therefore gave the forces of isolationism an even greater opening.

III

Isolationism is rooted in American geography and history. The United States has been protected by two vast oceans from Europe and Asia. The Founding Fathers, having just broken free of the bonds tying the New World to the Old, issued famous injunctions to their successors to avoid foreign entanglements. The very American word "overseas" has often served to put the rest of the world in its place. The principal counterweight to Americans' natural tendency toward isolationism is their ideology, which is, at its very core, internationalist and even interventionist.

The United States from its earliest days has nurtured a sense of itself as more than just a nation, more than just another piece of real estate with a capital, a flag and an army. American statesmen and citizens alike have seen their country as an embodiment of universal ideals. Accordingly there has been an enduring attraction to the notion that America has higher purposes to pursue than do other countries. The traditional, selfish concept of national interest may have been good enough for nineteenth-century Europe, but not for history's first non-imperial global power.[3]

When calling their citizenry to arms, U.S. presidents have been careful to present the challenge as more than just a matter of sorting out other nations' squabbles about lines on a map. When Americans fight, they want to see not just victory but virtue; they care about the kinds of regimes that prevail under American auspices and as a result of American exertions. Sending doughboys across the Atlantic in 1917, Wilson proclaimed, "The world must be made safe for democracy." Joining the alliance against the Axis powers in 1941, President Roosevelt inveighed as much against Nazi tyranny as against German expansionism. Laying the ground for a crusade to thwart the Red menace, Truman spoke repeatedly of the opposing visions of the individual's relationship to the state as contained in the Bill of Rights and the Communist Manifesto.

Thus, too, Bush led Americans into battle against Iraq by

[3]The United States' brief taste of what it was like to administer colonies in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War at the end of the nineteenth century seemed to confirm the country's disinclination to pursue an imperialist course.

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citing an appeal to broad principles. In his State of the Union address on January 29, 1991, he proclaimed:

> Halfway around the world, we are engaged in a great struggle in the skies and on the seas and sands. We know why we're there. We are Americans, part of something larger than ourselves. For two centuries, we've done the hard work of freedom. And tonight we lead the world in facing down a threat to decency and humanity. What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea—a new world order where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom and the rule of law.

As notable as the president's use of words like "decency," "humanity" and "freedom" was his careful avoidance of any reference to such a mundane consideration as "oil." Two months before, on November 13, 1990, Secretary of State James A. Baker had attempted to galvanize public support for the tough U.S. response to the invasion of Kuwait by saying, "To bring it down to the level of the average American citizen, let me say that means jobs; if you want to sum it up in one word, it's jobs." The reaction had been immediate, noisy and overwhelmingly negative: Baker was widely criticized for debasing what was supposed to be a noble cause. Neither he nor other administration spokesmen ever again resorted to quite such a forthright appeal to Americans' economic self-interest.

President Bush strengthened the impression of a policy that transcended such interests by the way he personalized the crisis from its earliest days, singling out the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, as "a dictator worse than Hitler." Dictators are the enemies of democracy primarily because of the way they treat their own citizens.

Thus, the president began Operation Desert Storm on a distinctly Wilsonian note of idealistic internationalism. He ended it, however, on a very different one. On February 28, the day after declaring Kuwait liberated, Bush suspended offensive combat operations against Iraq. While the president had reason to hope that Saddam Hussein would be overthrown after such a humiliating defeat, the decision to call off hostilities carried the risk that the Iraqi leader might remain in office. For months afterward Saddam's smug, often smiling image kept flickering across television screens around the world as he presided over Iraqi cabinet meetings, embraced emissaries and appeared on a balcony to fire his revolver into the air over the heads of cheering crowds.

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IV

President Bush had numerous, mutually reinforcing reasons for ending the war as abruptly as he did. Much of the U.S. military wanted to quit while it was ahead. Continuing the military campaign would have meant risking much higher allied casualties and perhaps becoming bogged down in a Vietnam-like quagmire. Curing the United States of the "Vietnam syndrome" was seen as an important benefit of Desert Storm, not to be jeopardized by over-reaching in the flush of victory.

No one in Bush's inner circle of advisers wanted to test the limits of international and domestic political support for a continuation of the campaign. U.S. warplanes had slaughtered Saddam's soldiers and countless camp followers as they fled Kuwait City at the end of the war, causing a wave of revulsion in the United States and some outrage abroad. Bush did not want to invite more criticism that he was engaging in a "turkey shoot." Virtually all the important allies in the coalition were pressing him to end the war as promptly as possible.

But Saddam was also spared for reasons that went to the heart of the policy behind the military operation. Despite Bush's rhetoric on the eve of the war, the objective of Desert Storm was, in its essence, the defense of the old, established order, the restoration of the status quo ante, in more respects than just the return of the Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah as the emir of Kuwait.

While fighting with the most modern weapons imaginable, the allies were united behind a concept of collective security that had changed little in seventy years. The coalition was dedicated, above all, to preserving the sanctity of international boundaries established after World War I and the notion of national sovereignty that went back at least 400 years, when the idea of the modern nation state emerged from the wreckage of the Holy Roman Empire.

What brought the wrath of the world down on Saddam's head was his proclamation, on August 8, 1990, that Kuwait was the 19th province of Iraq. It was this act that elicited from Bush his most succinct battle cry: "This will not stand!" That was and would continue to be the essence of U.S. policy—the annexation would not stand—and it was also the main explanation offered by officials of other countries for their participation in Desert Storm. If Saddam were allowed to get away

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with altering by force an internationally accepted boundary, he would be establishing a precedent that could complicate, if not jeopardize, every country's sovereignty.

For many Europeans Saddam's challenge awakened the worst memories of the 1930s. Here were the Rhineland, the Anschluss and the Sudetenland all over again. These historical associations were surely in Bush's mind when he repeatedly compared Saddam to Hitler. To those who were afraid that the Persian Gulf might turn into another Vietnam, he replied, in effect, that he was determined to prevent another Munich: if Saddam was not stopped now, he would have to be stopped later, and probably at greater cost.

For the Arabs it had long been a guiding principle that their leaders could engage in any treachery as long as they were reasonably polite about it, calling one another brother, and as long as they left intact the post-World War I borders. Saddam broke the rules. That violation made it possible for Bush to assemble a diverse coalition that included Arab royals, like the kings of Saudi Arabia and Morocco; moderate, pro-Western if authoritarian leaders like Hosni Mubarak of Egypt; and radical, anti-Western dictators like Hafez al-Assad of Syria.

Assad's participation was particularly telling. Over the years he had repeatedly violated in different ways the sovereignty of Syria's own small weak neighbor, Lebanon. But because Assad had not attempted to redraw, much less erase, any borders, he was welcomed into the anti-Saddam coalition.

The three sub-Saharan African nations in the coalition—Niger, Senegal and Sierra Leone—sent troops to the gulf largely because their governments wished to nip in the bud the idea that post-colonial frontiers were subject to adjustment unilaterally and by force. This was an issue potentially even more explosive for Africa than for the Middle East.

Just as a number of Third World countries quickly aligned themselves with United States, so did members of what had been the second, or communist, world—and for reasons similar to those of the African states. Poland, for example, had been subject to invasion and annexation throughout its history, and its government felt it important to have soldiers in the gulf as a way of underscoring its commitment to the principle of inviolability of borders.

Thus there was both logic and irony in the way the Gulf War ended. The coalition sent its warplanes against Iraqi forces on January 16, 1991, to restore the territorial integrity of Kuwait.

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Then, about six weeks later, the coalition suspended hostilities in a way intended to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq. The casus belli and the essential condition for a ceasefire came down to the same issue: On which side of the Iraq-Kuwait border were Saddam's forces? Once they were back on the right side—that is, their own—the war could end.

Much as they would have been delighted at the demise of Saddam himself, few if any of the allies wanted to see Iraq dismembered. Turkey, Syria and Iran were concerned that if the Kurds in northern Iraq succeeded in freeing themselves from Baghdad's rule, they would stir up the Kurdish minorities in their territories. Furthermore each of Iraq's neighbors was concerned that one or more of the others might exploit Saddam's defeat to carve off a piece of his domain—in other words, do to Saddam what he had done to Kuwait: annex territory. The Saudis, Kuwaitis and those in the smaller gulf states were especially worried that if the Shiites in the south of Iraq succeeded in their own rebellion, that region might in some fashion become an appendage of Iran. After the Iraqi strongman seemed to have been cut down to size, the gulf Arabs began to fret anew over the old specter of Iranian hegemony, which had led them to back Saddam against Iran in the 1980s during the earlier gulf war.

The dissolution of Iraq would have been alarming to other members of the coalition as well, countries that had their own restive ethnic minorities. Secessionism was a particularly troublesome issue in Yugoslavia, which was already showing signs of coming apart at the seams; in Czechoslovakia, where Slovaks were pulling away from Czechs; and even in Canada, where the Quebecers were threatening to leave the federation. The Soviet Union, then still a single state, would almost surely have exercised its veto to block any U.N. Security Council resolution that was likely to strengthen centrifugal forces in Iraq and thereby encourage those that were tearing apart the U.S.S.R. Another permanent member of the Security Council, the People's Republic of China, which had invaded and annexed Tibet in 1951, was sensitive on this point as well.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the Bush administration came under a barrage of appeals from foreign leaders both inside and outside the coalition not to do anything that would precipitate the breakup (or "Lebanonization") of Iraq. Among other things, it was argued, the day might come when the United States, the West and the gulf Arabs would need Iraq

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once again, as a counterweight to Iran (and to Syria, which had been the principal perpetrator of the Lebanonization of Lebanon).

As it happened, the president needed little convincing on this score. He took pride in calling himself a conservative, and his favorite word was prudence. By instinct and as a result of lessons learned from long experience, he believed it was only prudent to conserve existing structures unless changing them seemed absolutely necessary. Iraq was part of the existing structure. Bush and other American policymakers never supported the Kurds in their campaign for "autonomy," which almost everyone understood to be a euphemism for, or at least a first step toward, independence.

On February 15, 1991, Bush urged the "Iraqi people" to "take matters into their own hands" and "force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside." According to what several of his aides said later, the president was addressing anti-Saddam elements in the ruling Baath Party and the military, who he was hoping would seize power and maintain a strong central government in Baghdad.

But dissident Kurds and Shiites took Bush's message more literally. They could be forgiven for doing so. A radio station in Saudi Arabia, set up with assistance from the CIA and funding from the Saudi government, broadcast messages of support to the rebels. With the official knowledge and approval of the United States, the governments of Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria sent money, arms and other supplies to the insurgents. However, the objective of these efforts, covert and otherwise, was to put pressure on Saddam and increase the incentive of his subordinates to turn against him—not to split up Iraq.

For the next month the twin rebellions gathered force. Meanwhile, Saddam recovered. Using the forces he had managed to extricate from Kuwait as well as those he had held in reserve, he suppressed the uprisings, massacred civilians and brought devastation to the Shiite holy city of Karbala and the Kurdish center of Kirkuk far worse than anything the allies had done in the air war. The U.S. government had anticipated that there would be uprisings but hoped they would lead dissidents in the Iraqi Baath Party and the military to overthrow Saddam. Instead the Sunni Arabs in those organizations

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sided with Saddam against the Kurds and the Shiites, allowing Saddam to crush the opposition.

On March 13, during a visit to Ottawa, Bush made a statement suggesting that the Iraqi government's use of helicopters in these operations was a violation of the agreement that had led to the suspension of hostilities. Subsequently officials of the National Security Council staff, State Department and Pentagon insisted that Bush had never meant to signal that the United States was prepared to shoot down the helicopters or actively intervene on the rebels' side. In a series of meetings at the White House, Bush made clear, emphatically and repeatedly, that he saw what was happening in Iraq as a "civil war" in which the United States must not under any circumstances become involved. Even from his position on the sidelines, he was hoping that the Kurds would not win, if winning meant achieving independence. On March 26, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater announced that the United States would not interfere with the operations of Iraqi helicopters unless they posed a threat to U.S. or coalition forces. Saddam now had a free hand.

The winners of the war were congratulating themselves for having reestablished the principle that was meant to deter aggression: invade a neighboring state, and you will pay a price. But now the loser in the war was taking advantage of an awkward corollary: stay on your own territory, wrap yourself in the cloak of sovereignty, and you can do anything you want. Having been punished for violating the sanctity of borders, Saddam found protection behind that same principle as he butchered his own citizens. Having withdrawn from Kuwait, Saddam was now playing by accepted rules; his abominations were once again in the category of internal affairs, therefore no longer subject to the intervention of the United States or the world community.

The Iraqi leader seemed on the brink of transforming himself from an international outlaw into the champion of Iraq's survival as a state, a goal to which Bush and most if not all of the allies were also committed. It was the cruelest twist of the whole affair. Saddam had, in effect, joined the coalition.

V

If the postwar horrors had remained confined by the boundaries of Iraq, the United States and the international community might well have let them simply play themselves

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out. Even though President Bush had railed against Saddam as a monster, it was only insofar as Saddam behaved monstrously toward Kuwait that Bush—and most other coalition leaders—felt it was the international community's business and responsibility to do anything about him.

Given Bush's repeated comparisons of Saddam to Hitler, a hypothetical question comes to mind: What if British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had stood up to the German dictator at Munich? What if Hitler had contented himself with the territory of Weimar Germany for building the Third Reich, complete with concentration camps, gas chambers and ovens? Would the world have done anything about it?

And half a century later, a similar question arises: What if Saddam had set about mass murder among his own people who had risen up against him? Would the world have done anything about that, had hundreds of thousands not fled to the frontier areas of Turkey and Iran? Even when there was such an exodus, it was only reluctantly, belatedly and under pressure that the Bush administration responded with military force.

The pressure came primarily from four sources: the media, particularly television, which broadcast night after night footage of miserable, starving masses and dead babies; President Turgut Özal of Turkey, whose own territory and sovereignty were now in jeopardy, at least at the periphery, because of the massive influx of Iraqi Kurds; the West European allies, especially Prime Minister John Major of Britain and President François Mitterrand of France (who, in turn, was considerably influenced by his wife, an activist in humanitarian causes); and Secretary Baker, who had visited a refugee camp on the Turkish-Iraqi border. The secretary of state was only in the camp for 12 minutes, but it was long enough for him to see that half a million people were living in unspeakable conditions high up in the mountains—and therefore that the United States and the coalition had a huge problem on their hands. Shortly afterward, at his next stop in Tel Aviv, Baker telephoned Bush and urged a dramatic step-up in the effort to deliver supplies to the Kurdish refugees.

The president remained extremely reluctant to take any steps that constituted a reintroduction of U.S. forces to the gulf region. But in the days that followed Baker's call, a number of allied leaders, especially Özal and Major, convinced him that two looming horrors—massive starvation among the

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refugees in the border areas and a full-scale massacre of the Kurds by the Iraqi army—could turn the victory in the war into a debacle for the West. The result was, first, a major relief operation and then—in another impressive display of coordination and cooperation among allies—the deployment of U.S. and coalition forces to establish safe havens inside northern Iraq so that the Kurds could come down from the murderously cold and inhospitable mountains. Large numbers of Kurdish and Shiite refugees were also in Iran, but their plight was largely overlooked, since their encampments were far less accessible to Western journalists and TV camera crews—and since the leaders in Tehran were, to put it mildly, not in the habit of telephoning the White House.

U.N. resolution 687, which the Security Council passed on April 3, specified that Iraq must, under international supervision, destroy all its biological and chemical weapons and give up its ballistic missiles with ranges of more than 90 miles. Iraq was banned from developing or acquiring any of those instruments of war in the future as well as from acquiring or developing nuclear bombs or weapons-usable material. These measures were intended to punish Iraq as well as to limit its ability to threaten its neighbors in the future. As such they were welcome additions to international law, but they were also in the spirit of what might be called the old geopolitics. As usual the world community was focusing on the threat of aggression across borders.

However, two days later, on April 5, with the refugee crisis growing worse, the Security Council finally broke new ground. Resolution 688 asserted that humanitarian organizations had the right of immediate access to Iraqi citizens who were victims of repression inside Iraq itself. It was that action that set the scene for U.S. and allied forces to carve out sanctuaries on Iraqi territory.

Thus, only in the aftermath of war did the United Nations take a step—and a very small, uncertain one at that—toward redefining its interests and obligations to take account not just of what happens between and among nations but what happens inside them as well. Similarly, only as an unintended and halfhearted postscript to Desert Storm—and only under goading from his allies and American public opinion—did George Bush finally begin to give meaning to the slogan of a new world order. Just as Saddam Hussein's seizure of Kuwait had galvanized the coalition into resuscitating the old idea of

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collective security, his vengeance on the Kurds had, however belatedly and tentatively, stimulated the world toward a genuine sense of collective responsibility for the behavior of governments toward their own people.

VI

George Bush, however, did little to advance these concepts in the months that followed. Quite the contrary, in its handling of several other situations in 1991 his administration operated from the principle that the stability of relations among states was the ultimate international good; and, as a corollary, that change within states, even if fueled by the yearning for democracy, can be dangerous insofar as it threatens stability. Hence his administration's continuing eagerness to minimize the tensions in U.S.-Chinese relations resulting from the 1989 massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square. Hence, also, its refusal to do much more than protest when a military coup d'état in Haiti overthrew that country's popularly elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, at the end of September.

Most significant, however, was the Bush administration's reaction in 1991 to the breakup of two multinational communist states, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Bush and his principal foreign policy aides were initially quite forthright in their support for President Gorbachev's attempt to preserve the essential structure of the Soviet Union. In practice that meant preserving many of the powers of the central Soviet government against the mounting demands for independence on the part of the republics. During a visit to Kiev in July, Bush publicly warned his Ukrainian hosts about the dangers posed by rampant nationalism and the disintegration of the Soviet state. That speech put the president essentially on Gorbachev's side in the growing conflict between the Kremlin and the republics.

Likewise, in the early days of the civil war in Yugoslavia (a country that Woodrow Wilson had helped create), Secretary Baker indicated that Washington hoped the forces of federalism would prevail over the forces of secessionism—or, more to the point, over those of self-determination. Only later, when it became inescapably clear that the leadership in Belgrade was using the most brutal means to preserve a Serbian-dominated dictatorship over the other republics, especially Croatia, did Washington modify its policy. Even then, there was no hint

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that America, as the senior partner in the custodianship of European security, would exert real muscle to end the bloodshed in Yugoslavia or even endorse such a move by the European members of the Atlantic alliance.

To be sure, in his reluctance to engage in—or even raise the possibility of—military intervention in Haiti or Yugoslavia, Bush was in tune with his constituents; there was no groundswell of public support in the United States to send the 82nd Airborne Division to Port-au-Prince or Dubrovnik. However, in its uncertain response to all of these crises, the administration conveyed a sense of not really knowing what the American role in the world should be, now that communism no longer had to be contained.

VII

Meanwhile the issue of Iraq never entirely receded. By the end of the year Saddam Hussein was resorting to a variety of maneuvers to persuade the outside world to lift the postwar sanctions. To this end, he played on the conscience of the international community by having his propagandists release photographs of Iraqi children who were suffering from malnutrition; in its determination to punish him personally, Saddam was saying, the United States and the others in the coalition were guilty of mass infanticide. Once again television images of starving Iraqi people, along with persistent reminders of the resilience of Saddam's regime, put the lie to the administration's claim that it had achieved a great victory in the gulf. With the presidential campaign gathering momentum, the Democrats had all the more incentive—and all the more evidence—to depict Desert Storm as a failure.

Moreover, having been crushed on the battlefield but spared total defeat, Saddam not only remained the scourge of his own people, but seemed to be reemerging as a menace to his neighbors and to world peace as well. As the year unfolded, he played a cat-and-mouse game with U.N. nuclear weapons inspectors, who discovered evidence that Iraqi scientists had made much more progress in their plans to develop an atomic bomb than the outside world had realized, and that Baghdad even had an incipient program to develop a hydrogen bomb.

Important and serious as this issue was, the Bush administration's response should be seen for what it was: a traditional concern on the part of a traditionalist president with the external threat that Iraq posed to other countries.

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VIII

By the end of the year George Bush had, for the most part, stopped talking about a new world order. Several of his advisers explained that he had dropped the phrase because he felt it suggested more enthusiasm for the changes sweeping the planet than he actually felt; he wanted, as a kind of antidote to all the uncertainties in the world, to stress the old verities of territorial integrity, national sovereignty and international stability.

When, in November, Bush realized he was on the political defensive, he referred repeatedly to the Gulf War as a necessary and successful case of countering territorial expansionism. At his press conference in Rome early that month, he said, "If I had to listen to advice" from Democrats on Capitol Hill, "we'd have still been sitting there in the United States, fat, dumb and happy," with the Iraqi army "maybe in Saudi Arabia."[4] In a speech given to the U.N. General Assembly in September, the president briefly resurrected the idea of a new world order, but he defined it as "an order in which no nation must surrender one iota of its own sovereignty"—a formulation that should have been music to Saddam's ears.

In these and similar statements Bush was trying to rally support for his activist approach to foreign policy, but he was also confirming what many Americans had already realized, in many cases to their disappointment: Desert Storm turned out to have been about real estate after all; by drawing a line in the sand and then staying on one side of that line himself, Bush had reaffirmed that U.S. foreign policy was primarily about lines on a map.

In so doing, he was inadvertently asking for trouble from two opposing camps, both of which were already restless because of the end of the Cold War. At one end of the spectrum, the America-Firsters felt that with the defeat of the global communist enemy, there was no longer an ideological justification for the United States to risk its blood, treasure and prestige "overseas." At the other end, advocates of *moralpolitik* felt that the collapse of the Soviet Union presented the United

[4]In fact, the president was misrepresentating his critics. Few members of Congress had opposed Operation Desert Shield, the deployment of American and allied forces in the fall of 1990 to deter further Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia or the other gulf states. Rather, the controversy and opposition in Congress arose over Bush's conviction that a standoff in the desert, even when backed up by tough international economic and political sanctions, would not dislodge Saddam from Kuwait and that military action against Iraq itself was necessary.

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States with an opportunity—and indeed an obligation—to step up its mission on behalf of democracy and human rights around the world.

Bush was, quite simply, uncomfortable with ideology, liberal or conservative, as the basis for any policy, foreign or domestic. While unquestionably an internationalist, he saw himself as a pragmatist; he never had his heart in the cause, or in the concept, of intervention on behalf of democratic and humanitarian principles.

This left him and the country he was trying to lead with a dilemma: the United States had, in the past, always needed an overarching rationale for its engagement abroad, and it would almost certainly need one in the future. In mobilizing his fellow citizens to go to war against Saddam Hussein, Bush had suggested that what was at stake were standards, championed by the United States but applicable to all humanity, about how governments should govern. But in the way he ended the war, he repudiated that principle. More important, he gave his countrymen no coherent or compelling alternative. He left them in confusion over exactly what they had been fighting for in the Persian Gulf, hence over what America's role should be in the post-Cold War world. No wonder, therefore, many were all the more susceptible to a resurgence of the view that America should come home.

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Martin Indyk

WATERSHED IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Last year was a watershed in the Middle East. It began with a war in the Persian Gulf and ended with an Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid. The liberation of Kuwait, the destruction of Iraq's offensive capabilities by the U.S.-led coalition and the simultaneous, though unrelated, disintegration of the Soviet Union promoted the United States to a position of unchallenged dominance in the region. The radical powers—Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—found themselves without a superpower patron; the back of the "rejectionist front" was broken. As a direct consequence, by the end of 1991 all of Israel's Arab neighbors were engaged in direct peace negotiations with the Jewish state and Iran had arranged the release of the remaining American hostages.

The gulf crisis exposed the inadequacies of governments and the failure of their ideologies, the perfidy of some leaders and the venality of others. And the end of superpower rivalry in the Middle East robbed the players of their most valued asset: the ability to secure patronage by playing one superpower against the other. Yet not one Middle East government was overthrown as a result of the year's tumultuous events. Instead the region's leaders, most of whom had been in power for at least a decade, sought to adjust to the new post-Cold War, post-Gulf War circumstances as best they could while retaining a powerful urge to cling to the old ways of doing business.

Given America's dominant influence, things might have been different had the United States adopted a more ambitious approach to restructuring the Middle East order. The objectives were certainly lofty. In his March 6 victory speech to Congress, the president called for a new regional security structure, limitations on the Middle East arms race, an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict and economic freedom and prosperity for all the people of the region. But the Bush administration

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also had a preference for the status quo, and its actions fell short of its ambitious objectives. It sought more to stabilize the old order than to remake the Middle East in its own preferred image.

Bilateral security arrangements in the gulf (facilitated by new arms sales), modest proposals to control weapons of mass destruction, a set-piece beginning to prolonged Arab-Israeli negotiations and the dodging of any democratic agenda—so much a feature of American policy in other regions—were all part of this more cautious approach. It meant leaving Saddam Hussein in place as well as restoring the emir of Kuwait to power. This gradual approach suited the pace of the Middle East's leaders. And it obviated the need for the president to expend energy or confront the difficult dilemmas inherent in a restructuring effort.

At year's end the Middle East certainly appeared, on the surface, to be a more stable place. Western interests were well protected, American influence was unchallenged, oil supplies at reasonable prices were secured. But as Syria and Iran embarked on ambitious rearmament programs and Saddam Hussein struggled to consolidate his grip on power, signs of political turmoil became evident across the Arab world. There was a nagging sense that the moment had been missed, that devoting America's diplomatic energies to the launching of Arab-Israeli negotiations might not be sufficient to prevent the emergence of new threats to regional stability in the not too distant future.

II

The Gulf War was above all a product of miscalculation, in the first place by Kuwait and America's Arab allies, which simply could not imagine that Saddam Hussein would use military power against them (especially power they had helped him to accumulate). It was also a failure of assessment on the part of the United States, which should have better understood the implications of Iraq's defeat of Iran for the regional balance of power and shifted its policy toward Iraq from accommodation to containment. Finally, the war was a massive miscalculation by Saddam Hussein himself. Given the extent and sophistication of his nuclear weapons programs it is astonishing that he did not wait the mere 18 months, if that, until he had acquired a nuclear device before embarking on his Kuwaiti adventure. That he did not wait may have been

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due in part to his inability to fuel Iraq's economic growth and his military ambitions simultaneously. More likely it is attributable to his flawed strategic vision—that the Saudis would not dare challenge his fait accompli by inviting infidel forces to defend the Islamic kingdom and that, even if they did, a post-Cold War United States was unlikely to go to war for Kuwait when Saddam was offering to guarantee American oil supplies.

Iraq's failure to comprehend American resolve and capabilities was most evident in the weeks before the outbreak of war on January 16, 1991. The common assumption in Washington and Arab capitals was that, faced with a U.N.-endorsed demonstration of the coalition's commitment, Saddam Hussein would decide to withdraw. Instead, Saddam went beyond the brink. He may have considered that his prospects were better in war—given his own willingness to sustain heavy Iraqi casualties and his belief that the United States could not bear the same costs—than they would be after a humiliating withdrawal. But unconditional withdrawal was the most George Bush could allow Saddam Hussein, given the way he combined aggressive intentions and offensive capabilities in an area of vital concern to the United States.

Based on past experience Saddam clearly believed he could draw on mass discontent in the Arab world to undermine the cohesion of the coalition. His attempt to don the robes of Gamal Abdel al-Nasser and ride a wave of pan-Arab sentiment to victory over the "imperialist" powers was a dismal failure. His hollow claim to be liberating Palestine by invading Kuwait resonated only in the Palestinian streets of Jordan and the West Bank. His cynical effort to appeal to Islam and the gap between rich and poor in the Arab world, coming from a secular leader of an oil-rich country, was met with disdain except in the Maghreb and Jordan, where Islamic fundamentalists sought to ride his coattails to greater power for themselves. None of these efforts made any difference where it might have really counted—in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. These three Arab states together proved capable of sustaining sufficient Arab support for the U.S.-led campaign to liberate Kuwait and thwart Saddam Hussein's design. Despite dire predictions, the war was brief, allied casualties minimal and the "Arab street" dormant.

The determination President Bush showed in his efforts to liberate Kuwait was not matched by an equal determination to

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—from the Introduction

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

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restructure the Middle East in the wake of victory. The gap between the regional expectations generated by American capabilities and the will of the United States to impose an American imperium on the region was most clearly manifest in the decision to allow Saddam Hussein to survive in power.

That decision had in fact been made before the war was launched and was signaled in the articulation of war goals, which called for the liberation of Kuwait, the restoration of the emir and the destruction of Iraq's offensive capabilities—especially its weapons of mass destruction—but stopped short of calling for Saddam's removal.

There are many explanations for this decision. No U.N. mandate existed for Saddam's overthrow. Advancing on Baghdad might have been opposed by the Arab coalition partners. If Kurdish and Shiite revolts following the ground war had been allowed to succeed, Iraq might have disintegrated, generating profound instability. Both the American and Saudi governments had been frightened by intelligence reports that Iranian-trained brigades had crossed into Iraq to provide the backbone of the Shiite revolt. The Bush administration was strongly opposed to assuming responsibility for governing Iraq. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were fearful that U.S. forces would become bogged down in the quagmire of Iraqi politics and—in a replay of Lebanon—a welcome, liberating force would soon turn into an unwanted army of occupation.

President Bush was also concerned with the pressure on Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev from hardliners in Moscow who objected to Soviet acquiescence in a war on a former Soviet ally. An American move against Saddam in Baghdad, the president feared, would provide Gorbachev's opponents with the justification for a coup. In any case U.S. policymakers believed that Saddam would be toppled and that American interests could be protected even if the Baath establishment remained in power, provided that Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors was eliminated.

With the expectation of imminent demise now foremost in his mind, Saddam was quick to comprehend the lack of American resolve. The Bush administration's decision to allow the Iraqi army use of offensive air power was taken as a sure sign of American indifference to the ensuing slaughter. Within four weeks Saddam had rallied the support of the Sunnis, regrouped his armed forces, brutally snuffed out the Shiite

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revolt in the south and routed the Kurdish rebels in the north, forcing a flight of at least 1.5 million Kurdish refugees.

Saddam's survival was a rude and unwelcome surprise to Washington. It forced a readjustment of policy with the announcement in May that the U.N.-mandated economic sanctions would remain in force until Saddam had been toppled. But relying on sanctions to force Saddam to quit Baghdad had a major drawback—the Iraqi people would have to pay the price. Indeed, Saddam cynically exploited the hardship of his people, purposefully refusing to cooperate with U.N. efforts to provide food and medicine in the hope that the international community would be blamed for their plight. By year's end, although Saddam remained beleaguered in Baghdad and the base of his support appeared to be eroding, he was still in power. He was able to import sufficient food to keep his people on a subsistence diet and prevent them from rebelling. And he was able to create a crack in allied resolve when he persuaded Britain to unblock $125 million in frozen Iraqi assets; other European governments were reported ready to follow suit out of concern for the plight of the Iraqi people.

None of this affected the basic reality that Saddam could not for the time being threaten his neighbors. But it did raise the disturbing possibility that he, or a successor Baath regime, could eventually escape the sanctions, rebuild Iraq's offensive capabilities and wreak revenge. This prospect was underlined by the frightening discoveries by U.N. officials inspecting Iraq's strategic weapons facilities. They found a huge arsenal of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles as well as a biological weapons development program.

Most disturbing, however, was the extent of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Iraq had been pursuing four separate uranium enrichment routes, had produced limited quantities of plutonium and lithium-6 (for hydrogen bombs), was testing a detonation system and was probably still harboring undisclosed stocks of imported weapons-grade uranium. According to the U.N. Special Commission for the Disarmament of Iraq, Saddam was only 12 to 18 months from the deployment of nuclear weapons. With 15,000 nuclear scientists and technicians still in Iraq, there is now the real concern that even if all

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the nuclear material is discovered and all the nuclear facilities destroyed, Iraq's bomb-building knowledge will remain.[1]

The price of the decision to allow Saddam to survive is clear: only eternal vigilance can ensure that Iraq, the would-be Prussia of the Middle East, will not emerge again to threaten its gulf neighbors. In the meantime Saddam's survival is a constant reminder of the volatility and dangers of the old order in the Middle East.

III

For the other Arab leaders there was some short-term comfort in Saddam's survival. With the tiger back in its cage and the old order restored, perhaps they could go back to business as usual. No Arab leader in the coalition sought Saddam's removal. As Boutros Ghali, then Egypt's minister of state for foreign affairs, remarked in the midst of the war, "we have coexisted with the government of Saddam Hussein and [if Iraq withdraws from Kuwait] we will be able to coexist and even to cooperate with him."[2]

A similar attitude was adopted toward the restoration of the emir of Kuwait. Indeed, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia was reported to have summoned National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to Riyadh in April to underscore the fact that the war had been fought to liberate Kuwait and to disabuse the United States of any notion of promoting democracy in Saudi Arabia's northern neighbor.

But it would not prove so easy to resurrect the past. Saddam's aggression and the Arab response had shattered the myth of pan-Arab unity and left the Arab world in disarray. It did not take long for the implications to translate into policy as Arab leaders, struggling to bolster their authority, placed state interests above "Arab interests" with a vengeance.

At first, in an instinctive throwback to an earlier era, the Arab victors had sought to recreate the idea of Arab collective security. In March the six gulf Arab states together with Syria and Egypt had issued the "Damascus Declaration" calling for the enhancement of "economic cooperation" and the establishment of a solely Arab peacekeeping force to maintain security

[1]See Les Aspin's speech, "Winning the War and Losing the Peace in Saddam Hussein's Iraq," delivered in New York, Dec. 12, 1991.

[2]Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Egypt Says It Doesn't Favor Removing Iraqi Chief and Can Work With Him in Future," *The New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1991.

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in the gulf based on the nucleus of Syrian and Egyptian forces already deployed there. While the declaration spoke of a "common destiny and identical hopes and objectives," the reality soon proved very different.

The war cost Saudi Arabia some $50 billion and the Saudi government had to borrow internationally to fund its budget. Egypt and Syria had been paid handsomely by the gulf Arabs for providing the political cover of troop commitments to the coalition effort. But their expectation that they would play the leading role in postwar gulf security arrangements, and thereby continue to receive financial compensation, was quickly dashed. By April Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had quietly indicated to Egypt and Syria that their troops were no longer welcome.

The gulf Arab states had in fact decided to do the previously unthinkable—depend on bilateral security arrangements with the United States. Kuwait, a strident pre-war promoter of pan-Arabism and anti-Americanism, signed a bilateral defense agreement with the Pentagon in September that provided for a 10-year U.S. military presence. Saudi Arabia made a similar calculation: it was not about to permit Egypt and Syria a strategic presence in the gulf while it took on responsibility for their economies. King Fahd, however, was unwilling to run the gauntlet of domestic criticism from traditional religious forces for allowing the United States to establish a base and troop presence in Saudi Arabia. Instead, he entered into quiet arrangements for prepositioning military equipment and for joint exercises while seeking a massive and controversial infusion of American weapons and training to double the size of the Saudi army.

A similar preference for national over pan-Arab interests was evident in the decision of the gulf states to encourage the departure of Arab guest workers, breaking the compact between the small, rich countries of the gulf and the poor, overpopulated countries of the rest of the Arab world. During the crisis some one million Egyptian, Jordanian and Palestinian workers fled Iraq and Kuwait, and another 800,000 Yemenis were encouraged to leave Saudi Arabia. After the war the Kuwaitis took their revenge for what they saw as Palestinian betrayal by eliminating the once vital role the Palestinian community played in their government and private sectors. Nor were the other gulf Arabs willing to renew their dependence on Arab labor even if the workers came from countries

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that had sided with them during the crisis. Before Saddam's invasion, the poorer Arab countries had been able to rely on worker remittances from the oil-rich gulf to boost their dismal economic prospects. Now Egypt, Jordan and Yemen faced massive unemployment problems about which their Arab brothers in the gulf cared little.

The breakdown of economic and security arrangements between Arab countries exacerbated Arab political divisions created by Iraq's aggression—revealed most clearly in the treatment of the PLO, the symbol of pan-Arab solidarity. The gulf Arabs, led by Saudi Arabia, were particularly incensed by what they perceived as the perfidy of Yasir Arafat for siding with Saddam. Normally such feelings would have been overcome by the need to close ranks and express fidelity to the cause of Palestine. But the Gulf War had broken that mold too. Gone were the ritual declarations at Arab gatherings of support for the PLO as "the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinians." Gone too were funding for the PLO and the usual visits by Arafat to gulf capitals (although the PLO leader was able to effect a reconciliation of sorts with his arch-rival, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad). The breakdown of the old Arab order was perhaps best symbolized by the Saudi crown prince publicly rebuffing Arafat at the Islamic Conference summit in December with the admonition, "No kissing, please."

Egypt tried to pick up the pieces of Arab unity, but the legacy of bitterness was too great. Egypt soon discovered it had inherited the empty forms—the Arab League headquarters back in Cairo with Egypt's foreign minister as secretary general—rather than the substance. Denied a role as defender of the Arab gulf, Egypt was left to play handmaiden to America's new dominant status in the region. Since all the Arab states now sought good relations with Washington, Cairo offered its services as a broker. Promoting Syrian relations with the United States was particularly important to the creation of an Egyptian-led postwar Arab order.

Syrian President Assad had been quick to understand his country's need for alternative patronage when the Soviet empire began to collapse. The gulf crisis provided Assad with a perfect opportunity to build a better relationship with the remaining superpower. To consolidate this, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saudi King Fahd worked hard to bring Assad around to accepting the American-sponsored

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peace process with Israel and urged Washington to reciprocate. The benefits were immediate: a $2 billion infusion from Saudi Arabia, used to purchase weapons from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia as well as Scud missiles from North Korea; a summit meeting with President Bush; and repeated visits by Secretary of State James A. Baker to Damascus.

Assad also took advantage of his new relationship with the United States to gain its acquiescence in finishing the task of mastering Lebanon. The consolidation of Syria's grip was a mixed blessing. On the one hand, Assad had restored order to Lebanon by disarming the militias. On the other, the price of stability was Syrian dominance, formalized in the "treaty of brotherhood and cooperation," which severely restricted Lebanon's independence.

Whereas Saudi Arabia had previously played a subordinate role in inter-Arab politics, supporting the lowest common denominator consensus established by the radical states, the results of the Gulf War strengthened its hand and resolve. The expected reconciliation with the PLO did not materialize. Instead Saudi Arabia's actions in inter-Arab politics were determined by a new litmus test: whether a particular decision would enhance relations with the United States and strengthen the American commitment to Saudi Arabia's defense.

In effect, Saudi Arabia and Egypt—the two established mainstays of American influence in the Arab world—had switched roles. Changed circumstances and opportunities had led Egypt to adopt the role of conciliator in the Arab world, whereas Saudi Arabia was now more willing to do America's bidding—even if this strained relations with its Arab allies.

What it did not change, however, was the way the royal family conducted the internal affairs of the Saudi kingdom. Fearful of the domestic implications of heightened dependence on the United States, the Saudi rulers dramatically reduced the profile of America's troop presence, appeased the conservative tribal and religious sectors and took back authority from the younger generation of pro-American princes who had fought the war and helped save the kingdom.

A similar retrenchment took place across the Arab world. With the manifest failure of pan-Arabism and Arab socialism, the Arabs in general were left with a choice of two ideologies: Islamic fundamentalism or liberal democracy. Where democratization had been tried—in Algeria, Jordan and Egypt—Islamic fundamentalists had taken the opportunity of greater

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freedom of expression and elections to increase their strength and challenge the regime. The prolonged failure of Arab regimes to meet the basic needs of their people proved fertile ground for a homegrown ideology that provided hope and the certainty of ultimate salvation. The political turmoil provoked by the gulf crisis gave the fundamentalists an opportunity to consolidate their gains but, in its wake, Arab regimes countered with crackdowns.

This situation was first evident in Jordan, where King Hussein was unable to resist the tide of pro-Saddam, anti-Western sentiment and, during the crisis, gave free rein to the Islamic fundamentalists to promote their invective. But in the war's aftermath, the king shut them out of the government, arrested large numbers of the more extreme elements and committed Jordan to peace negotiations with Israel, despite the virulent objections of the Islamic bloc in parliament.

In Algeria, as in Jordan, the Islamic Salvation Front organized mass demonstrations in support of Saddam Hussein and demanded that the government train and arm Islamic volunteers to fight for Iraq. But in the aftermath of Saddam's defeat, the army intervened, suppressing violent demonstrations, arresting thousands of fundamentalists, including the leaders of the Islamic party, and postponing elections until late in the year.

It might well have been a different story in liberated Kuwait had the United States taken a strong stand for democracy. In an effort to court American public opinion during the gulf crisis, the emir-in-exile had promised the opposition parties that he would reconvene parliament and hold elections after Kuwait was freed. Once back in his palace, however, he declared a state of emergency and postponed elections until October 1992.

The Bush administration watched all these events from the sidelines, which suited the Arab regimes fine. Preoccupied with consolidating their rule they were not looking for encouragement from Washington to take risky measures that would open them to criticism from their own people. Feeling the need to come to terms with American dominance in postwar regional affairs, the Arab regimes found it easier to do so without bringing democracy into the bargain.

The gulf crisis had nevertheless shaken the foundations of rule in the Arab world, whether the regimes were on the side of victor or vanquished. And by year's end, it was clear that

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suppression alone was an insufficient response. In Algeria postponed and gerrymandered elections resulted in a stunning victory for Islamic fundamentalists, which led to a military power play. In Saudi Arabia, after years of procrastination, the king finally announced that an appointed consultative assembly would be convened in 1992, while openly warning against Islamic extremism. From the Maghreb to the gulf, regimes were groping for legitimacy, buffeted by the demands of democracy and Islam—antithetical partners in the creation of a new Arab order that was bound to be marked by political turmoil.

IV

For Israel the Gulf War was a traumatic event that shook the foundations of its long-held military doctrine and left the Jewish state feeling more vulnerable and isolated—even though the results of the war enhanced its security margin and improved the prospects for reconciliation with its Arab neighbors.

In the face of Arab hostility, preemption and retaliation had been at the heart of Israel's strategy of deterrence. Yet in the gulf crisis Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir came to see the advantages of not responding to the sustained Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel's civilian population, even though Israelis were forced to don gas masks and sit night after night in sealed rooms. In a November 1990 meeting in Washington, Shamir reached a strategic understanding with President Bush that, if it came to war, Israel would not preempt an Iraqi attack. The president assured him that the United States intended to destroy Iraq's offensive capabilities. Since Saddam wanted Israel to join the war, he could not be deterred from attacking by the threat of an Israeli response. Therefore, to preempt would simply be playing into Saddam's hands.

Israel had nonetheless prepared a combined forces response to root out the missiles in western Iraq. As the war continued and the United States proved unable to eliminate the threat, there was a reluctant acceptance in Washington of the inevitability of an Israeli response. By this stage, however, few were concerned that the Arab coalition partners would drop out if Israel entered the war—Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria had all publicly indicated that they would understand if Israel responded. Rather the problem was that Israel would have to overfly Jordan to retaliate against Iraq, and it seemed doubtful

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that King Hussein could avoid a response, given the king's embattled position with his own people. Thus Jordan and Israel could both be drawn into a widening war with potentially uncontrollable consequences.

This was a concern that weighed as heavily on Shamir as it did on policymakers in Washington. Throughout the buildup to war, Shamir had repeatedly expressed concern for the king's situation and urged American interlocutors to appreciate Hussein's predicament rather than punish him for it. Shamir believed that the king provided a better guarantee of stability on Israel's longest border, along the Jordan River, than any of the likely alternatives were the war to lead to his overthrow. For this reason he wanted to avoid—if he could—a situation in which the king would be forced to challenge the Israeli air force as it crossed Jordanian air space en route to Iraq. In the aftermath of the war, when asked about taking confidence-building measures to demonstrate his interest in peace with Israel, King Hussein acknowledged this tacit understanding between himself and Shamir. He responded that Jordan and Israel had already engaged in such measures: "We managed to avoid war."

The appreciation in Amman for Israel's restraint was mirrored in Riyadh, where the Saudis had shared a war experience with Israelis—both came under simultaneous Iraqi Scud attacks. The Saudi rulers contrasted Israel's behavior with Saddam's recklessness and concluded that they had a common interest in promoting a more stable regional status quo.

The Syrian response would prove to be the most important. Damascus had been Israel's staunchest foe, the heart of Arab rejectionism. Yet Syria seemed almost to encourage Israeli retaliation for the Iraqi attacks. Whether in the wake of a war in which they found themselves on the same side these two bitter enemies could sit down and talk peace would become the key to unlocking the negotiating process.

Certainly for the first time since the signing of the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, the effect of the war on Arab state attitudes toward Israel seemed to open the possibility of engaging them in the peace process. This was good news for Israel, which had long been emphasizing the need for negotiation with the Arab states as well as with the Palestinians. And the positive trend was compounded by two other new strategic realities. First, the destruction of much of Iraq's offensive capabilities combined with Syria's loss of Soviet backing had

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diminished, for the time being, the threat of an eastern-front war coalition. Second, the PLO had committed a devastating blunder by siding with Saddam. In one stroke Arafat had alienated both his principal Arab backers and the United States, had forfeited financial assistance and undermined the intifada in the occupied West Bank and Gaza.

These developments presented Israel with a window of opportunity that would not be open for long. Syria was already rearming, and Iraq would eventually recover from the war's devastation. Over time, if there were no alternative, the Arab states and the United States would return to the PLO as before. But in the wake of the war, there was a chance for Israel not only to engage the Arab states in the peace process but also to avoid the PLO and deal with Palestinians from the territories, who had always been Israel's preferred interlocutors.

Israel's need for a peace process had also increased. Its citizens had glimpsed the meaning of a new Arab-Israeli war in which the civilian homefront would be exposed to the terror of missile attacks possibly bearing weapons of mass destruction.

This fear coincided with hope generated by a massive influx of Soviet Jews. More than 185,000 came in 1990 and another 145,000 arrived in 1991. This unprecedented influx of so many highly educated immigrants in such a short period provided an extraordinary opportunity to revitalize the Zionist enterprise. It also presented a profound challenge to Israel's absorptive capacities. Whereas a year ago the problem had been to find housing for so many people, in 1991 it became clear that the real challenge would be to find the immigrants productive and creative jobs—by expanding the economy and increasing exports. Toward this end the Israeli government sought U.S. loan guarantees that would enable it to borrow large amounts of capital in the international markets; Israel also needed greater access to European markets for its exports. Prime Minister Shamir understood very well that the receptivity of the United States and Europe to these essential requirements would depend on Israel's responsiveness to the peace process.

There was, however, one other necessary ingredient for Israel to engage in a meaningful peace process: a relationship of trust between Israel and its only ally, the United States. From Shamir's point of view Israel had delivered, in very difficult circumstances, on a promise of restraint during the crisis—which he assumed to be of much greater strategic

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importance to the president than the controversial settlements in the West Bank. From President Bush's point of view the United States had done Israel a huge favor by taking care of the Iraqi threat, and he now had to deliver on his promise to his Arab coalition partners to seek a settlement of the Palestinian problem. Both sides expected gratitude, but quickly rediscovered mutual suspicion about each other's motives.

As President Bush announced to a joint session of Congress on March 6, the principle of exchanging "territory for peace" was at the heart of his administration's approach, and now he believed that changed strategic circumstances had made that trade possible. But in Shamir's view, Israel was already "such a small country" that security—as well as politics and ideology—required it to hold on to the occupied territories, regardless of the temporary change in its security environment.

Differences over Israel's settlement policy epitomized the gap between the two leaders' perceptions. The president had been persuaded to downplay his objections on the assumption that the best way to stop settlements was to give Israel an incentive by bringing the Arabs to the negotiating table. But Israel's housing minister, Ariel Sharon, had pressed ahead with an ambitious program that included establishment of an additional 16,000 housing units in the occupied territories. This clearly rankled President Bush, and when Israel made a request in September for $10 billion in loan guarantees he was determined that the United States would not be forthcoming until he received some satisfaction on his long-standing request for a freeze on settlement activity.

The administration did not want to jeopardize the chances of a peace conference by insisting on a settlements freeze at this delicate moment, especially when the Arabs had already been persuaded to delay a similar demand until after negotiations had begun. Instead the administration asked the Israeli government, and then Congress, to delay considering loan guarantees to avoid interfering with the peace process.

In Jerusalem the request for delay was an unwelcome surprise. In June the government had been warned publicly by its ambassador in Washington that it would have to choose between loan guarantees and settlements. But in August the Israeli government decided to accept the American proposals for a regional peace conference and assumed that this would clear the way for quick passage of the guarantees through a Congress that appeared overwhelmingly supportive. So confi-

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dent was the Israeli government that on the day Secretary Baker called Prime Minister Shamir to ask for a delay in the request, the cabinet was agreeing on a budget compromise that depended on the first year's $2 billion in guarantees. Thus Israel pressed its request, and the Senate might have quickly passed the legislation had Bush not intervened. On September 12 he issued a veto threat, demanding that Congress delay the request until January 1992 and suggesting that Israel was already getting a good deal of assistance at a time of economic hardship in America.

In Israel President Bush's harsh words were taken as confirmation of Shamir's worst fears—that the Bush administration intended to use Israel's need for economic assistance as pressure for a return to the indefensible 1967 borders. Shamir nevertheless understood that a refusal to participate in the peace negotiations was only likely to trigger greater American pressure and to make securing assistance even more difficult. Instead of rejecting the negotiations as an American ambush, Shamir embraced them, deciding at the last moment to head the Israeli delegation to the Madrid peace conference himself. But he also made it clear that Israel's flexibility in the negotiations would be determined by American as well as Arab behavior. Thus he refused to have any discussion with the United States about matters of substance, vigorously objected to American intervention in the negotiations with procedural or substantive proposals and delayed Israel's attendance at the December talks in Washington for five days to make his point.

The Bush administration understood that it would be difficult to make progress in the negotiations without Israel's cooperation and that Israel's flexibility would depend in large part on the state of U.S.-Israeli relations. Accordingly it sought to make up for actions that were unpalatable to Israel by reaffirming the fundamentals of the relationship. Thus 12 days after his insistence in September on delaying the loan guarantees, President Bush went before the U.N. General Assembly and called for repeal of the "Zionism is racism" resolution. In his speech opening the Madrid peace conference on October 30, the president tried to counterbalance the perception that the United States was about to impose a settlement on Israel by insisting that it was up to the parties to make peace, that the objective should be peace treaties (an Israeli requirement) and that the basis of the solution was "territorial compromise" (implying that the Arabs would have

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to give up territory as well). On December 3, the day before Arab-Israeli negotiations were supposed to begin in Washington, the State Department announced that the United States would pursue the president's call for U.N. repeal of the offensive resolution. This occurred in the General Assembly on December 16, by a resounding vote of 111 to 25, with 13 abstentions. The administration also refrained from intervening in the Washington negotiations, refusing to break the procedural deadlock between the Israeli and Jordanian-Palestinian delegations and insisting that the parties solve the problem themselves as Israel had requested.

Clearly both the United States and Israel recognized that they needed each other, that they were partners in the pursuit of peace, just as they had been partners—albeit silent partners—in the prosecution of the Gulf War. But with the debate about loan guarantees still looming in the near future, mutual distrust was likely to continue to plague the relationship, making cooperation difficult and hindering progress in the peace negotiations. Prime Minister Shamir illustrated this tension when he said in late September, "I have many doubts whether the United States could fill this role [of an honest broker] because of its behavior recently, but there is no better candidate."[3]

V

The difficulties the United States faced in dealing with Israel arose in part because of personality differences and in part because of divergent views regarding Israel's security and political requirements. But they were also a product of America's new status as the dominant power in the Middle East. In the wake of the war, all states in the region looked to Washington to achieve their purposes. Since the end of superpower rivalry meant that the United States needed each of them less, Washington could afford to be less sensitive to their concerns and could expect them to be more willing to do America's bidding.

Consequently the Bush administration found itself in the unprecedented position of being able to set the postwar Middle East agenda. As the president outlined it to Congress on March 6, the agenda would be ambitious, at least on the

[3]"Shamir has doubts U.S. can honestly broker Arab-Israeli Talks," *Associated Press*, Sept. 30, 1991.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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rhetorical level. But it soon became clear that the administration's objective was to bolster the existing order in the Middle East rather than to undertake a more radical transformation.

The president had called for a new security structure for the region. But at year's end the administration found itself in a dispute with Saudi Arabia over the terms for prepositioning American equipment, while the gulf Arabs haggled among themselves about collective security arrangements. All the regional powers—Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Israel—were effectively excluded from these arrangements. The United States could feel reassured that its bilateral arrangements with the gulf Arabs would provide more secure access and more rapid force deployments in a future crisis, but there was little guarantee that such a crisis could be averted.

Controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and preventing a new arms race also proved to be elusive. The effort to disarm Iraq made substantial progress in uncovering Saddam's strategic arsenal and nuclear program. But suspicions remained that Iraq was still concealing missiles and possibly weapons-grade nuclear material, and it was clear that the intrusive inspection regime and arms embargo would need to be maintained indefinitely.

To provide a broader framework for the administration's approach to regional arms control, President Bush had announced on May 29 an initiative designed to restrain "destabilizing" arms transfers, to freeze ballistic missile development and deployment, to end production of fissile material and eventually establish a regional nuclear free zone, and to extend the chemical and biological weapons conventions to the Middle East. As in other areas, however, the administration's approach was gradualist, eschewing calls from Congress for an arms moratorium in favor of a modest attempt to introduce the notion of arms control that would hamper the efforts of radical regional powers to acquire greater military capabilities while not interfering with U.S. efforts to strengthen its friends.

By October the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—also the largest suppliers of weapons to the Middle East—had agreed on guidelines for arms transfers. They would inform each other of new arms sales, help establish a U.N. register of conventional arms transfers, work to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and follow agreed guidelines for the transfer of conventional

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weapons. On paper the areas of agreement were impressive, and the fact that China was engaged in this process was a positive development, given its sales of ballistic missiles to the region.

There were, however, some important contradictions and flaws in the process. In implementing its regional security arrangements, the United States itself was engaged in major new arms sales to the region. There were no sanctions for noncompliance to counterbalance considerable incentives to export as domestic defense budgets decline and the need to compete in foreign markets grows. The MTCR does not include North Korea, Argentina or Brazil, which are already selling weapons to the Middle East and which will have strong incentives to step into any breach. The initiative also does not address the regional actors whose arms control negotiations are to be left to the multilateral discussions associated with the Arab-Israeli peace process. Moreover those negotiations will not include Syria, Iraq and Iran, the region's worst offenders.

While the gap between rhetoric and substance was evident in the areas of regional security and arms control, it was less so in the realm of political and economic restructuring—if only because here the administration had purposely downplayed expectations. President Bush made no mention of promoting political freedom or democracy in the post-Gulf War Middle East, even though these objectives were the centerpiece of American post-Cold War policy in eastern Europe. In his speech to Congress these traditional American foreign policy objectives were replaced by a commitment to promote "economic freedom and prosperity" in the Middle East. Even here, however, the one concrete proposal put forward by the secretary of state—a Middle East bank for economic development—was quietly shelved. And by year's end, with the United States preoccupied with promoting economic prosperity at home, the objective was left to be pursued by others with greater interest and more money—the Europeans and Japanese.

In the president's March 6 speech much greater emphasis was placed on his fourth objective of a peace process to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. By the end of 1991 this would emerge as the administration's crowning achievement. Converting victory in the gulf into a breakthrough in the peace process seemed to many observers a doubtful proposition. But what they overlooked were the six new elements generated by the end of the Cold War and the results of the Gulf War. Skillfully

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molded and manipulated by Secretary Baker and his aides, these elements produced the breakthrough of October 30, when Israel and all its Arab neighbors sat together in Madrid to negotiate peace.

The first of these elements was the demise of the Soviet Union and the dramatic shift in Soviet policy from competition to cooperation with the United States in the Middle East as evidenced during the gulf crisis. The message to Moscow's erstwhile allies in the Middle East was very clear. Henceforth they could not rely on the Soviet Union to back their radical policies, to guarantee their regimes if those policies got them into trouble, or to rebuild their armies if they engaged in war. This bolstered U.S. diplomacy not only by eliminating the ability of the regional states to play the superpowers against each other, but also by weakening the radical states that had previously rejected peace negotiations with Israel.

This contributed to the second element: Syrian weakness. Syria had previously benefited from opposing any settlement with Israel, but with the loss of its superpower patron its road to salvation had a Washington signpost. And with the United States making the peace process the litmus test of its relations with the states of the region, Assad understood that the road to Washington had to pass through Jerusalem. Syrian engagement in peace negotiations with Israel could make Damascus important to U.S. diplomacy. At a minimum it would give the United States a stake in restraining Israel—a capability that it had just demonstrated in the Gulf War. At best it might drive a wedge between the United States and Israel.

The third element was a change in the approach of Saudi Arabia, which now became willing to offer overt support for U.S. diplomatic efforts. This was in part a payback for American protection during the gulf crisis. But the Saudis now had an incentive to help solve the Palestinian problem to show that they were better able to secure Palestinian rights than Saddam could, and they felt that if it were not solved after this war another Arab demagogue would one day come along and seize the issue to make trouble for them again.

The fourth element was the sudden reversal of Palestinian fortunes. The discrediting of the PLO for its embrace of Saddam, its loss of Arab political and financial backing and the deflation of the intifada left the Palestinian movement in desperate straits. Now that the PLO had lost international support, the local leadership had an opportunity both to take

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matters into their own hands and to change the status quo. Jordan shared this desire to engage in the peace process because King Hussein had also discredited himself by his opposition to the liberation of Kuwait. The peace process provided the only way for him to refurbish his relationship with Washington and seek its help in reestablishing the financial support of his erstwhile gulf Arab backers.

The fifth element was Israeli flexibility. Prime Minister Shamir had previously opposed an international conference with Soviet involvement and PLO association with the process. But now he had every incentive to be more flexible about the procedures for negotiations, as long as he secured his basic objective of direct negotiations with the Arab states and Palestinians from the territories without a prior commitment to territorial concessions.

The final and decisive element was American influence. All the regional actors sought the good graces and partnership of the United States. For so long they had been unwilling to say "yes" to peace with each other, but now they could no longer afford to say "no" to the Americans. The key to progress lay in the quick exploitation of the window of opportunity created by the Gulf War. Accordingly, President Bush dispatched his secretary of state to the region in March to sound out the parties.

That trip and seven more shuttles produced evidence of all six elements at work. Moscow followed Washington's lead in the peace process, literally speaking from the same talking points. In nine months of diplomacy there was not a single instance when the Soviet Union deviated from the American position.

Syria began its engagement in customary fashion, insisting on procedural arrangements that would have given it a veto over the negotiating positions of other Arab parties. But in July, after laborious coaxing by Secretary Baker and an assurance from President Bush that the United States viewed the Golan Heights as occupied territory, Assad accepted the American proposals for convening negotiations without conditions or amendments. His willingness to accept arrangements that would bring Syria face-to-face with Israel in bilateral negotiations for the first time—and without any control over the other Arabs—was a clear indication of how Syria's circumstances had changed.

Saudi Arabia welcomed the secretary of state on his first visit with a commitment to engage in the process and support

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American efforts. By April, however, growing criticism from the Islamic clergy at home and opposition from Syria and Egypt to Saudi involvement led King Fahd to back away. After a stern reminder from Washington of Saudi Arabia's obligations to the United States, the king announced in May that the Gulf Cooperation Council would send an observer to the peace conference and that Saudi Arabia would attend the follow-on negotiations with Israel on regional issues. The Saudis also worked behind the scenes, withholding funding from Syria and the PLO to ensure their cooperation and backing for Palestinians from the territories in the negotiations with Israel.

Palestinian pragmatism was evident from the outset when Palestinian leaders from the West Bank and Gaza broke their own boycott on contacts with U.S. officials and met with the secretary of state, forcing the PLO to give retroactive approval. Subsequently they accepted Baker's proposal to negotiate an interim arrangement for Palestinian self-government and agreed to leave final-status negotiations until well after an autonomy regime had been put in place. This was precisely what the Palestinians had been offered in the Camp David accords but had vehemently rejected for more than a decade. They also accepted the exclusion from their joint delegation with Jordan of PLO officials, representatives from outside the territories and residents of east Jerusalem. This too they had previously found unacceptable.

Israel's flexibility was apparent in Shamir's acceptance of Baker's proposal for a regional conference under the joint auspices of the United States and the Soviet Union, a position he had previously staunchly rejected. For two months, he stood firm on his procedural objections to the American bridging proposals that provided for a minor U.N. role and the reconvening of the full conference if all parties agreed. But as soon as Syria agreed to direct negotiations, Shamir dropped those objections, comparing Assad to Anwar al-Sadat in that "a revolution had occurred in his concepts." While insisting that Israel would negotiate only with Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who were not associated with the PLO, Shamir was willing to tolerate a good deal of "static" in the background—in the form of PLO officials accompanying the delegations to Madrid and Washington, the delegations' members declaring that they took their orders from the PLO,

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and Faisal Husseini, a resident of east Jerusalem, asserting his role as leader of the delegation.

American influence was evident in the very fact that the secretary of state was able to get all sides to change their long-standing positions. He launched the direct negotiations between Israel and all its neighbors without corresponding shifts in the equally long-standing policies of the United States. Baker's constant reminders that the regional parties needed the negotiations more than the United States did, and that he and the president had plenty of other pressing matters to attend to, had a salutary effect on Arab and Israeli leaders alike. Baker succeeded in using this influence to persuade each of the parties to accept the previously unacceptable: direct, bilateral "two-track" negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and Israel and the Palestinians; the objective of a "comprehensive settlement" based on U.N. resolution 242. Negotiations on the Palestinian track would deal with interim self-government arrangements first, leaving the final status of the West Bank and Gaza to negotiations that would not begin until three years after the interim arrangement had been implemented. Palestinians would be represented by delegates from the territories who accepted this phased approach; regional issues would be discussed in multilateral negotiations involving the gulf Arabs and the Maghreb states; and the full conference would reconvene after the opening session only with the consent of all parties.

Given the bitter, long and tragic history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was an extraordinary moment in Madrid when the Arab and Israeli delegates entered the Hall of Columns on October 30 and sat down together at the peace table. They were entering a new era of negotiations, but they soon made it clear that they were carrying the heavy baggage of past enmities. Israel gained the recognition of its Arab neighbors, although their unwillingness to shake hands in the conference room showed how grudging that acceptance was. The Palestinians gained Israel's recognition, although they had been forced to swallow bitter pills. The Syrians finally sat down with the Israelis for bilateral negotiations but only after they publicly attacked Shamir—their supposed negotiating partner—as a "terrorist."

Just how long and arduous the negotiations would be became even clearer in the second round that took place in Washington in December. The Israelis showed up five days

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late to register their anger with the United States for imposing the timing and venue. The Israelis and Lebanese quickly found common ground when Israel declared that it had no territorial designs on Lebanon, but then just as quickly became bogged down on the issue of the Syrian troop presence in Lebanon. The Syrians would not agree to talk about peace until the Israelis committed to full withdrawal from the occupied territories; the Israelis would not agree to talk about withdrawal until the Syrians committed to a peace treaty. The Jordanian-Palestinian negotiations failed to get under way because the Israelis objected to the Palestinian demand that the Jordanian and Palestinian delegations be separated. Nevertheless all sides engaged in prolonged exchanges—the Israelis, Jordanians and Palestinians sitting on a couch in a State Department corridor—and agreed to meet again in the new year.

Israel and its Arab neighbors were at last talking to each other. That taboo had been broken. Along with the death of pan-Arabism and the demise of the rejectionist front, negotiations in process provided some hope that a new, more stable and peaceful order might well arise from the ashes of yet another Middle East war. If the elements that produced the Madrid breakthrough could be sustained, there was good reason to believe that agreements between Israel and its neighbors could eventually be negotiated.

But as the Gulf War demonstrated, the mere fact that Arabs and Israelis were finally talking to each other would not solve the region's problems. And by the end of 1991 there were many indications that the old order was still smoldering. Saddam Hussein was celebrating his survival by pinning "Mother of all Battles" medals on the chests of his generals. President Assad arranged his own reelection with 99.9 percent of the vote. Iran was taking advantage of Arab disarray by rebuilding its army, purchasing nuclear technology from China and forging an alliance with Sudan and Yemen, the outcasts of the Gulf War. And the electoral success of Islamic militants in Algeria brought about a constitutional upheaval early in 1992.

Meanwhile, after demonstrating in Madrid what it could achieve with its newfound influence, the dominant power became preoccupied elsewhere: America turned inward. President Bush was required to tend to the nation's ailing economy and his own reelection campaign, and Secretary Baker was

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busy trying to fashion a global policy that could accommodate the transformation of the Soviet Union into a cumbersome Commonwealth of Independent States. America's leaders will undoubtedly come back to deal with the Middle East if only because the Middle East always seems to find a way to intrude on America's agenda. And when they do, they will find that their cautious approach to restructuring the Middle East order will require them to deal with the remaining elements of the old order before they can hope to create the new.

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Gregory F. Treverton

THE NEW EUROPE

What is "Europe?" The answer remains to be seen, but "smaller than it seemed last year" is one quick response, given what is happening on the edges—the disintegration of the Soviet Union and open warring in Yugoslavia. In Europe's center the future becomes less of a guessing game. Indeed the treaties on European monetary and political union (EMU and EPU) signed December 1991 at the Maastricht summit mark a stunning success in light of the "Europessimism" of the mid-1980s. A new federation, anchored by a single currency and a central bank, is thus mandated for the end of the decade.

But Europe remains a far cry from the "Europe whole and free," as President Bush liked to put it. In particular the eastward reach of the 12-nation European Community will be limited by the bloc's west European preoccupations, and the EC itself will be strained by the reaching.

By the same token, no one on either side of the Atlantic has much idea how to reshape the American connection to Europe after the vanishing of the Soviet threat—or whether a reshaping is really necessary. Five years ago, or even three, warfare in Yugoslavia would have rushed to the top of the American foreign policy agenda. This time though, Washington, its gaze fixed on the Middle East, first stayed aloof and then left the crisis to the EC.

While it is clear that Americans cling to NATO as the only serious trans-Atlantic security connection and as the most explicit American engagement in Europe, it has become equally apparent that NATO is mismatched with Europe's future security problems: more eruptions like that in Yugoslavia, not a Soviet invasion across the central German plain. And it is just as apparent that NATO in its current form will not serve as the basis for anything like America's political role in Europe over the past forty years.

Gregory F. Treverton is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of the forthcoming *America, Germany and the Future of Europe*.

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II

Initially the EC's single market program—"1992" for short—had given precedence to deepening collaboration among the 12 members rather than taking on new ones, but the November 1989 collapse of the Berlin Wall upset that presumption. Instead, with East Germany added on, the Community widened immediately, then came under pressure to stretch further into Europe's east. German unification came to a Europe that was prosperous but still in the middle of the 1992 program. Two key steps, monetary union and political union, still lay ahead; the former would provide for a single currency and central bank, while the latter, slightly misnamed, would enhance supranational European decision-making powers and begin to forge common foreign and security policies. With these crucial steps yet unresolved, fears grew among the architects of the New Europe that their singular focus on EC integration would be lost. A united Germany, it was feared, was bound to become self-absorbed.

There was never any reason to doubt that German unification would be a resounding success in the long run; the question was how long? The process has been more expensive than western Germans had hoped and had been led to believe by their chancellor, Helmut Kohl, in the first all-German elections in December 1990. At the same time it has been slower than eastern Germans craved.

The wreckage of the old East German economy is appalling. By the end of 1991 eastern German industrial production was about half what it had been before the fall of the Wall. More than two-fifths of the labor force was unemployed or suffering forced short-time work, and the labor situation will get worse before it gets better. The unified country also remains divided in ways deeper than economic circumstances; eastern Germans feel colonized by their western brethren.

Yet the east's economic trough has probably passed. Privatization staggers in eastern Europe but not in eastern Germany. The German Trusteeship Agency, or *Treuhand*, started haltingly—hardly helped by the tragic Red Army terrorist assassination of its first chief, Detlev Rohwedder—but is now rolling. It has privatized nearly half of some 10,000 former state enterprises of the defunct German Democratic Republic that are now under its control. Eastern Germany has everything eastern Europe lacks: stable government, hard currency

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and predictable rules of the economic game. While success in the form of parity with western Germany in employment—not to mention per-capita income or living standards—is years off, success stories in the area of investment are beginning to emerge. This year growth in the east may approach ten percent, driven by construction and services. And in the end Germany—with its resources, drive and cultural affinities—will become Europe's resident expert in reconstructing former communist economies.

Western Germans' concern over unification costs—which resulted in markedly higher taxes and interest rates—camouflaged their own boom: growth rates in western Germany jumped to nearly five percent in 1990, up more than a point from 1989. After all, those westerners' taxes primed the pump in the east, which in turn fueled purchases of consumer goods from the west. The eastern German consumer boom petered out, and the drag of taxes plus higher interest rates drove western growth down to three percent in 1991, perhaps two percent this year. But no one doubts that eastern Germany's economy will experience a major investment-driven expansion in the years ahead, one that will fuel western Germany's growth as well.

In the run-up to unification the Bonn government was under pressure to reassure its partners that unification would not deflect it from its EC vocation. It agreed to accelerate EMU if its partners would advance at least modestly along EPU's supranational agenda—for example, by deciding more issues by majority vote instead of consensus in the Community's Council of Ministers, by bringing new issues like immigration and asylum into that policy framework and by making the European parliament somewhat more than a consultative body.

Economically, though, achieving the 1992 program and not much more would suit unified Germany just fine. It would get a bigger market and a freer flow of goods and services through the program, all but completed in Brussels but which mostly remains to be implemented in member-state legislation.

The existing European Monetary System (EMS) makes the EC in effect a deutsche mark zone without compelling the German central bank to share any real power. Thus, for instance, in the spring of 1991 and again in December, hard on the heels of Maastricht, the Bundesbank could drive up interest rates for purely German reasons—assuring that the fiscal stimulus

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

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needed in the east did not ignite inflation. The action, however, put upward pressure on interest rates in much of the rest of the Community, where recession, not inflation, was the problem. Alas, Germany's solution became the Community's problem.

Moving from EMS to EMU and a European central bank (or EuroFed), however, might mean sharing decisions with less inflation-phobic Europeans, like the Italians, and so Germany has been tenacious in its insistence that any EuroFed be as monetarily conservative as the Bundesbank. EMU will happen only on Germany's terms. That much was clear at the Maastricht summit, which accepted a number of German preferences—monetary stability as the EuroFed's goal (implying that it should have at least as much independence from member governments as the Bundesbank); considerable "convergence" in fiscal policy among member-state economies as a condition for EMU; and discipline for those waywards running excessive budget deficits.

When Margaret Thatcher was Britain's prime minister, she railed against EMU as an unacceptable transfer of sovereignty, and her presence as lightning rod served to shroud the anxieties of other nations. Not so now; those with big fiscal deficits, Italy in particular, take Germany at its word and so fear the consequences of EMU for themselves. Thatcher's successor, John Major, sounds more European but shares her opposition in principle and is stalked by Thatcherite ghosts on his party's right. At Maastricht the EC set a tight timetable for EMU—by 1997 if a majority of the states qualify, by 1999 at the latest for whichever qualify—but agreed to let Britain opt out if it chose when the time came. Thus EMU will not happen before the end of this decade and perhaps not with unanimity.

III

Almost certainly the EC will become what it has sought to avoid: a community of different speeds, tiers and forms of association, perhaps with variations by the issue at hand. The EC's imminent absorption of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) will, for one, make for a less cohesive Community. The European Economic Area (EEA) agreed by the EC and EFTA last October will complete a market of 380 million people, accounting for 40 percent of world trade. The EEA will be more than a free trade area but less than a customs zone, leaving the EFTA countries to continue regulating their own trade relations with

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the rest of the world beyond the EC. It is more *Anschluss* than merger: EFTA will assume existing EC rules governing matters from antitrust to the environment, yet EEA forces EFTA to adhere to EC rules and taxation policies without much say in framing them.

It is one of the finer ironies of Europe's dramatic evolution that Jacques Delors, president of the Brussels-based EC Commission and a shrewd political tactician, launched the EEA negotiations in January 1989 as a way to fend off pressure from the EFTA countries to become full members. But what was meant as a barrier turned out, predictably, to be an enticement. The EC's offer to EFTA amounted to taxation without representation and consequently pushed the EFTA countries to the realization that there was no alternative to full EC membership. That realization could only be reinforced when at year's end the EC's European Court cast doubt on whether EEA could be put into effect as negotiated.

Austria has already applied, as has Sweden, and the other EFTA countries—Norway, Finland, Switzerland and Iceland—will not be far behind. These EFTA nations easily qualify for full EC membership on economic grounds. Yet all of them—save NATO member Norway—have traditions as neutrals, and they all lack the years of cooperative experience that characterize the existing EC core. On some issues, such as human rights, the Scandinavians have been more activist than most current EC members, while on others—intervention in Yugoslavia, for instance, not to mention beyond Europe—they are likely to be more reluctant.

Conversely economies in Europe's east will not soon be ready for full EC membership, yet states there hanker for tighter political association with anything "European": the Council of Europe, NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) defense group, but above all the Community. French President François Mitterrand floated the idea of a confederated Europe beyond the EC, but no one has picked up the suggestion. The states in Europe's east have fewer illusions about the EC than they did two years ago, but they will continue to emphasize their connections to it as reflected in the "association" agreements they are now negotiating.

Those negotiations, however, seem to have given an acid postscript to the sardonic line making the rounds in eastern Europe: How far east will Europe extend? The glib answer: as far as German taxpayers want, and that is not very far. Eastern

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Europe fears it will get less of what it wants from Europe's center—market access in the short run, full membership in the EC in the long, and not too long at that—while the center worries it will get more of what it fears from the east: people. Eastern Europe wants what the EC finds hardest to give. The Community's earlier association agreement with Turkey, for example, left it chary of granting full membership, even in principle and even after a long transition; doing so is to create a persistent political claimant no matter how unready the applicant state's economy.

Widening the market for east European products is difficult enough, because those imports impinge on vested interests—textiles, coal, steel and agriculture. In the wake of the failed Soviet coup, however, the EC had proposed to phase out over six years tariffs against products from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, thereby creating a free trade zone, and to begin negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria. Special restrictions would apply to the aforementioned areas, but the Community would grant "asymmetry." It would begin a round of tariff cuts before the east Europeans were required to start theirs.

In September 1991, though, France held up the agreement, citing objections over Polish exports of processed beef. The move angered France's partners: France was balking at access for east European products that amounted to a bare sliver of the EC market. Compounding the irony, Poland had no beef for export anyway. France lifted its veto only when the Community agreed to subsidize Polish meat exports to the Soviet Union—another irony, one neither lost on nor esteemed by a Poland that sought to break its eastern economic ties, not reinforce them.

Widening the Community, like so many other issues Europe confronts, awkwardly exposes Germany's pivotal role. Bonn and London have been the chief advocates of widening eastward but for different reasons. Britain sees widening as diluting and thus as insurance against the supranational Community it opposes on grounds of national sovereignty and for fear of importing continental socialism through the EC.

Curiously for American ears (and German ears as well), Britain's code word for what it opposes is "federal." In fact Prime Minister Major had warned he would sign no union treaty at Maastricht that mentioned the word—and his EC counterparts obliged. Moreover, in one of Maastricht's looser

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ends, when Major objected to the Community's proposed introduction of "social policy"—workers' rights and the like—the other 11 member states agreed to proceed within Community institutions but without Britain.

Germany is a federal decentralized state, not a unitary one like Britain, and so a supranational Europe looks comfortable: a sort of enlarged Federal Republic. For Germany the argument for widening eastward is more *Zwang nach Osten* than *Drang nach Osten*, more the pull of perceived obligation than the push of imagined destiny. When Americans look at eastern Europe they see brave peoples struggling for freedom. When Germans look eastward what they see is more akin to what many in the United States see in Latin America—turbulent, faintly inferior lands that can cause trouble, not least by sending in streams of migrants.[1]

Eastern Europe will feel it has little alternative to seeking trade and aid from Germany. It seems destined to return to its prewar pattern: economies organized around Germany's. Prewar Germany had at least a quarter of eastern Europe's trade, and with the collapse of Soviet trade, Germany has again become the largest trading partner for Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. (The Community as a whole took between a third and a half of their exports.) The questions are, how much will that German role be contained in an EC framework, and how much will it matter politically if the answer is "not much"?

Germany's presence will be heaviest in those areas where history gives it a basis—for instance, Czechoslovakia, whose regions of Bohemia and Moravia have had long, if not always happy, ties to Germany; Croatia and Slovenia, and the Baltics. Those territories adjacent to Germany, especially the former German ones, will wind up bearing the same relation to Germany that northern Mexico does to the United States: independent in sovereignty, but in practice of a piece with the stronger nearby economy.

IV

If Europe's east stands to gain less economic benefit from Europe's center than it hopes, that center in turn fears it will get more people from the east and from north Africa than its

[1]Walter Russell Mead, "Coming to Terms with the New Germany," *World Policy*, Fall 1990, p. 601.

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societies—culturally homogenous and with no tradition of economic migration—can stand. Indeed immigration comes up in every European political conversation. Perhaps a half million people sought asylum or refuge in western Europe in 1991, and there is no end in sight. The specter of new immigrants has turned the spotlight on foreigners already present—and especially on second-generation Muslims. One recent poll showed that more than two-fifths of French respondents held unfavorable views toward North Africans.

In 1990 nearly 200,000 foreigners arrived in Germany seeking political asylum (there is no provision for economic migration). This was three times the number going to any other European country and nearly twice what Germany had received in 1988. In 1991, the 1990 total had been exceeded by September. Reforming the asylum law, perhaps by setting quotas, cuts against the country's image as one open to the oppressed. Thus the question divides both Chancellor Kohl's governing coalition and its opposition.

The government and the opposition tried but evidently failed to contain the issue. In the September 1991 regional elections in the western city-state of Bremen—a long-time Social Democratic stronghold—the right-wing German People's Party ran on an anti-immigrant program and gained representation in parliament for the first time. Indeed while eastern German skinheads with fascist insignia have captured most of the headlines, more beatings of foreigners have taken place in western Germany than eastern.

In March 1991, and again in September, chaos in Albania drove floods of refugees across the Adriatic to the Italian port of Bari. Italy, like its EC partners, has liberal political asylum laws but no provision for economic migrants. Faced with the flood, the Italian government felt it had no option but to refuse asylum, offer no assistance to the refugees and deport them en masse. The decision was criticized by Catholic and human rights groups but was probably accepted as necessary by most Italians.

In France Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front is the party of choice of nearly a fifth of those polled, and its anti-immigration stand is supported by a third of public opinion. In France and elsewhere mainstream politicians have themselves taken tough-sounding stands for fear of losing the immigration issue to the fringe. Last summer Jacques Chirac, a

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conservative former prime minister, said he understood why French workers were tired of the "smell and noise" of immigrants. Shortly afterward former President Valery Giscard d'Estaing warned of an immigration "invasion."

Immigration and foreigners have not been the targets in all cases—the move to the right in northern Europe, with Sweden and Finland dethroning social democratic governments, reflected economic discontent. But those concerns have been present everywhere, often mixed with the frustrations of individuals at the bottom of the economic ladder who feel most threatened. In that sense there are echoes of the Federal Republic's experience of the 1960s, when a neo-Nazi party gained strength on the back of economic recession. Most of Europe's 1991 election results, however, largely reflect backlash against incumbents, and so should not be overstated. In Belgium's elections last fall both the anti-immigrant party on the right and the Greens on the left gained strength.

In the long run most of western Europe faces labor shortages and so will need immigrants to sustain its living standards; France's statistical agency reckons the French shortfall at 150,000 per year by the second decade of the next century. Yet economic need will not settle questions of which immigrants should be preferred or how Europe's societies will adjust, reluctantly, to the prospect of cultural and ethnic diversity.

While some in the EC, Britain in particular, are reluctant to relinquish sovereignty over immigration, they are being forced to recognize that the problem cannot be addressed at the national level. The 1992 program is supposed to lead to an end to border controls throughout the Community (though by 1995, not 1993), thus implying that immigration policy would in effect be set by the Community member that was the "weakest" link—hence more reason to push the issue to the Community level.

As a compromise between sovereignty and necessity the EC has been handling immigration as a matter to be decided among governments, not by the Community's supranational machinery. At Maastricht the EC states left immigration, like foreign and security policy, outside the formal Community structure but did agree to coordinate their policies more closely and, in particular, to establish a common visa policy by 1996.

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V

Open warfare in Yugoslavia is vivid testimony to both the dashing of pan-European dreams and the strain on Europe's center. A year ago there were hopes that the pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe might be the nucleus of a new European security order. Before 1990 CSCE hardly existed, and so in the Charter of Paris, signed in November 1990, CSCE foreign ministers undertook to give it some substance by deciding on regular follow-up meetings, as well as establishing a small secretariat in Prague, a conflict prevention center in Vienna and an office for free elections in Warsaw.

Yet whatever the long-run possibilities for CSCE, it never got into the game in Yugoslavia. Its limits were all too apparent: it is too inclusive (38 nations) and it operates on the basis of unanimity. Thus Yugoslavia could itself block any CSCE role. The Soviet Union also resisted CSCE intervention in Yugoslavia, its eyes fixed on its own disintegration. And so the most the CSCE could do in this case was pass a vague mandate to the EC. The CSCE will for a long time be no more than a convener of, and umbrella for, smaller groupings of states who are prepared to act.

Backed by referendums Slovenia and Croatia made good on their threats to declare independence by the end of June 1991 if Serbia and its allies did not agree to a looser Yugoslav confederation. Slovenia had fended off attempts by the center to disband its territorial army in 1990 after the communists were turned out of power; it kept about 40 percent of its weaponry. In Croatia, by contrast, the disarming of the territorials was almost complete.

Slovenia, small, armed and ethnically homogenous, proved too prickly to hold, and its separation in some form soon became a given. Croatia, by contrast, was ill-armed and more diverse: ethnic Croats account for three-quarters of the republic's 4.6 million total, commingled with enclaves of 600,000 ethnic Serbs scattered in clusters across the country. Over the summer and into the fall of 1991 fighting intensified, as the Croats gradually lost territory to Serbian militias and the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav army. The human cost was high enough—estimates range as high as ten thousand, including many civilians. For Europe as a whole the higher cost was that

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of dashed hopes for a prosperous, stable future as artillery rained down on the ancient city of Dubrovnik.

The EC did not feel it could remain aloof, for it had members adjacent to the conflict and others with direct interests. It demonstrated that it could act politically with some dispatch; its foreign ministers were in almost continuous contact. By the end of July the EC had 50 observers in Yugoslavia, including Croatia, a number that had expanded to 200 by October.

Once the Community became involved, however, schisms within the EC emerged, especially between France and Germany. Germany argued for supporting the sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia, with which it had both economic and historical ties—not to mention the half-million Croatian migrants in Germany—and for branding Serbia as the aggressor by imposing economic sanctions against it. In contrast, France, with its own traditional connections to Serbia, held to the primacy of sustaining some Yugoslav federation—a position consistent with that of the United States.

As a compromise the EC tried to broker peace through a conference at The Hague chaired by Lord Carrington, former British foreign secretary and NATO secretary general. It arranged a dozen or so ceasefires, all of which collapsed. At various times the Community flirted with the idea of moving from peacekeeping to peacemaking, perhaps by dispatching troops through the WEU to enforce a ceasefire. The idea came to naught: the scattered nature of the conflict meant that 30,000 troops or more would have been necessary; Germany was still in the midst of its constitutional quandary about whether its troops could be sent beyond NATO for any purpose; and Britain, once badly burned by its bloody attempt at peacemaking in Northern Ireland, was twice shy.

A frustrated EC finally applied sanctions in November—formally against Yugoslavia but explicitly aimed at Serbia and the federal army. The United States, which had stayed aloof while hoping some Yugoslav unity could be preserved, followed suit. Ironically, though, it was Cyrus Vance, the U.N. mediator and former American secretary of state, who had enough success by year's end in brokering a ceasefire to lead the U.N. to plan on deploying 10,000 peacekeeping troops. His position as honest broker was consolidated when, in a stunning display of Germany's new influence, Bonn pulled its EC partners into recognizing Slovenia and Croatia in January

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

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
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1992. Whatever the merits of Germany's argument for taking a clear stand against Serbia's aggression—and there were some such merits—EC representatives became *persona non grata* in Serbia.

The sad truth is that Yugoslavia is a problem without a solution. The EC members disagreed not so much about how to decide as about what to do. The original EC plan envisioned the country as a loose federation in a currency union, without border changes and with international peacekeepers overseeing the demilitarization of disputed areas inhabited by minorities. That plan made eminent sense to everyone but the warring parties, especially Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević. Having miscalculated by overreaching for independence, Croatia might have settled for less. For their part the Serbs were disinclined to yield the fruits of their military victory, perhaps aiming for an enlarged Greater Serbia if not a restored Yugoslavia under their domination. They were moved to accept a ceasefire only when their offensive stalled and the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav army began to fall apart.

Yugoslavia is a particular case. Its ethnic antagonisms are especially intense, its borders particularly artificial, its populations intermingled, all of its republic's economies—except possibly Slovenia's—inviable on their own. And none of its leaders are likely candidates for the Nobel Peace Prize, to put it diplomatically.

On the other hand the interethnic Yugoslav crisis has resonance elsewhere in eastern Europe. Redrawing boundaries and moving people, as in the aftermath of World War I, is hardly appealing, which leaves two choices, neither one much more appealing. The first would be deep and lasting international intervention in the affairs of what had been thought sovereign states, in order to safeguard borders and protect minorities stranded amid hostile neighbors. But who would be the intervenor: the United Nations, the EC, NATO? The other, now heard more often in Europe, is to write the troublemakers out of Europe, to be ostracized if need be and walled off as best they can be.

In the intra-Community schisms over Yugoslavia there are echoes of nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century European politics. They are visible enough not to require exaggeration. It is perhaps too early to say, as many Americans are prone, that Europe has failed, that it cannot succeed without the United States. On closer inspection the EC's response to

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Yugoslavia has brought mixed results: the Community had tried but failed in brokering a peace, and in the process its own divisions had been displayed for all to see. But in taking on an awkward, perhaps intractable, problem when no one else could or would, the EC was able to contain the strains among its members, however uneasily.

It can no longer be denied that trying to cope with Europe's east will put pressure on Europe's center. The lure of being accepted one day into Europe's club, the Community, may be a deterrent to nastiness in Europe's east—but not a very powerful one. And however the EC's political role is judged, there remains a manifest lack of military instruments to backstop that role, even to protect unarmed Community observers or for simple peacekeeping.

VI

This weakness suggests a mismatch between institutions and purposes, and it points up a broader gap in western Europe's construction. Both France and Britain have shrunk from drawing the full implications of Europe's transformation since 1989, especially in the security area, a fact underscored by the Yugoslav crisis. At the same time Germany is caught between its past reticence and its new prominence.

Britain's position during 1989–90 was unhappily reminiscent of its role in 1950 at the beginning of European economic integration; under Ernest Bevin, it had been the godfather of NATO but then parted ways with the continent as economic integration began. This time the political map of Europe changed at a stroke, but Britain was carping from the sidelines, not leading the next steps of European construction.

In many respects present Europe is set up for an Anglo-German partnership. Yet despite Margaret Thatcher's departure from the scene, there is scant enthusiasm across the British political spectrum for playing such a leading European role. The two nations are the freest traders in the Community, and they see eye to eye on the need to broaden the EC eastward; Germany's insistence on tough conditions for EMU makes Bonn and London closer on that issue than they seem. Even where they seem most divided, over defense, they share a commitment to NATO and to the American presence in Europe, and a British connection would have the benefit of not

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seeming to trap Germany between its American connection and its EC commitment.

France's predicament is the dawning realization that it has invested in approaches that have been devalued by changed circumstances. Pursuing grandeur, Paris skewed its defense effort toward nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional forces only to find the prestige of nuclear weapons debased. Seeking independence, it opted out of NATO's military command only to find that independence meant conventional forces that had difficulty getting to the Persian Gulf or doing much once there. So, too, the EC as an instrument of French statecraft has declined with Germany's unification and the prospect that new Community members will incline toward Germany.

France has stopped short of a new version of its historic gamble of 1950, the Schuman plan, when it decided that if it could not restrain Germany, it would join it and so began organizing the EC. Now the shock of German unification, real enough, was less than that of prospective German rearmament in the 1950s. It was not enough to call forth a new vision and, besides, if the Soviet threat was going away, there seemed no need for new thinking about defense. Instead France has clung to Gaullist orthodoxy, trying to sustain the same policies when circumstances no longer permit.

In economics that has meant trying to have influence over German monetary policy through EMU. France has attempted to hold Germany tight to the Community but without abandoning its own Gaullist preference for a *Europe des états*: close cooperation among governments, not a supranational Europe. In foreign policy that approach has meant trying to constrain German decisions through common EC approaches, but again intergovernmental ones.

In security, too, France stopped short of real efforts to build west European defense arrangements. For instance in October 1991 President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl proposed a European force to be developed out of the existing 4,000-man Franco-German brigade. At the same time they suggested that Denmark and Greece, both NATO members, join the Western European Union and that Ireland become an observer. (The existing WEU members are Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries, Spain and Portugal.) The Mitterrand-Kohl letter had referred to a "European corps," setting loose the

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impression that the two had in mind a force as large as 100,000.

However it turned out that the whole idea was more of an afterthought in a letter mostly devoted to EPU. Britain and Italy objected to the idea, saying it would undercut NATO, and Germany took pains to reassure them—and the United States. The size and composition of the force were, it transpired, still matters for study. The initiative was well short of a serious west European force—of, for instance, a more than symbolic mixing of French and German units and the stationing of German, if not American, forces on French soil. It was even further from proposing the sharing of nuclear weapons with Germany in a European army—a return of sorts to France's other proposal of 1950, the Pleven plan for a European Defense Community.

To be fair, the United States has been more than ambivalent about the prospect that western Europe might organize for its own defense. For Washington, rhetoric like "European defense cooperation" or a "European pillar" has always meant that the Europeans should organize themselves better to do what America wanted. Last spring, when there was talk in Europe of a WEU rapid-reaction force, Washington weighed in with a sharp letter arguing that nothing Europe did on its own should disrupt NATO.[2]

In May 1991 NATO agreed on its own rapid-reaction force as part of a broad reshaping of the alliance, which will have but half as many soldiers five years hence. The scaled-down NATO force was a preemptive strike against the WEU trial balloon, but a strike with little purpose. Because it was a NATO force, it could not train for, or be deployed in, contingencies outside the alliance area. Thus it cannot be a vehicle for including some German units in operations beyond Europe—when and if Germany's constitutional debate is resolved. Neither will it help Europeans plan for such operations. Nor will it let Europeans organize their own operations for contingencies inside Europe in circumstances like Yugoslavia, for which NATO does not seem appropriate. In principle the WEU idea could have served all those purposes and, to boot, might have brought France a little closer to NATO's integrated command through the back gate.

The starting point for American policy should be an end to

[2]The American note is described in *The Washington Post*, June 7, 1991, p. A17.

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ambivalence over the Europeans building some defense cooperation of their own. Europe will do so anyway; indecision and divisiveness over Yugoslavia's crisis will be a goad to do better. Yet despite its best efforts, Europe may bog down in confusion and muddle in its attempts to forge common foreign and security policies. It would be better all around if the United States did not play spoiler but instead encouraged Europe's efforts.

West European defense cooperation would complement, not compete with, NATO. The alliance would remain as a deterrent against renewed threats from the east; a reassurance to nations in both eastern and western Europe; and a structure to take the edge off intra-west European arguments about defense, especially about Germany's role. It is one thing for western Europe to build cooperation given NATO's continued existence; without NATO, the process could be sharply contentious.

Moreover it makes little sense to worry about the EC getting too involved in security matters. On recent form the Europeans will not do all that much, for they will continue to disagree on what is to be done. Common foreign and security policy was the most contentious clutch of issues in the preparations for Maastricht. Last spring the British saw the WEU force as a way to keep the EC out of security; the French saw it as a bridge to getting the Community into the defense sphere. At Maastricht there was a compromise on both foreign and security policy. Foreign policy was left outside the formal Community institutions, but members committed themselves to tighter cooperation; they can, by unanimity, make a particular issue the subject of joint action. On defense, the WEU was labeled both the defense component of the Community and a way to strengthen the European pillar of NATO.

As the Community expands it will find cooperation of all sorts difficult, most acutely in security. Rather the challenge for Europe—and the concern for U.S. policy—is ensuring that Europe's center does not begin to break apart under the pressures from the east and the fragmenting tendencies implied by the absorption of the EFTA countries.

VII

NATO will not continue to serve as the cornerstone for an American political role in Europe. Yet if not NATO, then what? Is America's political role in Europe to be reshaped or simply

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allowed to decline? On that score there are no good answers, surely not from Europeans who have been absorbed in their own affairs.

The alliance has been one of the great postwar successes, so some nostalgia for it is understandable, all the more so for Americans who have dominated it. It remains the only serious security game in town. But it is fruitless in the long run for American policy to acknowledge, on the one hand, that the Soviet threat which NATO was constructed to contain is no more and yet insist, on the other, that NATO must remain the preeminent European security institution.

Americans may decide that their interests no longer require them to play the active, leading political role Washington has played in Europe for the last four decades. That conclusion is suggested by the American government's response to the Yugoslav conflagration. It is one not easily dismissed. The overarching Soviet threat is all but gone, a fact recognized by the United States and NATO, not least in the nuclear realm.

President Bush announced in September 1991 wide-ranging unilateral cutbacks in nuclear weaponry. With the agreement of NATO leaders the United States will eliminate all ground-based tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The alliance will be left with only a few hundred aircraft-delivered nuclear weapons, in contrast to the existing 3,500 weapons. NATO thus implicitly, but not yet formally, is abandoning its threat to use nuclear weapons first; the change is logical since the contingency that called for the threat, that of a Soviet conventional attack overwhelming NATO, is no more.

The removal of the Soviet threat also figured in the first post-Cold War trade dispute between the United States and Europe, when the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade collapsed over agriculture in December 1990. The EC offered a 30 percent cut in overall farm supports over the ten-year period from 1986 to 1996 (and so only a 15 percent cut over the next five years), with no assurances on lowering export subsidies or providing access to its markets. The United States and other farm exporters sought 75 percent cuts over ten years, with 90 percent cuts in export subsidies.

There was nothing new about American objections to the Community's Common Agricultural Policy, but in the past the United States had yielded on the issue in exchange for European support on other trade issues. This time it did not; without the common security imperative, the "fallout" risks of

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disputes over trade seemed less. Many Americans, not least Bush administration officials, felt Germany "owed" the United States one on agriculture in exchange for the highly supportive American role on unification. Germany, however, was self-absorbed, hardly likely to take on either its own farmers or France in cutting agricultural supports. The United States and the EC sought to repair the damage but could not come to agreement in a year of off-again-on-again discussions.

If, absent the Soviet threat, trade disputes can be allowed to simmer, the absence of that threat makes civil war in Yugoslavia tragic but not a threat to the wider peace of Europe. Nasty turns of politics on the territory of the erstwhile Soviet Union would, as well, take literally years to pose again the kind of military threat to Europe's center that was the defining feature of the Cold War. With its autonomous regions threatening to become ministates, Russia seems doomed to turn repressive, its citizens associating the democracy they never quite had with longer queues for food. But its violence will be directed inward for a long while. Indeed the one concern that has animated official Washington, control of nuclear weapons in a disintegrating Soviet Union, is a product of weakness and desperation, not strength.

In these ways Europe needs America much less than it did in the years after World War II, and America has much less to fear in Europe. American attentions are not nearly so concentrated on Europe as they were then. The time may come again when Europe will need America desperately, and the need may call forth comparable American attention. That time might come if real danger again appeared in Europe's east, from Russia, if Europe's center around Germany disintegrated, or both in some combination. With luck that prospect will never arrive, despite the straining of Europe's center.

NATO will remain as present reassurance and residual insurance: to be refurbished should the need arise, but otherwise declining in a genteel way as circumstances permit. The number of American forces in Europe is being cut dramatically in any event, by half or more, which will take some years, so there is no need now to make more radical and potentially premature decisions.

This approach would imply a diminished, though still important, political role for the United States. In the security realm it would resemble the role imagined for the United States in the first few years after World War II—as Europe's

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backstop, not its present defender. In economics it would mean developing the forms of consultations with the Community that have been set in place in the last several years—in order to limit the damage of future arguments over agriculture, for instance—while not pretending that consultation can substitute for the political engagement of America's security connection throughout the Cold War.

Finally, though, the opposite tack is tantalizing even as it seems beyond the imagining of the American body politic and its elected leaders. Why not reshape the American connection to Europe? Take Yugoslavia as a starting point. There is something sad, obscene almost, in the sight of America taking a walk when bloodshed rages in Yugoslavia, the focal point of so much Cold War hand-wringing. An ultimatum to stop the fighting seems likely to have worked better in Yugoslavia than it did against Saddam Hussein, especially if backed by the U.S. Sixth Fleet and made vivid by a few air strikes on those bombarding Dubrovnik.

Yugoslavia might induce Americans, and frighten Europeans, into rethinking the role of NATO. Suppose the Alliance said it would not permit eastern Europe's borders to be changed by military force. Slovakia could secede but only through negotiation. This task for NATO would imply some risk, including for Americans. But it would also provide the reassurance eastern Europeans crave as they work through their political and economic transformations.

Americans may decide the risk is too great, the gain too small, when measured against hard U.S. interests. If they do, though, they are deciding to play less of a part in Europe's future than they have in its past forty years. On that point they should be clear.

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Stephen W. Bosworth

THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA

A seismic shift is under way in the Asian-Pacific region, a shift in the structure and balance of political and economic power. This transformation has fundamental implications for America's future position in the region. For more than four decades U.S. engagement in Asia was based on two pillars: a Cold War commitment to Asian security and America's extraordinary economic power. Both of these foreign policy premises are now gone: the Cold War ended suddenly and dramatically; American economic hegemony has waned more slowly but with no less drama.

Should America attempt to conduct its relations with the region as in the past, its capacity for effective leadership will rapidly shrink; the foundations of the style and type of leadership America previously exercised no longer exist. As the political leverage of military power decreases, economic power will count for more. The United States must come to terms with the fact that its relative economic weight in a region that has seen an unprecedented era of economic progress has substantially declined. The economic power of Japan and many other Asian nations has increased enormously. No other recent event demonstrated this point more vividly than President Bush's controversial mission to Japan in January 1992.

At the same time American security interests in Asia seem in better shape today than at any time in nearly a century. After three major wars and a long standoff with the Soviet Union, the Asian-Pacific region is stable. The Soviet Pacific fleet that appeared so formidable just a few years ago is now rusting at its moorings in Vladivostok and Cam Ranh Bay. There is no major threat to regional security, except perhaps the still unresolved division of the Korean peninsula, and for the first time since before Pearl Harbor U.S. military forces in the Pacific have no readily identifiable opponent.

Any future American military presence in the Asian-Pacific region will thus translate into far less, in terms of political

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influence and leadership capacity. Washington insists that it will continue to exercise leadership in the region, and most Asian nations appear to hope that it will. Both sides recognize their own interests in healthy trans-Pacific relations; they fear the uncertainty that would accompany any substantial weakening of America's regional engagement. But America's own ability and willingness to maintain a significant regional military presence is increasingly called into question.

A strong overall American presence in the Asian-Pacific region will require new structures of cooperation and fresh attitudes on both sides of the Pacific. Despite growing domestic concerns and its Cold War victory, America cannot afford the illusion that Asia is now unimportant to its national interests. For more than four decades the United States tended to view its interests in Asia principally in Cold War terms. In an important sense, however, U.S. relations with Asia, particularly northeast Asia, transcend that struggle. Even before the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was predicated on the idea that stability in western Europe and northeast Asia was critical to America's own interests. It was this conviction that originally compelled America's policy of containment, and that objective national interest remains true today.

II

The Asian-Pacific region as a whole enjoyed the highest rate of economic growth in the world in the 1980s. A few countries such as the Philippines still lag behind, severe income disparities remain within the region and some countries, but nearly all Asian nations have made impressive progress in reducing poverty. There is every reason to believe this strong economic performance will continue into the next century: savings rates are high; market-oriented policies prevail; national economies are increasingly open; and trade within the region is growing strongly.

Economic progress has been accompanied by movement toward more democratic political systems. China is of course the major exception, and communist regimes still hold on stubbornly in Vietnam and North Korea, as does a brutal clique in Burma. There is also an occasional setback to democracy, such as the military coup in Thailand in February 1991. But much of Asia saw a growing political pluralism in the 1980s, a loosening of

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authoritarian systems as well as a marked increase in the transparency and accountability of government.

Asians themselves are primarily responsible for their own economic and political successes. They have made the short-term sacrifices necessary to mobilize savings and raise investment rates, and Asian political leaders and citizens have taken the personal risks necessary to bring political liberalization. The United States, however, can also claim considerable credit for Asia's economic and political accomplishments. Throughout the Cold War America provided a security umbrella for the region that enabled Asian countries to concentrate on national development. The American private sector has provided capital, technology and managerial skills to Asian economies, and U.S. taxpayers have contributed billions of dollars in official development assistance—bilaterally as well as through multilateral lending agencies. Moreover a huge American market absorbs a large share of the commodities and manufactured products exported by the newly industrialized Asian economies.

At the same time the United States has been a major beneficiary of Asia's economic and political dynamism. U.S. trans-Pacific trade now exceeds trade with Europe by nearly a third. The U.S. economy has also accrued substantial benefits from American investments in Asia. And Asia's capital surpluses, principally Japan's, have in recent years helped cover essential U.S. investment needs in the face of huge federal deficits and a falling national savings rate.

Given this favorable assessment it is perhaps understandable that Asia ranks far down on the current list of American concerns. The uncertain prospects for political and economic transformation in the former Soviet Union, the challenges of eastern Europe and the instabilities of the Middle East seem to demand most of the time and energy of senior Bush administration officials. America is also now more preoccupied with its own domestic condition than at any time since the beginning of World War II, and as it struggles with an accumulation of domestic issues it appears to have scant energy left for foreign policy concerns.

III

Although the region's security outlook has improved since the end of the Cold War, when viewed from Asia it is actually somewhat less benign than it appears at first glance. An

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intransigent Stalinist regime in North Korea seems bent on acquiring a nuclear capacity. The fragility of the political settlement process in Cambodia risks the threat of further conflict in Indochina. There exists concern over both the possible effects of internal Chinese political struggles on Beijing's behavior toward its neighbors and the longer-term consequences for regional stability of growing Chinese economic power. Notwithstanding the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia will remain a major presence in northeast Asia. Its own internal turmoil and unsettled territorial disputes with eastern neighbors could make it a cause of regional insecurity.

Among Asians there is also an unfocused yet nonetheless real concern that America will precipitously scale back its regional military presence, possibly sparking a regional race to fill the resulting vacuum. The Bush administration insists that America will stay militarily engaged in the western Pacific, but the future of U.S. deployments in the region appears uncertain.

The United States currently has about 130,000 military personnel deployed in Asia, mostly in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced in 1990 that by the end of 1992 those forces would be reduced by 12 percent. At that time it was generally recognized that this reduction probably presaged a more substantial but gradual drawdown of American forces. But events since Cheney's original announcement make it likely that the actual force reductions will be both more substantial and more rapid than predicted even a year ago.

Earlier Pentagon planning assumed a continued American military presence in the Philippines, an assumption overturned by the eruption of Mount Pinatubo and the action of the Philippine senate. It now seems likely that by the end of 1992, for the first time since 1898 (with a brief interruption during World War II), the United States will have no significant military presence in the Philippines. Some of those forces may be relocated elsewhere in Asia, but many of them are likely to be pulled back to Hawaii or even the continental United States, as was the case in 1990 with the fighter squadrons redeployed to Alaska from Clark Air Base. The costs of relocating forces and physical installations to Guam or other U.S. Pacific territories would probably be prohibitive, especially given the budget climate likely to prevail in Washington over the next several years.

Political considerations in the region will also play a role in

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

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

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determining future levels of U.S. deployments, particularly in South Korea and Japan. To signal U.S. concern over North Korea's nuclear program, for example, the Bush administration recently announced a delay until after 1992 of the previously anticipated withdrawal of some American forces from South Korea. Over time, however, political considerations are more likely to act in the opposite direction. Any serious move toward ending the division of the Korean peninsula, for instance, would likely bring a substantial drawdown or even complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea.

The future of the large American military presence in Japan is also subject to political uncertainties. Many Japanese and most Asians continue to regard those American forces as important to regional security and a symbol of constructive collaboration between the two nations. But many Americans ask why, with Japan's economic power and the end of the Soviet threat, the United States should continue to provide for Japanese security, particularly when American companies and workers face growing competition from Japanese producers.

In the short term, political and budgetary pressures will undoubtedly cause Washington to seek a larger contribution from Japan toward the costs of the U.S. military deployment there. But Japan is already paying virtually all of the local costs of those U.S. forces, and some Japanese are already asking: If Filipinos will not accept a continued American military presence when the United States is willing to pay them to do so, why should Japanese accept a continued American deployment for which Japan is expected to pay?

Even if both Japan and the United States see their interests in continuing an American military presence, this will almost certainly be on a smaller scale. Any long-term stationing of American military forces will require a redefinition of the rationale of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance and a politically acceptable agreement as to the purpose of those forces. More important, any revitalized security agreement will have to be part of a strong well-managed U.S.-Japanese relationship, the construction of which will be a challenging task.

As forward deployments of U.S. air and land forces in Asia are scaled back, Washington will rely more on the navy to provide evidence of America's continuing security interest in the western Pacific. The navy's capabilities are also likely to decline significantly over the next several years. While the navy may escape the full impact of defense spending cuts, its total

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number of active ships is slated to fall to about 350 by the mid-1990s from about 600 today. Given the requirements for an American naval presence in other parts of the world, there will almost certainly be a reduction in naval stationing in the western Pacific.

In sum this combination of factors will in the relatively near future bring about a sizeable reduction in the U.S. military presence in Asia. As a result the American bilateral security commitments with key Asian countries, which have provided the basic framework of regional security, will be changed at least superficially, if not substantially. The question thus arises whether some type of new multilateral security structure is needed as an important political supplement to the U.S. bilateral arrangements.

Geography and history make it unlikely that Asian countries could develop multilateral security arrangements similar to those likely to emerge in western Europe. It may nonetheless be appropriate that the United States lead in encouraging a regional forum on security to address issues such as territorial disputes and arms limitation. Such a forum could only be developed incrementally and should include both China and Russia. One of its primary aims would be to reduce the likelihood that Japan or any other regional power might feel the need to develop the capacity to project military power within the region as the U.S. military presence declines. Another advantage of such a forum could be to address cost-sharing for regional security on a multilateral basis, rather than bilaterally, where it is inevitably a more contentious issue. A multilateral approach could thus make it easier to blunt U.S. domestic political opposition to any continued American contribution to Asian security.

IV

America's future role in the Asian-Pacific region must also take into account the pronounced shift of national economic weight that has occurred over the past decade. This changed balance of economic power has implications for America's leadership capacity that are perhaps more important than those in the security realm.

In the late 1940s the United States accounted for nearly 50 percent of world output in goods and services. By 1990 that share had fallen to about 24 percent, roughly the same level as in the period just before World War II. This is not necessarily

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a sign of national failure. America's postwar economic preeminence was an aberration caused by the fact that the United States was the only industrial power to emerge economically unscathed from the war. Moreover America's current share of global output is 24 percent of a far larger total than before, and America's standard of living is immeasurably higher than a half century ago.

More startling is the rise of Japan's relative economic weight, which has grown to about 16 percent of world production from virtually zero immediately after the war. While Japan is still Asia's dominant economic power, accounting for at least two thirds of regional output, much of the rest of Asia has grown rapidly as well. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore—the so-called Asian Tigers—have expanded impressively for more than a decade. Thailand, Malaysia and others are now approaching the status of newly industrialized countries. China has also achieved rapid economic growth over the last decade. The region as a whole is now roughly an economic equal of both North America and western Europe.

Americans are acutely aware of Asia's growing global economic weight. Asian consumer goods and capital equipment have won increasing shares of the U.S. market, and American companies find themselves in fierce competition with Asian producers in international markets. U.S. trade deficits with several Asian countries, especially Japan, have strained bilateral relations, particularly as the overall U.S. trade deficit grew in the 1980s. Less understood by Americans, however, is how substantially the balance of economic power within the Asian-Pacific region itself has shifted away from the United States and how that inevitably changes the distribution of political influence in the area. Indeed economic transactions among the region's nations are now more important to many Asians than those with the United States.

A major shift, for example, has already occurred in the investment roles of the United States and Japan in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Brunei. ASEAN has long been an area of interest for both Japanese and American companies. Direct investment by American companies in ASEAN nations in 1980 was about $5 billion, not much less than the roughly $7 billion invested by Japanese firms. Even as recently as 1986 U.S. direct investment doubled to $10 billion; Japan's rose apace to just under $15 billion. But by 1989

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American investment had stalled at the same level while Japanese investment soared to $23 billion.

The most important reason for the surge in Japanese investment was the rise beginning in 1985 in the value of the yen. Japanese companies were desperate to get out from behind an appreciating yen as the currency traded at 125–130 to the dollar from its previous 260. In order to remain competitive in U.S. and European markets they embarked on a massive redeployment of production facilities from Japan to Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and to a lesser extent the Philippines. The strategy worked, and in the process Japanese firms also positioned themselves to meet the growing demand for capital equipment and consumer goods in those large southeast Asian markets.

It is more difficult to understand why American direct investment stagnated in the last half of the 1980s. ASEAN nations as a group constitute the fifth largest U.S. trading partner. While America's firms did not have the same powerful incentives to expand their presence in southeast Asia, U.S. investment there had been steadily rising since the end of the Vietnam War. Indeed American private investment in ASEAN economies more than tripled in 1976–86, to $10 billion from $3 billion. A fall in the value of the dollar—the other side of the yen's rise—would account for only a part of sluggish American investment; the currencies of most other Asian nations remained relatively stable against the dollar, and the dollar cost of investment in those countries was nearly constant. The failure of American investors to keep pace with both the Japanese performance and southeast Asia's vigorous economic growth must lie in the U.S. economy itself: growing budget deficits, a declining national savings rate and of course the high cost of investment capital, particularly relative to the capital costs enjoyed in the second half of the 1980s by the Japanese.

Japan is not the only Asian source of new investment capital for southeast Asia. While the data are incomplete, it is clear that both South Korea and Taiwan are also moving rapidly to invest in ASEAN nations, as well as in China. Thus the developing countries of southeast Asia in need of investment and technology for modernization are now looking north, not across the Pacific. Moreover trade within Asia, particularly that with Japan, is beginning to reflect this new pattern of investment flows. The United States remains a vital market for Asian exports, including those produced at facilities in southeast

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Asia owned by Japanese, Koreans and Taiwanese. But for all Asian nations, exports to other Asian countries account for a growing share of total sales abroad. Asian exports to the United States are declining in percentage terms.

Korea is a good example. It sold 40 percent of total exports to the United States in 1986 and only 25 percent to the rest of Asia. By 1990 the percentage of Korean exports going to the United States had fallen to 30 percent, and sales to Asia had risen to 34 percent. Even the Philippines, a country with historical links to the United States, is experiencing a shift in the structure of its foreign trade. In 1986, 24 percent of Philippine imports came from the United States. By 1989 that figure had declined to 19 percent, and the share coming from other Asian nations rose to 46 percent from 42 percent.

A corresponding shift has also been underway for some time in the flow of official development assistance within the Asian-Pacific region. In the first couple of decades after World War II the United States was far and away the principal source of foreign aid to developing Asian countries. In the 1970s Japan rightly began to assume more of the burden of regional development assistance, and U.S. foreign aid was focused more in other areas, including the Middle East and Central America. And by 1980 Japanese bilateral aid to Asian countries was slightly above that of the United States, $1.4 billion versus $1.3 billion.

Total Japanese development assistance is now roughly equal to that of the United States, about $10 billion annually. By 1989 U.S. bilateral aid to Asia had risen slightly, to $1.8 billion. But Japanese bilateral aid flows to Asian nations had more than tripled, to $4.3 billion. Moreover the share of American aid to Asia can be expected to decline with the withdrawal of U.S. military installations from the Philippines and a likely corresponding reduction in American assistance to that country.

V

After some hesitancy the United States has placed its political weight behind the new Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, an emerging organization that includes both Asian and non-Asian countries of the trans-Pacific community. APEC is billed as a regional institution that will serve as a vehicle for consultation on a full range of economic and other nonsecurity

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issues including trade, investment, macroeconomic policy, the environment and energy.

While the eventual institutional shape and content of APEC are still not defined, U.S. support for the organization shows that America has begun to realize that, as U.S. economic power in the region declines, new structures must be found to advance its economic interests. Other countries will no longer automatically follow the American lead. U.S. leadership will now depend more on consensus building within multilateral institutions. Moreover a number of relatively new international issues such as environmental protection can only be addressed on a multilateral basis.

The effort to launch APEC as the major trans-Pacific economic institution has become linked to recent developments in international trade. Many Asian leaders are worried by an apparent trend toward the formation of regional economic blocs as the primary intergovernmental frameworks for trade, perhaps at the expense of the global trading regime codified in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

The U.S. decision to expand its original bilateral trade agreement with Canada into a North American Free Trade Area that also includes Mexico has been particularly disconcerting to Asians. The combination of NAFTA, the European Community's move toward a single market and the protracted stalemate of the GATT's Uruguay Round raises serious questions about the durability of the multilateral trading system that has been in place since soon after World War II. To Asians NAFTA seems suspiciously like an American attempt to construct a neighborhood trading system as an alternative to a troubled global regime. Both NAFTA and EC integration strike some Asians as protectionist responses to their surging competition in European and American markets.

The United States argues strongly that NAFTA is not intended to be a regional trading bloc and that it will be compatible with GATT and lead to increased trade within the region without restricting access from abroad. From a strictly legal perspective those arguments are correct: NAFTA will be consonant with the rules of GATT. Over the long term, however, Asians are probably justified in their concerns. Factories in Mexico will have a significant advantage over those in Asia regarding access to U.S. markets. More new jobs will thus be created in Mexico and fewer in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and other developing Asian countries.

It is alternately argued that the growing web of intra-Asian

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
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

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trade and investment centered heavily around Japan has itself begun to constitute a de facto Asian trade bloc. Japan and the other Asian nations are nonetheless global traders and have a major stake in the continued primacy of the global trading system. Their growing trade with one another is a function of economic imperatives, not governmental agreements. Yet it is not surprising that some Asian leaders have begun to talk about the need for a formal Asian grouping as a counterweight to a deepening EC and emerging NAFTA.

The Malaysian proposal for the creation of an East Asian Economic Caucus that would explicitly exclude the United States is the most visible manifestation of Asian concerns. So far Asians have been careful to disavow publicly any intention to create a formal regional trading bloc. There is nonetheless the risk that an EAEC could become just that in reaction to NAFTA and the EC, particularly if the Uruguay Round fails. Even Japan, which had been wary of the Malaysian proposal out of concern for its own global trade interests and opposition from the United States, has signaled a tentative interest in the EAEC.

If the United States wants to head off the development of an East Asian trading bloc, it will need to employ more than rhetoric. It should try, for example, to put some real content into APEC, such as a major initiative in environmental policy. The United States might also explore ways in which Asian countries could be formally associated with western hemispheric trading arrangements. Most important, there should be a redoubling of efforts to bring the Uruguay Round to a successful close.

VI

The U.S.-Japanese relationship is fundamental to the future of America's position in Asia. Given Japan's large and ever-increasing economic presence throughout the region, the United States cannot hope to exercise constructive leadership without a healthy and harmonious relationship with Japan. Few things are as unsettling to other Asians as evidence of dysfunction in U.S.-Japanese relations, and in the aftermath of President Bush's recent trip such evidence is all too apparent.

Current difficulties between the United States and China also trouble Asians. Serious instability in China would jeopardize the well-being of China's neighbors. That sense of anxiety is only heightened by sharp Sino-American disagreements

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over trade, human rights and Chinese transfers of nuclear and missile technology. For American policy the challenge with regard to China is to manage the relationship in the short term while maintaining a base for the development of a broader set of policies with an eventual successor regime. That is a formidable task.

Americans tend to view problems with China as far less threatening to their own well-being than the growing strains in Japanese relations. The U.S.-Japanese bilateral relationship has been one of the most successful in recent history. The American security commitment, as well as Japan's own Peace Constitution and self-imposed limits on defense spending, sheltered Japan to a considerable extent from global politics and allowed the Japanese to concentrate on building their economy. They did so with great success. For the United States the mutual security alliance with Japan was the most important Asian link in its global containment of the Soviet Union. Washington was able to count on Japan to support its political, economic and security leadership. For the rest of Asia close U.S.-Japanese relations provided implicit assurance against Japan again becoming a threat to regional security.

The U.S.-Japanese relationship still works well on one level. The flows of goods, people, technology and capital between the two countries are enormous and growing. More than 350,000 Americans now work for Japanese companies in the United States. Japan is the largest overseas American trading partner and the largest single market for American agricultural products. Most American financial institutions with global aspirations have sought Japanese equity partners. And more and more American companies working at the upper rungs of the technological ladder, including relatively small firms, seek access to Japanese capital and markets.

Despite this unprecedented interdependence, relations are increasingly troubled. Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Richard Holbrooke put it well: "There is a general sense among many outside observers that the overall relationship is drifting slowly downward."[1] The weakening of the glue once provided by the common security threat from the Soviet Union is one obvious cause of current problems; the stabilizing benefit of the security ties has greatly diminished.

[1]Richard Holbrooke, "Japan and The United States: Ending the Unequal Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1991/92, p. 42.

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But there were growing strains even before that threat declined, and problems in U.S.-Japanese relations go far beyond the loss of a common adversary.

The American and Japanese economic systems are similar in some ways, but they are rooted in very different national cultures and sets of assumptions. Attitudes and practices concerning basic questions such as the relationship between government and private sector, ties between and among individual firms, and corporate governance are substantially different. Despite Japan's own efforts to open its economy and a steady rise in Japanese purchases of American products, the persistent trade imbalance strengthens the perception in the United States and elsewhere that Japan's is a closed system and that the Japanese enjoy far more access to the U.S. economy than Americans do to theirs. Such perceptions lead to further American pressures for Japan to change and to increasing Japanese resentment. Japanese perceive American demands as self-serving: Why should the Japanese adapt their own economic practices when, based on current performances, these seem just as good as or even superior to those of the United States?

The situation is complicated by the fact that the two national economies are in different phases. The United States is suffering a decline in real wages and a squeeze on middle-class family incomes; Japan is recording rapid growth in per capita incomes and a rising national living standard. The U.S. economic performance has caused a growing frustration among Americans and a tendency to scapegoat. The Japanese are conveniently available. In Japan, alternately, one finds an almost palpable disdain for what is seen as the inability of the United States to address its own problems.

Most of the strain between the two countries has thus far been confined to the bilateral relationship. Japan has long been content to play a subordinate role to the United States on most regional and global issues. But there are new domestic and foreign pressures on Japan to begin playing a larger role on the international stage, a role more commensurate with its economic power. Washington urges Japan to accept greater international responsibility, yet there has been little progress in devising the new bilateral and multilateral structures that would help Japan do so. This failure creates still another potential for disagreement between the United States and Japan over both means and goals. The bilateral controversy

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over the form and size of Japan's contribution to the U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf War is but the most visible example.

In part the problem lies in different world views. Despite its relative youth as a country, the United States has a well-established tradition of involvement and interaction with the international community. Moreover during the past 40 years America has become accustomed to leading and Japan following. Despite its long history as a nation-state, Japan lacks a strong tradition of constructive international engagement. It is accustomed to dealing with the rest of the world as something "out there," not as a wider community in which Japan has a natural role.

Americans tend to assume that the legacy of mistrust and resentment left by Japanese aggression earlier in this century inhibits Japan from exercising leadership in Asia independently of the United States. Until now, that has been the case. Suspicion and mistrust of Japan and its motives indeed exist in Asia, and there is no doubt that both Japan and its neighbors would strongly prefer that Japan's regional position and influence evolve in close cooperation with the United States. It is also clear, however, that memories of World War II are less and less acute among new generations of Asian leaders. As Japan's economic power rises, Asian countries are increasingly looking to Japan rather than the United States for support in their own drives toward economic modernization. Japanese economic power inevitably translates into political power.

There is no easy formula for mutually satisfactory relations between the United States and Japan, either bilaterally or on a regional basis. Frank dialogue and farsighted political leadership are required of both countries. So far both have occurred in insufficient quantities, allowing emotionalism to build in each nation. The impact of President Bush's recent visit to Japan may be especially damaging in this regard. In the past the United States has carried many unpleasant messages to Japan about what the Japanese should or should not do regarding trade policy and other issues. No matter how gracelessly these messages may have been delivered, they were usually accepted and acted upon by the Japanese because they were fundamentally right. This time the message was wrong. The American recession was not made in Japan, and if American manufacturers want to sell more automobiles in Japan, those companies will have to design, build and market the automobiles the Japanese want to buy. A further unin-

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tended but likely effect of President Bush's message will be to diminish the credibility within Japan of those Japanese who want to continue giving high priority to maintaining good relations with the United States.

Japan needs to build a domestic consensus to support its constructive engagement in the international security and economic systems from which it derives such obvious benefit. Gradual liberalization of rice imports, for example, is not simply an American demand on Japan; it is a necessary Japanese contribution to strengthening the multilateral trading regime in which Japan has a fundamental stake. The United States needs to adopt a new style of leadership based on real consultation and consensus building. The two countries together need to find new areas of concrete cooperation to compensate for the diminished importance of their bilateral security ties as a balance to their economic competition. The environment, research and development in new energy technologies, and disaster relief are a few possibilities. The joint launching of such initiatives in APEC would help to give that organization a sense of purpose.

VII

The shifting weights of the United States, Japan and other Asian nations in the regional and global economies, the lifting of the common security threat and the strained U.S.-Japanese relationship—all emerging more or less simultaneously—have combined to create new perceptions on both sides of the Pacific about America's relations with the region.

There is, however, a final cloud of uncertainty that looms over America's future position in Asia, one that is more difficult to describe and virtually impossible to document empirically. It may nonetheless be the most important factor in determining the U.S. role in the region: America's moral authority. The United States is in danger of losing that stature, not so much for anything it is doing in Asia, but for what Asians perceive America is doing to itself.

In Asia, as in few other regions of the world, the moral authority of U.S. leadership was founded on the attraction of American ideals and the unique successes of the American political and economic system. Generations of Asians saw the United States as a model toward which they should strive in their own efforts at nation building. The durability and underlying equity of America's social contract, the nation's

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economic dynamism and expanding middle class as well as its confidence in the principles on which its government was founded were all once widely admired.

But today America's inability or unwillingness to summon the national resolve to address serious social and economic problems corrodes its ability to exercise effective international leadership. Asian leaders find it incomprehensible that the United States does not recognize the inevitable consequences for its national power of its mounting debt, declining savings rate, crumbling infrastructure, growing income disparities and inadequate educational system. This Asian concern over America's domestic problems has gained considerable resonance in the United States.

There is now a tendency among Americans to attribute many internal problems to excessive international commitments. This line of reasoning creates a false and even dangerous choice. The already evident reduction of American commitments abroad, perhaps desirable on its own terms, is not a panacea for domestic problems. Even slashing U.S. defense spending by half—a development that seems increasingly likely over the next several years—frees up no more than three percent of America's gross national product. While that is a significant savings, America spends more than 12 percent of GNP on health care, some 8–9 percent on education and 3.5 percent to service its national debt. The size and effectiveness of these expenditures must also be addressed on their own terms. Defense savings do not translate directly into cures for domestic ills; reducing defense spending and foreign aid should not be mistaken as a strategy for solving America's internal problems.

Americans increasingly feel the need to pursue a narrower international agenda. Absent a global adversary, U.S. national security is no longer at the same risk it was during the Cold War. National priorities can and should be adjusted accordingly. America's unaddressed list of domestic social and economic concerns increasingly impacts on its capacity for effective international leadership. If the United States is to continue to influence favorably the future economic and security structures of a region as dynamic as the Asian-Pacific, much will depend on its own economic strength, renewed social cohesion and the foresight of its political leadership.

In the meantime there is a growing feeling among Asians that the United States may no longer be all that relevant to

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their future. But America is a Pacific nation, and it has a fundamental interest in the security and economic well-being of the Asian-Pacific region. Even while increasingly focused on domestic concerns, Americans must keep in mind that what happens in Asia is of great importance to the United States. The narrow dictates of self-interest alone argue that the United States cannot afford to be cut off from Asia's economic dynamism: the region provides a rapidly growing market for American products; Asian competition is a powerful force for greater American efficiency; and the federal budget deficit mandates that America tap Asian savings for the foreseeable future. The form and nature of America's commitment to the Asian-Pacific region must adapt to changed domestic and international circumstances, yet America cannot afford the luxury of disengagement.

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Susan Kaufman Purcell

COLLAPSING CUBA

It is only a matter of time before Cuban communism collapses. While the date of its demise is obviously unknown in advance, it can be expected sooner rather than later. Fidel Castro still seems determined to hold back history but, with the death of the Soviet Union, his last hope for a conservative leadership in Moscow to rescue Cuba's crumbling economy may also have died. The end of Soviet patronage has left Castro with a dilemma: to avoid challenges to his continued rule and to revive Cuba's flagging economy he must relinquish some control, but his domestic opponents could try to use the momentum of reform to force him from power. As 1991 drew to a close Castro still had not found a satisfactory solution to his problem.

The island's economic disintegration was accelerating at a breathtaking pace. Aid from the former Soviet Union, which was already drastically reduced, should now disappear entirely. Castro's attempts to attract foreign capital to replace Soviet subsidies are likely to be too little, too late. Tinkering with the design of Cuba's outmoded communist system may postpone Castro's day of reckoning, but fundamental economic and political changes seem increasingly unavoidable. The most interesting question now is whether Cuba will be able to avoid violence and experience a peaceful transition from a communist dictatorship to representative democracy.

II

The history of the Cuban Revolution is in great part the history of Cuba's growing dependence on Soviet economic and military aid. By the beginning of the 1990s almost three quarters of Cuban imports came from the Soviet Union, principally Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan. The most important import was petroleum. Until 1991 the Soviet Union furnished virtually all, and often more than, the

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estimated 10 million tons of oil Cuba used annually. In return Cuba exported to the Soviets sugar, some citrus, tobacco and nickel.

Yet Cuba's exports never came close to balancing what the island received from its patron: the Soviets overpaid Cuba for its sugar; the Cubans underpaid the Soviets for their petroleum. While estimates vary on the value of these Soviet subsidies, the consensus ranges between $3.5 billion and $4.5 billion per year, which made Cuba the number one recipient of Soviet aid by the late 1980s. In return the Soviet Union got an invaluable political and military ally only 90 miles from the United States. Cuba also advanced Soviet interests in the Third World by training and arming Marxist guerrillas and helping prop up governments friendly to Moscow.

Cuba's dependence on Soviet subsidies made the island highly vulnerable to economic and political shifts in the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms posed an immediate economic threat to Cuba. As economic decision-making in the Soviet Union was decentralized, newly empowered state enterprises and republics were immediately reluctant to trade with Cuba because of its lack of hard currency. Perestroika also disrupted Soviet production and distribution processes, causing exports to Cuba to arrive late or not at all. Shortages of essential goods, already being felt on the island by mid-1989, had by the end of 1991 become acute. The decisions by Moscow and republican leaders were accelerating the breakdown of the Soviet economic system and, by extension, that of Cuba as well.

Soviet cargo ships expected in Cuba by January 1991 did not arrive until May. By September no rice had reached the country, only 16 percent of its normal supply of vegetable oil and less than half that of butter. A variety of raw materials, chemicals and much of the fertilizers that Cuba uses in sugar production also failed to arrive. Shipments of wood, sheet metal, steel beams, glass for construction and paper had decreased substantially, as had exports of spare parts for Cuban buses and machinery.

Moscow's refusal in 1990 to sign a new five-year trade agreement with Cuba marked the beginning of the end of the two nations' "special relationship." Instead trade relations were to be negotiated yearly. Moreover, starting in January 1991, the value of trade between the two countries was calculated in dollars, not rubles. Cuban sugar traded at 25

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cents a pound, down from the previous year's figure of 40 cents. As a consequence Cuba's ability to import food and energy deriving from sugar exports to the Soviet Union was also cut nearly in half. After the failed August 1991 coup Gorbachev made an already bad situation for Cuba worse. He announced that any new trade agreements would reflect Soviet commercial interests and require Cuba and other trading partners to pay in hard currency at market rates. That development effectively eliminated all trade subsidies to Cuba beginning in 1992.

Cuba's problems were further compounded by the transfer of mineral rights to the former Soviet republics. These decisions severely disrupted both the production and export of petroleum from the former Soviet Union and raised the possibility that sometime in 1992 Cuba might stop receiving oil altogether. But Soviet shipments of petroleum to Cuba had declined even before those events. Cuba received 13 million tons of petroleum from the Soviets in 1989, 10 million tons in 1990, and for 1991 the total was expected to fall to seven million tons. In a December 1991 interview with Senator Larry Pressler (R-S.Dak.) Castro painted an even worse picture, claiming that Cuba had received less than one third of the oil it had anticipated for the year.

The impact in Cuba of the disruption of Soviet-Cuban trade relations and Soviet aid is starkly apparent. Long lines form to purchase increasingly scarce goods, and the list of rationed items continues to grow: eggs, fish, canned meat, biscuits, cream cheese, rum, undergarments and soap have all been added since late 1990. Medicinal herbs are replacing unavailable medicines. Even the government-controlled press has been affected; paper shortages have closed down some publications and caused others to appear less frequently.

Energy shortages have also caused problems. The government now rations liquid gas for cooking and has reduced electrical power generation, producing repeated blackouts in Havana and other cities. Factories have been closed and construction projects canceled. Sugar destined for the old Soviet Union has been unable even to reach Cuba's own ports because of inadequate transportation. Pushcarts have begun to replace garbage trucks in Havana, and shortages of gasoline and spare parts have idled buses and tractors. As substitutes, Cubans have begun using old model surplus bicycles imported

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

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from China, and the government is domesticating 100,000 bulls as beasts of burden.

The energy and other shortages have translated into declining economic output and growing unemployment. Even the black market, which had prospered as the official economy began to encounter problems, is now disappearing in parts of the island because of decreasing production and growing transportation problems. The Cuban peso has become virtually worthless, and the dollar is the only currency accepted by those having anything to sell. Prostitution, nearly eliminated in the early years of the revolution, is making a comeback. Students and workers wait outside enterprises catering to tourists, seeking clients who will take them shopping in dollar stores reserved for diplomats, tourists and Communist Party officials.

III

Cuba's severe economic disintegration was not inevitable. Most other Latin American nations are today moving from the "lost decade" of the 1980s to the "growth decade" of the 1990s. But as the Soviet economy began to unravel, Castro increasingly assumed regressive inward-looking policies as a course for Cuba's economic and political survival. He could instead have undertaken many of the same economic reforms that his Latin neighbors instituted when confronted in the early 1980s with a challenge similar to his own: the debt crisis.

Rather than Soviet aid, those countries had become dependent on commercial bank loans to sustain inefficient, closed, corrupt and statist economies. When the lending ceased, Latin American governments, both military and democratic, ultimately concluded that profound economic restructuring, as well as austerity and stabilization programs, provided the only long-term solution. They embarked on a series of reforms that privatized state enterprises, expanded their tax bases, lowered tariff and nontariff barriers to trade and invited direct foreign investment.

Those reforms went against what had been the prevailing ideology of economic development in Latin America since the 1960s. Few would have been implemented if the shortage of capital that resulted from the debt crisis had not forced a change in the region's thinking and behavior. The immediate impact of the debt crisis and the change of development strategy was Latin America's so-called lost decade of the 1980s.

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The region's economies stagnated and standards of living dropped precipitously. The 1990s, however, are turning into Latin America's "growth decade." The reform process of the 1980s has begun to bear fruit in the form of more efficient and productive economies and growing investor interest in the region.

Castro chose not to follow the lead of his Latin neighbors because he correctly concluded that by doing so he would jeopardize his total control over Cuba's economic and political systems. The Latin American development model has created new centers of political and economic power independent of the state. That is precisely what Castro was determined to avoid. As the Cuban economy declined, he instead chose an eclectic mix of policies aimed to reduce his immediate vulnerability to political challenges. Those policies were designed to allow him over the long run to attract capital without capitalism, thereby ensuring the survival of his personalistic dictatorship.

Castro's name for the crisis that had gripped his nation was the "special period in a time of peace." Correctly realizing the explosive potential of growing food shortages, the regime complemented food rationing with efforts to make Cuba more self-sufficient in food production. This increasingly involved transporting tens of thousands of workers, mainly white collar, from the cities to the countryside, where they would "voluntarily" help with the harvest. Plans are now under way to construct new towns in rural areas to enable such workers to live and work there permanently.

At the same time the government launched a series of centrally planned campaigns to increase production of basic foodstuffs. An effective way of expanding food production would have been the reinstatement of the farmers markets that were tolerated briefly in the 1980s and spectacularly increased agricultural production. That experiment was abruptly ended because of the threat it posed to Castro's control of the economy. There was some expectation that the October 1991 Fourth Party Congress would reinstate the markets, but Castro apparently rejected the idea. Nor was he willing to allow peasants on cooperative farms to use a portion of their land to produce crops of their choosing. His decision to go the central-planning route may produce a short-term increase in food production, but at the expense of other nontargeted sectors of the economy. That was the case in

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1970, when Castro tried and failed to increase sugar production to an unprecedented 10 million tons.

In the meantime Castro is trying to gain hard currency by building up the tourist industry. The government has entered a number of joint ventures with foreign firms. Cuba supplies land, basic materials, labor and logistical support; foreign investors provide engineering, design and other technical expertise, and capital goods, which can enter Cuba duty free. The government also allows tax-free repatriation of profits during the initial stages of the project and, in at least one case, is allowing its Spanish partners to control the hiring and firing of the labor force. What the government does not allow, however, is contact between tourists and ordinary Cubans. A policy of "tourism apartheid" excludes Cuban citizens, but not the political elite, from the new resort facilities.

To date the biggest project involves a Spanish hotel firm investing $150 million to build three hotels and a shopping center. According to the Cuban government, 340,000 tourists visited Cuba in 1990 and spent nearly $250 million. The largest number came from Canada, followed by Germany, Spain and Italy in Europe and Mexico, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America. Cuba hopes to build about 5,000 hotel rooms a year to increase the current 13,000 rooms to 30,000 by 1995.

In a further effort to earn hard currency the Cuban government is trying to diversify its export base by increasing its output of biotechnology products and pharmaceuticals. In 1990 Cuba reportedly earned more than $80 million by exporting to Brazil large quantities of the meningitis-B vaccine. Exports of pharmaceuticals are expected to generate more hard currency in 1991 than Cuba's traditional exports of tobacco and cigars. In a related effort Cuba is also encouraging "medical tourism." Some 2,000 individuals came to Cuba in 1990, for example, to receive treatment for eye, heart and other problems. Castro blames the lack of comparable health care for Cuban citizens on the U.S. embargo.

Cuba has also begun to allow foreign companies to prospect for oil. A six-year contract was signed in December 1990 with a French consortium composed of Total Petroleum and Compagnie Europeéne des Pétroles, and exploration began in March 1991. The agreement reportedly allows the consortium to own more than 49 percent of the joint venture. In April 1991 the Cuban government and Petrobras, the Brazilian state oil company, finalized a memorandum of intent to cooperate

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in exploring for oil in Cuban waters. If oil were discovered, it would help solve Cuba's energy shortage and increase its hard currency earnings through exports.

Finally, Cuba has been searching for new trading partners, focusing on China, Japan, the Caribbean and Latin America. Its efforts have met with some success in Mexico and Venezuela, whose governments are providing new credits for their companies to trade with Cuba. Increased trade with CARICOM, the 13-member Caribbean Community and Common Market, has been thwarted by Cuba's refusal to recognize the government of Grenada, which came to power in the aftermath of the 1983 U.S. invasion.

These efforts to offset the loss of Soviet aid will likely prove inadequate. The government's expectations regarding the growth of the tourist industry seem highly optimistic. Foreigners currently visiting Cuba are not big spenders and are not returning. Furthermore foreigners investing in Cuban tourism are positioning themselves for the post-Castro period, when the economy is expected to open up, and as the Cuban government moves closer toward collapse the increased risk should begin to deter further large investments. Even with new investment laws that allow free importation of materials and supplies as well as liberal labor practices, it will be difficult for Cuba to make the substantial investments in human capital and infrastructure to enable it to compete effectively with more open Caribbean island economies.

The search for oil also will probably not pay off rapidly enough, if at all. It normally takes at least five to six years to bring in a petroleum field. A bigger field takes even more time, and companies prospecting off Cuba are undoubtedly looking for fields large enough to supply more than just the island. The fact that the U.S. embargo keeps American oil companies from prospecting also means that foreign companies can strike harder bargains with Cuba, thereby reducing Cuba's share of any profits. The same principle holds regarding trade agreements that Cuba might sign on other commodities.

Castro himself has implicitly acknowledged the possibility that his efforts are doomed. In September 1991 he began speaking of a "zero option," meaning zero petroleum, due to a total cutoff of Soviet supplies and Cuba's inability to replace them through other purchases or barter. Under the zero option food would be severely rationed and distributed in communal soup kitchens. Electricity would be rationed as well,

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

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and no petroleum would be allowed for private use. The government would also drastically reduce its investment in health and education. The timing of the announcement of the zero option, following close on the failed Soviet coup in August, was not fortuitous. Subsequent events in the former Soviet Union have made the zero option scenario all the more plausible.

IV

Cuba's deteriorating economic situation is increasingly being translated into political discontent. The government has responded to those political rumblings in a number of contradictory ways. Some government actions can be read as signs that the regime is loosening its hold on the population; others indicate that the government's ability to tolerate dissent remains severely limited.

One sign of growing unhappiness is the substantial increase in the number of people who are trying to escape Cuba. In 1991, 2,417 Cubans made it over the dangerous seas in small rubber rafts or boats to Florida. The figure for the entire preceding year was 467. The number of high-level defectors has also continued to rise. They include a well-known baseball player and a jazz musician, former government officials, the brother of Raúl Castro's wife and a MiG pilot who defected to Key West in his plane, to Washington's embarrassment.

Organized political opposition in Cuba, though still illegal and not yet a serious threat to the regime, is nonetheless becoming more overt. It is also broadening its focus from an almost exclusive concern with monitoring human rights violations to new efforts to bring about a peaceful democratic transition. Compared with an earlier period, one observer found "many more groups, with their members more ready to give their names and sign appeals and press releases."[1] Elizardo Sanchez, one of Cuba's leading dissidents and head of the Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, believes that several hundred dissidents have organized themselves into small groups of trusted friends, rather than larger groups, in order to prevent infiltration and repression by the government.

The failed Soviet coup, however, encouraged many of

[1]Anna Husarska, "Havana Postcard: Espresso to Go," *The New Republic*, Nov. 4, 1991. Also see her article, "Cuba Looks Like East Europe Just Before Communism's Fall," *The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 3, 1992.

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Cuba's internal dissident organizations to form two major coalitions. Both favor a peaceful transition to democracy via elections and a market economy. Their main differences are tactical and, to a lesser extent, ideological. The more conservative group, the Cuban Democratic Coalition, opposes dialogue with the Castro government. The other group, the Cuban Democratic Convergence, is more social democratic and favors negotiations among all Cubans in order to achieve a democratic transition.

The Cuban Committee for Human Rights, led by the prominent dissident Gustavo Arcos Bergnes, remains in contact with both groups, but so far has joined neither. In September, however, Arcos and Sanchez, whose human rights group forms part of the Cuban Democratic Convergence, met for several hours in an effort to find common ground. The meeting was significant because the two men, Cuba's most important dissidents, had long been considered rivals. Arcos, in fact, was briefly jailed by the government in January 1992.

The fact that the dissidents have not united around a single leader is probably for the best. Were they to do so, that leader would probably suffer the same fate as General Arnaldo Ochoa, a military hero whose growing popularity posed a threat to Castro and who was consequently executed after a Stalinesque show trial in the summer of 1989.

The greater activism of the internal dissidents encouraged exile groups to formalize contacts with them shortly after the failed Soviet coup. The Cuban American Foundation, the powerful exile group led by Miami businessman Jorge Mas Canosa, has ties with the Cuban Democratic Coalition. The Madrid-based Cuban Democratic Platform, led by journalist Alberto Montaner, and the Miami-based Independent and Democratic Cuba, led by former comandante and political prisoner Huber Matos, each have ties with the Cuban Democratic Convergence.

The Catholic Church has also stepped up its activities. The archbishop of Havana has demanded religious freedom in a handbill distributed to his congregations, and he appealed to the Cuban people to refuse, on ethical grounds, participation in the "rapid deployment forces" that the regime has organized to repress even its peaceful opponents. In early December the archbishop also delivered a statement calling on the authorities to make the necessary changes in order to avoid violence.

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So far, however, there has been little violent opposition to the government; the costs of rebelling still seem higher than continuing submission to Castro's increasingly irrational policies. This could change as the economic situation continues to deteriorate. Tempers are already short on the long ration lines; incidents of theft and "antisocial" criminal behavior are increasing. The latter includes "hoarding" and "profiteering," defined by the government as buying and selling goods on the black market. The regime has chosen to deal with these problems by strengthening the national police and distributing weapons to selected workers in factories, warehouses and other facilities to protect materials produced or stored there.

The government has also organized peasant vigilante brigades "to preserve order" in the countryside. And it is using the so-called rapid deployment forces, modeled after former Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega's "dignity battalions" and the Sandinista's infamous "turbas," to harass and beat up people whose "crime" is to support human rights and democracy. Incidents of violent crackdowns, hasty and often public trials as well as imprisonments have escalated, especially since the failed Soviet coup.

By the end of 1991 several leading dissidents were in danger of being formally charged with treason. One of them, María Elena Cruz Varela, a poet and leader of Alternative Criterion, was forced by central security agents to eat some of her own political writings in the presence of her daughter.

Repression has not, however, been the government's only response. The regime has also made a number of political changes that seem to point in a more liberal direction. The party congress recommended direct election of members of Cuba's national assembly, who are now chosen by municipal councils. The congress also lifted the ban on party membership for religious believers who do not oppose the government and significantly reduced the size of the party bureaucracy. The election of a new party central committee lowered its average age to 47 from 52. The party congress also recommended allowing handymen, carpenters, plumbers and other tradespeople to work for their own profit.

These reforms are less substantive than they may appear. The direct election of the national assembly would not transform it into a body of independent actors: political power is still concentrated at the top. Allowing some tradesmen to become capitalists is not nearly as important as the reform that

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was rejected—the reinstatement of independent farmers markets.

If the congress was a test of strength of the party's so-called reformers, such as Carlos Aldana and Roberto Robaina, the inescapable conclusion is that they are still very weak or not reformers at all. This is particularly true regarding Aldana, who lambasted Cuban dissidents in a lengthy speech in late December. While the combination of these reforms could generate some new support for the regime, it remains doubtful that, alongside stepped up repression, they will be sufficient to tamp down Cuba's growing discontent.

v

Castro's foreign policy suggests that the Cuban leader shares these doubts. While adjusting Cuba's economic and political systems to cope with the nation's growing crisis, he also hoped to get his Latin American neighbors to provide him with subsidized oil and support for his efforts to end the U.S. trade embargo in place since 1960.

Castro made an unscheduled appearance in late October at a meeting of the presidents of Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia in Cozumel, Mexico, where he reportedly sought help for his disintegrating economy. Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari said after the meeting that there would be "no special relationship" concerning shipments of Mexican or Venezuelan oil to Cuba. Castro's only satisfaction was when Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez called on the Bush administration to end the U.S. embargo.

Cuba's attempt in the fall of 1991 to get the United Nations to declare the U.S. trade embargo illegal also failed. Latin American governments indicated that they would either vote against the Cuban resolution or abstain. Moreover the United Nations would have difficulty explaining why, if trade embargoes were illegal, it had not condemned the Arab embargo of Israel. Seeing the handwriting on the wall, the Cubans thus decided not to allow their resolution to come to a vote.

Castro cannot be faulted for hoping that his Latin neighbors would help him. In the past they tended to downplay the dictatorial aspects of his rule, choosing instead to emphasize his nationalism, anti-imperialism and dedication to social and economic equality. They also preferred to blame U.S. policy toward Cuba, instead of Castro's own behavior, for Cuba's problems.

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But times have changed. Today Latin America is governed almost entirely by democratically elected presidents who do not look kindly on military governments, of right or left. The advent of a new international economic and political order has also made it important for Latin America to nurture its relationship with the United States. With the end of the Cold War and the communist threat, many Latin nations fear Washington may choose to ignore the region. The new weakness of the Latin American left also makes it less necessary for Latin governments to support Cuba in order to placate internal left-wing critics.

This does not mean that Latin American governments and the United States agree on Cuba. The region itself is divided, as was evidenced in November at the Group of Rio summit held by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela in Cartagena, Colombia. While publicly expressing "profound concern about the situation and future of Cuba," the Latin nations privately disagreed over pressing Castro to hold democratic elections. Argentina and Uruguay, for instance, favored such a course; Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela opposed it. But the fact that any Latin American government was willing to pressure Castro is a change from even the recent past, when criticizing him was considered playing into the hands of the United States—to be avoided at all costs. This new willingness of at least some Latin leaders to take a stand against Castro sends him an important message: if he wants Latin America behind him, he will have to change.

VI

The economic and political changes Castro has made are encouraging mainly to those who wish to give the Cuban leader the benefit of the doubt, but the numbers of those willing to do so, both inside and outside Cuba, are rapidly diminishing. So are Castro's options.

Until the end of the Soviet Union, he could hold on to the possibility that the Soviet army would remove Kremlin reformers and continue giving Cuba military and economic aid. Even if traditional levels of economic aid could not be restored, Castro could at least count on continued military aid to enable him to buy time through the selective use of repression.

The repressive option now looks increasingly likely to be Castro's short-term response, but in the long run it will

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probably be untenable. Soviet military aid, which was estimated at $1.5 billion annually, has been discontinued. In September Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would pull its 11,000-man military brigade out of Cuba—a figure subsequently explained to include 3,000 combat troops, 3,000 signal intelligence personnel, 3,500 military advisers and some civilians in military-related roles. Although a visit to Cuba by a Soviet general to discuss withdrawal plans ended inconclusively, the disintegration of the Soviet Union shortly thereafter made the issue moot. It seems highly unlikely that the now independent republics, particularly Russia, will choose to maintain a military relationship with the Castro government.

This breakdown in patron relations constitutes a short-term psychological blow for the Cuban military, which suddenly finds itself cut off from its traditional source of weapons, training, technical support and intelligence. But this may be its only important impact, given the legacy of fear in the army after the Ochoa execution and the continuing difficulty of organizing a coup in a military organization penetrated by informers.

In the longer term, however, it should cause the military to think twice before firing on the Cuban people in the event of a mass demonstration or before going along with any other strongly repressive response to Cuba's problems. It could also lead to a coup if the military were put in a position of having to choose between shooting Cuban demonstrators or continuing to back a ruler who seemed intent on martyring not only himself but his fellow Cubans as well.

If a coup were to occur, however, Cuba's need for economic aid and investment, from the United States in particular, combined with pressures for democracy not only from within Cuba but also from the United States and Latin America, would more likely cause the military to promise elections and a short transition to democratic rule.

A better alternative for Castro is to take the lead himself in opening the Cuban economy and promising democratic elections. He could conceivably get Washington to enter into a bargaining process whereby, in return for some reform, the United States could be persuaded to lift a part of its embargo. Castro would then attempt to hedge that reform process after political realities in the United States made it difficult to reimpose the embargo at full strength. Having succeeded in partially reviving his economy while skirting real political change, Castro would possibly be home free.

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Such a scenario, however, entails obvious risks for Castro. He could discover at a certain point that he, not Washington, would be unable to backtrack. Castro would then be obliged to carry through on a promise for elections, which could even lead to his own defeat. But Castro's love of power and his often expressed disdain for elections and western-style democracy, which he recently called "complete garbage," obviously makes this an outcome he will seek to avoid at all costs.

VII

A peaceful transition to democracy via free and fair elections is precisely Washington's preferred scenario for Cuba. On May 17, 1991, President Bush outlined his conditions for "a significant improvement" in U.S.-Cuban relations: free and fair elections; the right to opposition political parties; a free media with opposition access and international oversight of the electoral process. Bush also asked that Cuba allow the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to investigate alleged abuses and that Havana free political prisoners as well as end aid to revolutionary movements in other countries.

The Bush policy, for all its broad bipartisan support, has been criticized by both left and right in the United States. Liberal critics want the United States, rather than Cuba, to take the first step in improving relations by at least partially easing the trade embargo. They argue that the embargo has not worked for more than thirty years and it is time to try something new. A variation on that theme is the contention that Castro deals better with adversity than with economic prosperity, which would prove more destabilizing to him than continuing economic hardship. A more liberal approach, they say, would avoid violence and allow for Cuba's peaceful transition to democracy. In addition it would reduce U.S. vulnerability to another mass influx of Cubans such as that in 1980, when Castro opened the port of Mariel, leading to the exodus of 128,000 Cubans, including many criminals, to Florida.

Most of these arguments, however, are no longer relevant. The embargo did not work precisely because the Soviet Union was determined to prop up the Castro government. Now that Soviet support has collapsed, the embargo can finally have its full impact. The same argument can be made regarding Castro's ability to deal with adversity, which may have been true while he could count on Soviet backing. There can be little

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doubt, however, that Castro's problems would be reduced with access to the hard currency that a resumption of U.S. trade would provide. And while a mass exodus of Cubans to Florida in 1980 caused more short-run problems for the United States than for Cuba, the reverse would be true in the 1990s. Given Cuba's loss of Soviet aid and its already collapsing economy, such an exodus would in fact probably bring down the Castro regime.

Concerns over a potentially violent transition in Cuba due to the embargo seem driven in part by ideology; the same worries were conspicuously absent among many of the same forces that sought trade sanctions against the right-wing South African government. Moreover it is far from certain that the embargo necessarily increases the likelihood of a violent outcome. It could just as easily trigger mass nonviolent demonstrations against the regime, like the vast majority of the demonstrations that overthrew eastern Europe's dictators, and lead to a provisional government and democratic elections.

If there were a violent transition, however, the Bush administration is already on record as ruling out U.S. military intervention. Instead the United States would probably pursue a variant of its recent policy toward Haiti, when its democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown in a September 1991 coup. That policy entailed joining in a multinational effort under the auspices of the Organization of American States to try to achieve a negotiated solution to the conflict and a restoration of democratic rule.

Conservative critics of current U.S. policy, in contrast to their liberal counterparts, want the United States to tighten the embargo in order to accelerate Castro's fall. They point specifically to a 1975 loophole that allows foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations to trade with Cuba. In 1989 foreign subsidiary exports equaled $169 million, and purchases from Cuba were valued at $162 million; for 1990 those totals rose to $533 million and $172 million, as U.S. subsidiaries sought to fill the gap left by the collapse of Cuban trade with eastern Europe. Opponents thus argue that the loophole is prolonging Castro's rule by blunting the impact of Cuba's loss of Soviet bloc trade.

Congressional sentiment clearly falls on the more conservative side. A bill chiefly sponsored by Senator Connie Mack (R-Fla.) that would tighten the trade embargo gathered support in 1991, and a similar but separate bill was drafted by

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Robert Torricelli (D-N.J.), head of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemispheric Affairs. The second would couple provisions for tightening sanctions, such as denying economic and military aid to countries aiding Cuba, with the promise of a "carefully calibrated" reduction of sanctions if Havana moved toward democracy and respect for human rights.

President Bush has threatened to veto any bill tightening the embargo, on the ground that it would unnecessarily pit the United States against many of its important allies—Canada, Mexico and western Europe—over a law that probably could not be implemented anyway. The president is correct. But there is another compelling reason for not tightening the embargo: doing so would convert what is now essentially a Cuban problem into a U.S. problem.

For the first time since Castro took power, dissidents inside Cuba have begun organizing themselves into broader groups that are more actively challenging the regime to hold elections and begin a transition toward democracy. They have even established a more formal and growing relationship with representatives of the 1.5 million Cubans living outside Cuba. Given Cuba's history of frustrated nationalism, it would be far better if Cubans found their own way out of the current situation, instead of following the lead of a power they have depended on in the past.

The best U.S. policy thus remains the current policy, centered around continuing the embargo and calling for free elections. It is also the simplest policy for the United States to pursue; it is already in place and for the first time has a chance of being truly effective. It may somewhat prolong the inevitable transformation of the crumbling Cuban system, but not by much. In the meantime it is helping to level the playing field between unarmed dissidents and a heavily armed but increasingly vulnerable government. It may also allow Cubans, in this new age of nationalism, to construct a new Cuban nationalism based on democratic rather than authoritarian values.

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Michael Chege

REMEMBERING AFRICA

In 1991, resurgent democratic movements in sub-Saharan Africa sensed a surprising shift in Bush administration policy. African political reformers were caught on the rebound and the continent's aging despots were stunned. U.S. foreign policy toward Africa had edged closer than ever before to the timeworn position of its congressional critics. For the first time since the Kennedy administration's support for anticolonial African nationalism, crowds yearning for freedom, this time from domestic tyranny, cheered statements from the U.S. State Department as it distanced itself from the autocratic and unpopular leaders it once supported.

The demise of the Cold War and the steady though incomplete dismantling of apartheid have undermined the logic that once drove America's alliances of expediency on the continent, which were so inimical to expanding civil liberties in Africa. While attitudes in the West may have changed, the policies of the United States and its European allies toward Africa are still not the supportive pillars of stable market-driven democracies they could be. But much also depends on Africa itself. African political reformers must now discard the old ideological shibboleths that have helped keep their countries shackled in poverty, communal violence and political repression. The pace of their own reform, how quickly they can devise new development policies and institutions more consonant with the march of history toward economic and political liberalism, will help determine the full impact of external support for change.

Only with the emergence of African states that foster individual freedoms and market economies with complementary public sectors will the continent receive the attention it deserves. African societies might then graduate from being passive recipients of charity to full actors in global politics and economics. Amid the flood of problems that still exist in Africa, its surging tide of democracy is barely visible, especially to a world whose eyes are keenly focused on events elsewhere.

Michael Chege is Program Officer in Governance and International Affairs for the Ford Foundation in Harare, Zimbabwe.

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II

Until the Persian Gulf crisis media coverage of world affairs was dominated by the drama of the democratic revolutions in eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet empire, the slow evolution of 1992's united Europe, the unfolding economic power of Japan and the Pacific Rim and even the emergence of new democracies in Latin America. Africa was for all purposes dropped from the cast. For much of the world Africa remained little more than an unfailing source of bad news: famine, dictatorship and economic collapse; blatant violations of human rights and gross carnage wreaked by merciless warlords; a region where unashamed autocrats still tightened the screws of their despotism while their counterparts around the globe were being hounded out of presidential palaces by popular revolts.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s natural catastrophes and political mismanagement combined to produce human and economic tragedy in Africa of unprecedented proportions. Regressive statist economic policies aggravated drought in the Sahel (1973), famine in Ethiopia (1985) and a succession of calamities of biblical proportions elsewhere: locusts in Sudan (1988), floods in Tanzania (1989) and the AIDS pandemic, which the World Health Organization now predicts will wipe out 20 percent of Africa's labor force by 1996. By eliminating the middle-aged and best-educated sectors of the population AIDS will cause immeasurable setbacks to Africa's development programs. It will also raise the percentage of the population dependent on assistance, thus increasing pressure on already scarce government resources.

After suffering negative rates for most of the 1970s sub-Saharan Africa achieved average agricultural growth of 1.3 percent in the 1980s, which brought little economic reprieve. Meanwhile the annual population growth rate was 3.1 percent—the fastest of any region in history—helping to create a severe food deficit as well as depleting basic services. Nearly half of sub-Saharan Africa's 480 million inhabitants were living in poverty, defined as undernutrition and lack of access to locally identified basic necessities. With the exception of a small number of African states—Cameroon, Botswana, Mauritius—per capita incomes fell by about 2.8 percent each year in the last decade, leaving most countries economically worse off than they were at the end of colonial rule. It is small

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wonder that many poor rural Africans have been known to ask when independence would end.

It is not a record of which Africans can be proud. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) have written off the last decade in terms of economic development. The outspoken former president of Nigeria, General Olusegun Obasanjo, has warned that in prevailing global circumstances Africa has become the third world of the Third World—a continent beyond the pale of the dominant movements of this era. Writing under a pseudonym in *Le Monde*, a ranking French diplomat has argued, "Economically speaking, if the entire black Africa, with the exception of South Africa, were to disappear in a flood, the global cataclysm will be approximately nonexistent."[1]

Yet cavalier judgments that write off Africa are unjust and ill-informed. They do a great disservice to a growing number of ordinary Africans, statesmen, journalists, clergymen, community leaders and intellectuals who are struggling against steep odds to reverse the continent's fatal cycle of dictatorship and economic calamity. While African dissidents have been the unwitting victims of the media fatigue, scorn and stereotyping that appear to have overtaken Western concern for developments in Africa, 1991 did in fact bring seeds of hope.

For the first time since their independence at least 12 African states are at some stage or other in the evolution toward multiparty politics, after humiliating acknowledgements of the ravages of single-party systems. In early 1991 five African states held competitive multiparty elections for the first time and in three of those states—Benin, Cape Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe—the opposition peacefully assumed the government. Even in Zambia, the 27-year reign of Kenneth Kaunda was ended as he was overwhelmingly defeated at the polls by Frederick Chiluba, who was inaugurated in a peaceful transition in November. Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Guineau-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Rwanda and Sierra Leone each adopted new constitutions or moved to legalize opposition parties; Mali ousted its autocratic regime; Congo and Zimbabwe abandoned Marxism-Leninism.

Elsewhere on the continent events were sometimes more

[1]Victor Chesnault, "Que faire de l'Afrique noire?" *Le Monde*, Feb. 28, 1990, p. 2.

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muddled and violent. Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam was forced to flee his country in May 1991 as Tigrean rebels seized control of Addis Ababa, and Eritrea finally seceded from the nation after waging the globe's longest-running war this century. A broad-based interim coalition of forces has now pledged to oversee a transition to democracy. Angola ended its own bloody 16-year civil war and will hold free elections in 1992, and neighboring Namibia celebrated its first year as an independent state under a democratic constitution. In Zaïre an end to the long and corrupt rule of Mobuto Sese Seko may finally be in sight; after bloody rioting throughout the country in September and October he said he would remain in power until new elections can be held. In Somalia fighting between rival factions left thousands dead in November and December, and the future of that state remains uncertain.

The South African government in 1991 knocked out some of apartheid's most vital legal supports: the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, the Group Areas Act of 1966 and the Population Registration Act of 1950. The process of dismantling apartheid, however, remains far from complete. The de Klerk government and the nation's various opposition groups must still carefully negotiate a constitution extending equality to that country's black majority.

It appears that freedom is contagious in both national and global terms. The fall of east European dictators had a catalyzing effect on African democrats. But to be truly effective, reform in Africa must be accomplished through a candid appraisal by Africans themselves about the origins of the disasters that afflict them and the difficult policy choices now confronting them. In the new global order unleashed by the collapse of communism, Africans will have little choice but to pull their own weight by meeting the most exacting standards in domestic governance and economic competitiveness.

III

The carefully cultivated dogmas and half-truths of an intellectually stifled environment have shielded Africans from their own realities and produced many devastating false starts. In the case of the sub-Sahara much political ignorance begins at home. In deference to African opinion, however, American and Western policy has often reinforced that weakness.

Take the problem of "tribalism" for instance. The conven-

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tional belief is that tribal affinity in African politics is the premier scourge of good government. Ethnic warfare in Liberia, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Africa and Rwanda in 1991 is given as recent example. Since independence African leaders and their well-meaning foreign sympathizers have put much effort into exorcising this demon. Think national, not tribal, governments insist. Yet even as they have denounced it, incumbent African leaders backhandedly indulged in ethnic patronage to bolster their own authoritarianism or to distribute power and resources and maintain political stability.

African governments continue to resist ethnic pluralism on the ground that "tribal" loyalties will sunder their fragile new states. For African leaders and a vast number of African intellectuals nation-building is, in sociological terms, a process of integrating diverse, primordial and ethnocentric African tribes into modern statehood. Mozambique's ruling FRELIMO party, for example, in the 1970s sought to "kill the tribe to build the nation." Even the staunchest advocates of political pluralism in Kenya and elsewhere seek to distance themselves from tribal tags. The myth of the dangers of "tribalism" also achieved rapid currency among Western donors, journalists and diplomats.

But the word "tribe" itself is an invidious term of colonial vintage that denigrates African ethnic groups. This explains why more than 30 million Yorubas with a centuries-old civilization are classified as a "tribe," unlike the Basque "community" or just plain Serbs and Croatians. The fact that Africans themselves use "tribalism" for the purposes of group and supposedly historical identity—and find journalists and diplomats willing to believe them—is no proof of its primordial origins. African ethnicity, like ethnic consciousness elsewhere, uses any number of primary identities—area of origin, religion, culture, language—to build a group's internal cohesion in the face of competition for power and resources from other groups. In fact, far from being primordial, the first major arena of intergroup competition in Africa arose under colonialism with the establishment of new cities and modern cash economies. The distinguished anthropologist Elizabeth Colson has concluded, "At least in Africa, tribes and tribalism as we know them today are recent creations reflecting influences of the colonial era."

What most distinguishes sub-Saharan Africa's ethnic pluralism from ethnicity elsewhere is its unusually vast cultural,

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linguistic and geographic bases. This variety multiplies the manner in which ethnic identity may be invoked in social conflict or collaboration. African ethnicity is also marked by a weakness of secondary bases of identity—class, profession, vocation—that arise with industrialization and the spread of secular values. These two factors complicate national political management of civil society by materially poor and weak states.

Yet Africa must learn to live with its fissiparous subnationalism and ethnic diversity. "Tribalism" indeed is an issue that calls for further reflection among African political reformers seeking to recast the social bases of their governments. Governments in sub-Saharan Africa have long repressed ethnic interests, centralizing power and economic resources supposedly to promote a new "integrated" national consciousness. Their critics now demand proportional ethnic repre entation and an end to nepotism as the high road to the same elusive national unity. But the political and constitutional institutions congruent with ethnic pluralism are not found in strong centralized states. Rather they are found in the opposite. African states may now have to try a formula for stability and equity that disaggregates centralized power, allows freedom of association, including ethnic organization, and in particular promotes federalism.

Federalism may ironically strengthen national political loyalty. By diffusing autocratic power and providing cultural autonomy and control over local resources, it may satisfy varied and sometimes highly idiosyncratic provincial demands. Strengthening the parts could then provide solidarity for the whole. African leaders and many of their external advisers have argued that, outside Nigeria, African states are too small for federal arrangements. But it is the complexity of the social organization, not the size of the population, that mandates decentralized power. Switzerland, for instance, is both smaller and more federalist in constitutional character than the United States. It is ironic that some of Africa's foreign advisers—the old Soviet Union, the United States, Belgium and Canada—have resisted constitutional decentralization for Africans and yet are themselves societies where ethnic diversity is an established part of the social and political fabric.

Ethnic solidarity thus cuts both ways. The challenge of African states is to cultivate the benefits of ethnic diversity, while minimizing its admittedly destructive political potential.

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This formula is nearly opposite the tired and disastrous policies of past decades. Toleration of ethnic identity, as long as it operates within the law and is subordinated to national loyalty, could turn an apparent problem into an asset. African leaders and thinkers must cease viewing national and ethnic identities as mutually exclusive.

Political decentralization along federalist lines is of course no panacea. To be effective it must be underpinned by democratic principles and institutions. These must include, above all, scrupulous observation of individual rights and the rule of law, safeguards for minorities and the separation of political powers to check the rise of autocrats. It is less a question of imitating the United States and the West—a notion abhorrent to many African nationalists and intellectuals—than of fashioning those institutions that best serve Africa by arresting the process of political decay set in motion by decades of presidential centralism in a social environment that was inhospitable to it in the first place.

The social institutions of sub-Saharan Africa vary so widely that new and appropriate governmental systems are likely to run the gamut from breakaway states and confederacies through federalism to politically pluralistic unitary states. Such is the wide choice now facing South Africa as the de Klerk government negotiates the structures of a constitutional democracy with the African leaders of the Patriotic Front. It is also a looming problem for the continent's most populous state, Nigeria, once its quixotic military-inspired two-party system comes to grief, as many predict it will. And one could add others: Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Cameroon, Kenya, Somalia, Zaïre and Ghana. Investment and concentrated thinking toward political innovation will be required as developments unfold in all these nations.

In the past African governments and intellectuals have unquestioningly accepted the sanctity of colonial boundaries inherited at independence. To revise them, the logic went, would open a Pandora's box leading to widespread national disintegration. After the Congo crisis of the 1960s and France's ignominious role in Biafra, the United States and European countries have respected this reasoning. The OAU, author of this formula, still holds out hope for a boundaries-free united Africa. But if one judges from Africa's experience

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thus far, this "best" option has turned out to be the enemy of the good.

Eritrea was able to secede from a reluctant Ethiopia only after 30 years of violent struggle. In Somalia the old northern region in 1991 became the Somaliland Republic. Autonomy-seeking movements have led to decades of carnage in southern Sudan, conflict in Casamance (Senegal) and popular discontent with central governments in Tuareg Mali, western Cameroon, southern Mauritania, Zanzibar, northern Malawi and northern Mozambique. One need not wait for the full cycle of violence to work itself out before power redistribution, autonomy or even secession is conceded. Where a people's allegiance to their own ethnic group supersedes that given to the state, it may be time to let them secede or fuse with another state. For what does a country benefit if it secures its boundaries yet suffers perennial bloodshed among its own people?

Like those of Europe, African leaders must accept that fission and fusion of national borders is a political and historical inevitability. There is nothing remiss about altering state frontiers in the nobler interests of domestic tranquility and sustained economic growth, which are now so scarce in these lands. The divisions of today may well prepare the ground for lasting political integration tomorrow, and vice versa. It will take much courage for the OAU and its members to champion this unorthodox but politically beneficent reality. But once it gains local acceptance, bilateral and multilateral donors must hearken to the needs of the Eritreas and Somaliland republics in precisely the same manner as they have the Baltic republics and other new European states.

IV

No effort to address the needs of democratic government in Africa would be complete without discussing the policy options available to reverse the continent's economic decline and worsening poverty. Democracies moored on poverty are precarious experiments. Over half of the 46 states in sub-Saharan Africa have adopted economic structural adjustment programs with external donor support in an effort to reverse the disastrous trends of the last two decades. The results have been at best mixed.

Crisis in the balance of external payments is usually the first distress signal of an African economy, and the rescue has traditionally been provided by the International Monetary

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Fund. Almost uniformly the IMF provides balance-of-payments support contingent on immediate deflationary policies that include reduction of public-sector deficit, currency devaluation, smaller price distortions and tight monetary policy. Since the early 1980s the World Bank has also embarked on financial support for policy reform, or "structural adjustment lending," based on sectoral policy changes that reflect realistic market prices.

There have been considerable overlap and sometimes conflict between the two Bretton Woods institutions. Both, however, clearly emphasize internal supply-side reform to stimulate efficient production and tend to downplay international factors behind Africa's economic problems: such policy has been at the root of the debate on Africa's economic reform. In this debate Africa's leading bilateral donors—the EC, the United States and Scandinavia—have been little more than spectators. Outside the debate, the United States has favored more private-sector lending than Africa's other donors.

Since 1981 the UNECA and the OAU have urged that more emphasis be given to Africa's external debt problem, declining commodity prices and the disarticulated colonial structure of African economies, which require more regional integration and economic self-reliance. They have argued that, more than mere "adjustment" to the status quo, Africa needs a thorough economic transformation to become a modern industrialized continent.

In November 1989 the World Bank issued a widely hailed study on Africa's long-term development, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, urging policy changes across a wide range of economic and social sectors. The crux of the strategy lay in raising agricultural production beyond the continent's record population growth rate. It also called for increased investment in industry, mining and human resources, a resuscitation of the private sector, socially equitable growth with an emphasis on the poor, environmentally sound development as well as a strengthening of Africa's own capacity for policy analysis and a pan-African identity.

The World Bank also took African governments to task for profligate and corrupt spending, lack of accountability and repression of basic freedoms. For the first time its ambivalence toward regional economic integration gave way to reasoned endorsement of it. The bank had indeed gone far to meet its critics. UNECA gave the report grudging approval, and the

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World Bank urged a "global coalition" of international donors to join in an economic rescue effort for sub-Saharan Africa.

But the report was in fact too much of a good thing, and it left African policymakers satisfied but none the wiser. It is impossible to gainsay recommendations that nearly everything wrong in Africa ought to be righted. Tough choices remain to be made on the continent in the face of ever scarce resources. Where is Africa's economic revival to begin in practical terms?

The sub-Sahara is largely an agricultural region dominated by smallholders, and that is where private sector lending should start. Chinese agrarian reforms in the 1980s and those currently under way in Vietnam demonstrate that stunning production gains can be realized by providing individual smallholders with land security, access to full market prices and improved infrastructure, and by eliminating mendacious government bureaucracies. African agricultural incomes have fallen not only because of poor world market prices, but also because of declining total production. Production declines reflect internal mismanagement, political chaos and inefficiency. Only once those problems are eliminated can the continent exploit its comparative advantage in primary commodities. Experience in Kenya, Malawi, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast demonstrates that a surging export trade pulls along food production in its train. By crossing this threshold and implementing effective population-control programs, sub-Saharan Africa might eventually satisfy its own food security needs. Export revenues could then be put toward initiating economic diversification in agriculture, industry and the service sector.

Without removing a wide range of price distortions these sectoral-based efforts will be countermanded. Adjusting prices is socially disruptive and economically expensive, but it is an inevitable cost of economic reform. The alternatives, including dithering, are infinitely worse, a reality that vocal critics of structural adjustment in Africa and their lobbies in the West need to remember. A strong case can be made, of course, for mitigating the impact of falling incomes on the most disadvantaged sectors of the population, an issue to which donors to Africa also need pay greater attention.

A call for African economies to revamp commodity trade is likely to be met with derision. The OAU already roundly criticized a 1990 U.N. report endorsing that option. Yet the alternative—retreating from world markets—is worse than

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admittedly imperfect trade in primary products. The prospects of a "global rescue plan" for Africa are so remote that it would be foolhardy to bank on them. For all its good intentions, the World Bank's "global donor coalition" has not raised official development aid anywhere close to its projected $22 billion per year.

In fact history mocks the very idea of an international coalition to save Africa. The U.N. General Assembly in 1986 adopted a "compact" between donors and African states. The aim was to accumulate $128 billion in global assistance to African economies under the framework of the United Nations Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development. In September the U.N. secretariat admitted that for various reasons neither side had honored its part of the bargain and that the plan had foundered.

With the end of the Cold War, Africa has lost whatever political luster it may have once had, and there are no compelling geostrategic or economic reasons to catapult it to the top of the global economic agenda. Under congressional pressure, the Bush administration raised its 1991 aid commitment to sub-Saharan Africa from $600 million to $800 million, an amount equivalent to only one third of U.S. aid to Egypt alone. The administration now considers the issue settled, although some congressmen and African development experts consider the amount disproportionately small compared to the continent's enormous humanitarian and development needs.

Africans must now take the initiative and face the world as it is, not as it ought to be. They will have to accept, if grudgingly, international and domestic market fluctuations, as have Thais, Hungarians, Koreans, Poles and Brazilians. Faced with such economic prospects, Africans must now work to have industrialized Western governments that preach the benevolence of free markets drop their increasingly protectionist postures. Of immediate concern to Africa are the agricultural protectionism of the EC and the United States, the escalation of tariffs on Third World manufactures and the so-called Multi-Fiber Arrangement, a severe Western barrier to textile and clothing imports from poor nations.

The external debt policy of Western creditor nations must also be reviewed to help prop up sound economic management in new African democracies. As of 1990 sub-Saharan Africa owed $161 billion, primarily to official bilateral and multilateral sources. Even with some rescheduling and debt

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relief by European countries, debt servicing still amounts to 30 percent of the region's export earnings. The Group of Seven leading industrialized nations agreed at its July 1991 London summit to additional debt write-offs for Africa's poorest reforming economies. Britain has since followed this agreement with debt reduction to better-managed African economies as well.

The U.S. Treasury, however, has pleaded the need for a special congressional appropriation to cover any debt forgiven. This came after U.S. debt relief to Poland and Egypt for an amount far exceeding the $850 million sub-Saharan Africa owes to the United States. Africa's leading debtors to the United States are Zaïre, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Nigeria, Malawi and Cameroon—not exactly top players in the league of African democracy. To avoid throwing good money after bad, debt forgiveness could be used as a carrot to entice political reform and economic efficiency. Based on those criteria the major beneficiaries of relief would likely be countries like Zambia and Benin—small debtors—which provides all the more incentive for the United States to follow Britain's suit.

In the long run Africa's sustained economic growth will be founded not on easy grants but, as elsewhere, on the ability to raise and repay loans in international money markets and the capacity to draw direct foreign investment. For too long the bugbear of exploitative multinational corporations and inward-looking populist economics have deflected private foreign capital. If African poverty is aggravated by the presence of a mere two percent of the globe's direct private investment, as conventional thinking maintains, then would living conditions not surely be abysmal in new capital magnets like Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Brazil and Mexico?

The truth is increasingly the opposite. Those countries, like the nations of Africa, are former colonies. At independence Ghana and Sudan had the same or higher living standards than did Korea. Yet today those African states are not in the same league as Asia's newly industrialized countries. Africa's still-vocal opponents of international capitalism may nonetheless sleep easy. Private investment in sub-Saharan Africa fell to $900 million in 1989 from its 1982 peak of $2.3 billion. And the prognosis holds little hope of a reversal. A recent study reveals that between 1979 and 1989 British transnational corporations withdrew 31 percent of their investment from

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the sub-Sahara.[2] Moreover British divestment has most affected better-run economies like Zimbabwe, Kenya and Nigeria. American multinationals have also steadily divested over the last decade from Kenya—once a favorite destination of foreign capital.

Some African commentators have criticized the diversion of Western capital investment to eastern Europe. But the process of capital divestment from Africa was already in motion before those revolutions. The reasons behind it predictably include corruption and poor governance, price controls and foreign exchange shortages. Those problems also led to inefficient production and falling private capital inflows. Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, invested a mere 15 percent of its gross domestic product in 1987–88 back into the region. That compares to an average of 30 percent in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, countries whose per capita incomes are roughly equivalent to those of African states. The quality of Africa's own investment also leaves much to be desired. The rate of return per unit investment in sub-Saharan Africa was 2.5 percent in the 1980s, compared to 23 percent in South Asia.

The IMF and World Bank are wont to emphasize that capital investment will rise in the wake of reform. But in circumstances such as these it is unrealistic to expect a turnabout in private foreign capital inflows, even with reforms. African governments must first cultivate the confidence of their own domestic investors. As with good governance, sensible economics also begins at home.

V

America's policy change toward Africa came not a moment too soon. For many years, particularly during the Nixon and Reagan administrations, U.S. policy toward Africa was the despair of reform-minded African democrats, congressional subcommittees and Washington's pro-African lobbies. They watched with consternation in 1982 as American directors at the IMF voted for a $1.1 billion loan for South Africa, against loud protests from antiapartheid groups and the press; the previous summer South African defense forces had struck deep into Angola, and they continued to launch devastating

[2]Dr. Paul Bennell, "British Industrial Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Development Policy Review*, vol. 8, 1990, pp. 155–77.

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raids into neighboring countries with impunity even until 1989.

Successive U.S. administrations, following the global client-age calculations of the Cold War, cast their lots with many of Africa's most corrupt and vain regimes. Zaïre's President Mobutu was needed to keep Jonah Savimbi's UNITA movement supplied with armaments in its protracted guerrilla war against the Soviet- and Cuban-sponsored government in neighboring Angola. Similar geostrategic considerations informed America's relations with Kenya's authoritarian leader Daniel arap Moi in the 1980s and the repressive regime of Somalia's Mohamed Siad Barre; both leaders actively supported the U.S. rapid deployment force with Indian Ocean bases after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Neither leader cared to consult local opinion on those decisions, any more than did the late president of Liberia, Samuel K. Doe, caretaker of the hub of the U.S.-African communications network in Monrovia. Doe's government blatantly rigged that country's 1985 elections and routinely abused civil rights, all the while earning $550 million in American aid throughout the 1980s, most of which was promptly embezzled.

The U.S. policy shift in 1991 thus surprised African despots and thrilled African democrats. In early November, when the U.S. embassy in Kinshasa, Zaïre, released a statement by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen insisting that "Mobutu has lost legitimacy and should hand over the government to an opposition-led transition," copies of the statement flooded the streets of the capital within hours as joyful crowds flocked to the home of opposition leader Etienne "Moses" Tshisekedi. In 1991 U.S. diplomats also protested the harassment of the political opposition in Togo and Swaziland. In Kenya, U.S. ambassador Smith Hempstone virtually became a local folk hero for sticking adamantly to the principles of democracy and human rights in the face of a recalcitrant Nairobi government. He was supported by the White House and the State Department, to the chagrin of President Moi and his ministers, who had made a fetish of insulting him for his stand.

But these expressions of moral backing aside, U.S. embassies pleaded penury in most African countries making the transition to democracy. In Benin, the Ivory Coast, Gabon and Cape Verde, the United States made only small contributions to electoral management and human rights initiatives, and in

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1991 the United States raised its expenditure on "democratic infrastructure" for all of Africa to $30 million. Fortunately Africa's democratic reformers have been able to get maximum mileage from America's moral support and diplomacy, absent substantial U.S. financial backing and expertise. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also succumbed to the Africa-last-and-least syndrome. Out of the agency's $171 million for democracy funding in fiscal year 1990, sub-Saharan Africa got slightly over half a million dollars—0.3 percent of the total—compared to $73 million for more democratized Latin American and Caribbean nations. Funding for constitutional reforms, government electoral expenses and independent observers remain high priorities to complete Africa's democratic transitions.

Perhaps the most significant U.S. policy shift toward Africa in 1991 was to link development assistance to democratization. In November USAID indicated that priority for aid would be given to "democratic and honest" governments. This pronouncement not only brought U.S. aid policy in line with the human rights conditions of Section 116 of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, but also placed it in step with the EC's African development program, which too has renewed emphasis on denying aid to dictatorial one-party regimes. African opposition leaders hope that this uniting of forces will not turn out to be a dead letter, like the British government's June 1990 proclamation threatening aid cuts "to governments who persist with repressive policies," which was quietly shelved in Kenya and Malawi, Britain's leading aid recipients in Africa.

At the Paris Donors Consultative Meeting in November 1991 aid pledges to Kenya were deferred for six months after the Moi government cracked down on opponents of its one-party state, its human rights violations and rampant corruption. Kenya has long been a favorite destination of Western aid, private capital and tourists, and its rebuff may serve as an object lesson to other renegades from democratic reform like Malawi, Cameroon, Tanzania and Seychelles, as well as those nations who would adopt a leisurely pace toward political liberalization. After that Paris meeting Kenya permitted the formation of opposition political parties.

Working in concert with the Paris Club of bilateral and multilateral donors, the United States and its European allies must now go further and reexamine their military and security aid policies toward African countries. South Africa was sub-

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jected to an arms embargo for pursuing apartheid policies with severe internal repression. Yet there are other African regimes whose domestic policies have been perhaps even crueler than South Africa's, and they should receive the same sanction. Although U.S. law prohibits military aid "to consistent violators of human rights," Chad, Djibouti, Kenya, Malawi and Zaïre each receive U.S. military aid in excess of $1 million, and they hardly qualify by that criterion. The same leverage should be applied to the imperfect democracies in Senegal and Tunisia, which are also leading recipients of U.S. military aid. It would serve the ends of democracy far better if this money were channeled through the United Nations or OAU toward peacekeeping operations and transitions to legitimate rule in disintegrating Somalia, Liberia, Mozambique and Zaïre.

VI

It is encouraging that the Kenyan foreign minister's denouncement of U.S. Ambassador Hempstone as a "racist" with a "slave-owner mentality" was met by local demonstrations and protests in the letters columns of Kenya's print media. Refuge in white imperialist-bashing is not the popular gimmick it once was. Candid self-reproach and recourse to realistic policy choices are increasingly gathering popular momentum.

At a 1990 conference UNECA Secretary General Adebayo Adedeji spoke on behalf of many when he said that "the voice of the people rather than the voice of one person or an oligarchy" should inform development policy. A mail survey done by the London-based *New African* in January 1990 found that 79 percent of respondents in Africa favored competitive multiparty political systems. And in 1991 60 percent of voters in Sierra Leone approved a referendum on competitive electoral politics. South Africa's indefatigable antiapartheid campaigner Archbishop Desmond Tutu has urged that the civil liberties of all Africans be respected. "If detention without trial is evil in South Africa," he told a Nairobi audience in November 1988, "then it must be evil in every part of the African continent." He also acknowledged the now-evident fact that there is today less freedom in many African countries than during the colonial period.

The absence of realistic and self-critical policies has probably done more damage to Africa than its much-vaunted lack of resources. For too long a vocal and influential number of African leaders and intellectuals have blamed Africa's circum-

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stances on someone else, usually omnipresent "imperialist" conspirators. Nigerian Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka has argued in *The Los Angeles Times*: "To meet the challenge of renewal, it is time to rid ourselves of the past legacy of excusing, ignoring or even justifying atrocities by leaders simply because they are on the 'left.'"[3] He upbraided African dictators and their apologists for betraying the continent "from within."

But self-critical sentiments from African writers, academics and journalists are now more commonplace than ever before. Editors like the often-jailed Gitobu Imanyara of the *Nairobi Law Monthly*, Kenneth Best of Liberia's *Daily Observer*, Pius Njawe of Cameroon's *Le Messager* and Stanley Kamana of Tanzania's *Family Mirror* have bravely crusaded for a critical and free press in the face of unrelenting government hostility. Kindred efforts by human rights lawyers in Kenya and Nigeria have been reinforced by groups like Africa Watch, PEN, Amnesty International, the New York-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the BBC World Service as well as Africa-based U.S. and European media correspondents. If President Bush's July 1991 remark about "keeping the faith with all oppressed peoples to promote democracy and freedom" is to have practical meaning in Africa, this is good company to keep.

But for Africa's every democracy advocate there is a government adviser who will defend authoritarianism in the presumed interests of political stability and development. Influential Nigerian policy advisers, for example, have prevailed against the ballot box, and in October 1991 Kenyans were treated to a lengthy defense by 140 intellectuals of the supposedly stabilizing capacity of the one-party system. Such African policymakers and intellectuals appear oblivious to the evidence accumulating against them elsewhere on the continent and throughout the rest of the world.

Africa's task of reform cannot be accomplished in geographic or intellectual isolation. The United States, the EC and multilateral donor agencies would do Africa a great favor by treating its dictatorships to equal-opportunity hostility. They should insist on high-performance standards in economic management and the observance of internationally accepted

[3]"Global Viewpoint," *Los Angeles Times* Syndicate, May 28, 1991.

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principles of democracy and human rights. To exempt Africans from these norms—because they are "disadvantaged," "culturally different" or "just Africans"—is to give succor to the political blundering and economic incompetence that penalize Africa's poor most. At worst it amounts to patronizing racism: the kindness that kills.

While imploring Africans to play by the rules of a new world order, the industrialized democracies must also demonstrate by example their adherence to the same principles. For the United States in particular, with its large African-American population, application of universal justice increases its moral authority in Africa, while setbacks to nondiscriminatory race policies only accomplish the reverse.

American foreign policy toward Africa was for too long compromised by Cold War calculations and misplaced trust in the autocrat as an agent of stability. The political change on the continent in 1991 provides reasonable grounds for a meeting of the minds. The ideas of today's political reformers in Africa will lay the institutional foundations for new constitutions, changes in legislation and dialogue among rival national groups. Democracy is an incremental process. With renewed vision on political and economic fronts, the United States may yet provide some building blocks to that process and thereby reconcile itself once again to Africa's aspirations.

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Michael Mandelbaum

COUP DE GRACE: THE END OF THE SOVIET UNION

On August 24, 1991, three days after the collapse of an attempted coup by a group of high Soviet officials in Moscow, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev killed himself in his Kremlin office. Mikhail Gorbachev's special adviser on military affairs left a suicide note: "Everything I have worked for is being destroyed."

Akhromeyev had devoted his life to three institutions: the Soviet army, in whose service he had been wounded at Leningrad in 1941 and through whose ranks he had risen to the position of chief of the General Staff (1984–88); the Communist Party, which he had joined at 20 and on whose Central Committee he had served since 1983; and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics itself, officially founded a year before his birth in 1923. In the wake of the failed coup all three were disintegrating.

The armed forces were divided and disgraced. Entire units had refused to take part in the coup. A number of the troops sent to beseige the Russian parliament building—where a crowd that ultimately numbered 100,000 had gathered to defend the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, and his government—defected to Yeltsin's side. After the coup had failed Defense Minister Dimitri Yazov and his deputy, Valentin Varennikov, were arrested. Yevgeny I. Shaposhnikov, the newly appointed minister, announced that 80 percent of the army's officers would be replaced because they were politically suspect.

The Communist Party was shattered. As jubilant crowds cheered, statues of communist heroes were pulled down all over Moscow. Gorbachev, shortly after his return from his ordeal in the Crimea, resigned as leader of the party, dissolved the Central Committee, ordered an end to party activity in the

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military, the security apparatus and the government, and told local party organizations that they would have to fend for themselves.

The union of 15 republics was itself dissolving. In Moscow people began to wave the blue, white and red flag of prerevolutionary Russia. The republics scrambled to declare their independence, the Ukrainian parliament voting for full independence by 321 to 1. For 75 years the vast stretch of Eurasia that was the Soviet Union had been tightly, often brutally controlled from Moscow, which had come to be known as "the center." The president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, declared that "the center has committed suicide."

II

The coup might have been expected to succeed. The ranks of the eight-man junta that on August 19 announced it was assuming power, proclaiming a state of emergency, banning demonstrations, closing newspapers and outlawing political parties, included the leaders of the most powerful institutions of the Soviet Union: the government, the security apparatus and the military-industrial complex.[1] Yet they failed completely. Two minor episodes during the three dramatic days of August 19–21 exemplify the reasons for their failure.

On August 20 Yeltsin dispatched his foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, to Paris to prepare a government-in-exile should that become necessary. The junta learned of the trip and sent word to Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport to detain Kozyrev. He succeeded in leaving, however, because the order to stop him went to the airport's VIP lounge while Kozyrev simply stood in the departure lines with ordinary passengers. It apparently did not occur to the plotters that a high official would fail to take advantage of the privileges available to him.

In short, the men who launched the coup were incompetent. They did not send troops and tanks in to the streets of Moscow until a full six hours after declaring the state of emergency. They neglected to seize Yeltsin immediately, thus making it possible for him to become the focal point of resistance. They

[1]The members of the "State Committee on the Emergency Situation" included: Gennadi Yanaev, Gorbachev's vice president who announced he was assuming the presidency; Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB; Yazov, the defense minister; Valentin Pavlov, prime minister; Boris Pugo, interior minister; Oleg Baklanov, first deputy chairman of the Defense Council; Vasily Starodubtsev, chairman of the Farmer's Union; and Aleksandr Tizyakov, president of the Association of State Enterprises.

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failed to cut the Russian parliament's communications with the rest of the world.[2]

It was, to use a phrase familiar under the old regime, "no accident" that the coup-plotters bungled so badly. The people at the top of the communist system were not the best and the brightest of the society they governed. That system did not encourage or reward initiative, imagination or decisiveness. It valued, instead, dull conformity and slavish obedience to authority. Several members of the junta were later reported to have spent most of the 72 hours of the coup drunk.

The other exemplary episode took place on Monday afternoon, August 19, the first day of the coup. The junta called a press conference. Gennadi Yanaev, the vice president who had assumed Gorbachev's duties because, he said, the president was "ill," made a statement and fielded questions. One journalist asked whether he had sought "any suggestion or any advice through General Pinochet." The question evoked laughter. It was meant to be sarcastic and belittling by associating the coup-plotters with the conservative Chilean dictator who had overthrown Marxist President Salvador Allende in 1974 and had thus been routinely reviled by Soviet propaganda.[3]

The event, the question and the response were all telling. When Lenin seized power in Petrograd in November 1917 he did not feel it necessary to call a press conference to explain and justify what he had done. Nor were his successors in the habit of entertaining questions from the press. And when they did offer their thoughts in public, no one had ever dared to

[2]The attempted coup was the fifth high-level effort in a year to turn back the tide of change in the Soviet Union and restore the old order. The first and most successful effort came in October 1990, when Gorbachev turned sharply in a conservative direction, rejecting the Shatalin plan for sweeping economic change and ridding his government and his entourage of prominent liberals. On the next three occasions, however, the indecision and incompetence that marked the coup were in evidence. On January 13, 1991, an attack on a television station in Vilnius, Lithuania, seemed a prelude to a crackdown across the Soviet Union, but none occurred. In March, in response to an effort by the communists in the Russian parliament to prevent Yeltsin from taking office as president, his supporters announced plans for demonstrations in Moscow. The Soviet government issued a decree in Gorbachev's name prohibiting demonstrations and ordered 50,000 troops into the city. Unintimidated, thousands of Muscovites demonstrated without incident. In June Prime Minister Pavlov announced in the Supreme Soviet that he was assuming most of Gorbachev's powers. The president mustered support to turn back the challenge in a speech of his own in the parliament, and Pavlov immediately retreated. "The coup is over," Gorbachev joked with reporters at the time.

[3]Pinochet was also a symbol of one possible response to the country's mounting political and economic troubles. In Moscow the term "the Pinochet solution" referred to a combination of dictatorial rule and the introduction of market economics—political authoritarianism along with economic liberalization.

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
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

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mock them. In Stalin's day failing to applaud the leader vigorously enough was cause for being sent to prison—or worse.

Since Stalin's day, however, things had changed. The Soviet Union in which Yanaev was attempting to seize power was a very different country from the one that Lenin and Stalin, indeed that Khrushchev and even Brezhnev had ruled.[4] So different was it, in fact, that each of the three great institutions to which Marshal Akhromeyev had devoted his life was already in an advanced state of decay by August 19.

Well before it balked at the junta's orders the army had been severely battered. In 1988 it had withdrawn from Afghanistan after nine years and 15,000 deaths without having pacified the country. The next year the revolutions in Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia ended the Cold War, depriving the Soviet armed forces of what had been, for four decades, their central mission. Troops stationed in those countries had to leave; many had no homes to which to return.

Draft evasion became rampant, especially outside Russia. The army was divided politically by rank, age, region and ethnic group. Junior officers began criticizing their superiors; several were elected to all-union and republican parliaments, where they expressed dissenting views on military questions. The political leadership committed itself to substantial reductions in military spending, and proposals were floated to abolish conscription and rely instead on volunteers to fill the army's ranks.

In all, the military suffered from a severe loss of status. In the Brezhnev era, in particular, official propaganda had glorified the mighty Soviet army as the stalwart defender of socialism. By 1991 it was despised outside Russia as an agent of imperial oppression and had come to be seen in the Russian heartland as a self-serving bureaucracy whose endless appetite for resources was bankrupting the country.

The Communist Party was similarly reeling from blows to its privileged standing before Gorbachev effectively closed it down. It was subject for the first time in six decades to open criticism, which turned into an avalanche of denunciation. Far from being the champion of the toiling masses and the

[4]One possible reason for the junta's caution was the desire to present the coup as constitutional. If so, if its members felt the need to win public support on this basis, this would further demonstrate how far change had proceeded in the Soviet Union since 1985.

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vanguard of the just society, as it had always portrayed itself, the party came to be seen as a criminal conspiracy dedicated to preserving its own position. The elections of 1989 and 1990 to the national and republican supreme soviets humiliated the party, as people voted in droves against communist officeholders even when there was no opposing candidate.

Members deserted the party in enormous numbers. By one estimate four million people, fully 20 percent of the membership, had quit the party in the year immediately preceding the coup. In some places the local party apparatus simply disintegrated. Gorbachev renounced the long-standing and fundamental communist claim to a monopoly of power, and the month before the coup he pushed through a party charter that virtually abandoned the formerly sacred precepts of Marxism-Leninism. After his election as Russian president, Yeltsin ordered party cells in workplaces throughout Russia dissolved, challenging the basis of the communist grip on the everyday lives of the people of the Soviet Union.

As for the union itself, it was well on the way to becoming a hollow shell even before the republics began to declare independence in the coup's wake. The republican elections had brought to power governments determined not simply to take orders from Moscow, as had been the rule in Soviet politics for decades. Each of the 15 republics had proclaimed itself "sovereign," meaning that its own laws took precedence over those of the center. Ukraine, the second most important of them after Russia, was moving to recruit its own armed forces and issue its own currency.

On the eve of the coup nine republics were preparing to sign a new union treaty, which would have deprived Moscow of virtually all economic power and left the republics with the right both to challenge any powers the center retained and to secede if they were dissatisfied with the new arrangements.[5] The prospect of this new union treaty probably triggered the coup attempt, for it would have eliminated most of the functions of precisely those organizations that the plotters headed. The coup was a last-ditch attempt to preserve their

[5]Six of the 15 Soviet republics—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia—refused even to take part in the negotiations, in a kind of de facto secession from the Soviet Union.

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own power.[6] But that power had already been severely eroded. As the political scientist William Taubman put it at the time: "The coup occurred because of all the changes that have taken place, and it failed because of all the changes that have taken place."[7] The coup-plotters struck to restore the old order; the result of their failure was to put it out of its misery. What began as a coup d'état to preserve it turned out to be the coup de grace for the Soviet Union.

III

How did all this come about? How did it happen that a mighty imperial state, troubled but stable only a few years before, had come to the brink of collapse in 1991? Who and what were responsible?

The chief architect of the Soviet collapse was Mikhail Gorbachev himself. During the coup, as a prisoner of the junta in his Crimean villa, he was the object of a struggle between the partisans of the old order and the champions of liberal values. But it was Gorbachev who had, in the period between his coming to power in 1985 and the fateful days of August 1991, created the conditions that had touched off this struggle.

The Soviet leader had created them unintentionally. His aim had been to strengthen the political and economic systems that he inherited, to strip away their Stalinist accretions and make the Soviet Union a modern dynamic state. Instead he had fatally weakened it. Intending to reform Soviet communism he had, rather, destroyed it. The three major policies that he had launched to fashion a more efficient and humane form of socialism—glasnost, democratization and perestroika—had in the end subverted, discredited and all but done away with the network of political and economic institutions that his Communist Party had constructed in Russia and surrounding countries since 1917.

The policy of glasnost relaxed bureaucratic controls on information, broadened the parameters of permitted discussion and thereby enabled the people of the Soviet Union to say more, hear more and learn more about their past and present. Gorbachev's purpose had been to enlist the intelligentsia in his

[6]This was Yeltsin's analysis. "Objectively, the new union treaty would strip virtually each of the architects of the putsch of their offices, and herein lies the secret of the conspiracy and the main motivation behind the actions of the parties to it." See *The New York Times*, Aug. 22, 1991, p. A13.

[7]*Ibid.*, p. A16.

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campaign to revitalize the country and to generate popular pressure on the party apparatus, which had resisted the changes he was trying to make. He plainly wanted to encourage criticism of his predecessor, Leonid Brezhnev, and to resume the campaign against Stalin that Khrushchev had launched but that Brezhnev had ended.

Glasnost, however, did not stop there. The sainted Lenin, and even Gorbachev himself, came in for critical attention. Gorbachev wanted to foster a reassessment of some selected features of Soviet life. Instead glasnost called all of it into question, including, ultimately, the role of the general secretary of the Communist Party.

More broadly, the people of the Soviet Union were able for the first time to speak the truth about their history and their lives. That meant that they could learn the truth and could acknowledge it to one another. The effect was cathartic, and the catharsis had a profound, indeed a revolutionary, impact on Soviet politics. It began to undo the enduring effects of the terror that the Communist Party had routinely practiced during its first three decades in power. Of the first wave of that terror, imposed not by Stalin in the 1930s but by Lenin during the civil war, the historian Richard Pipes has written:

> The Red Terror gave the population to understand that under a regime that felt no hesitation in executing innocents, innocence was no guarantee of survival. The best hope of surviving lay in making oneself as inconspicuous as possible, which meant abandoning any thought of independent public activity, indeed any concern with public affairs, and withdrawing into one's private world. Once society disintegrated into an agglomeration of human atoms, each fearful of being noticed and concerned exclusively with physical survival, then it ceased to matter what society thought, for the government had the entire sphere of public activity to itself.[8]

Glasnost enabled the people of the Soviet Union to lay claim to the public sphere after seven decades of exile from it. Through democratization they had the opportunity, for the first time, to act collectively in that sphere. Gorbachev's purpose in permitting elections, again, was to generate popular support for his program. Democratization was to be a political weapon in his battle against the Communist Party apparatus. That apparatus was deeply entrenched, wholly mistrustful of what he was trying to do and generally adept at frustrating his

[8]Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990, p. 838.

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plans. The experiment in democracy that he launched did not demonstrate, as Gorbachev had hoped, that he enjoyed popular support. Rather it showed that two widely held beliefs about the political inclinations of the people of the Soviet Union were wrong.

Elections discredited the official dictum that the Communist Party had earned public gratitude and support for the "noble, far-sighted" leadership it had provided since 1917. They discredited, as well, the view held by many Western students of the Soviet Union that the party did have a measure of legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Its achievements in defeating fascism between 1941 and 1945 and providing a modestly rising living standard thereafter were thought to have earned it a measure of respect, which was reinforced by the political passivity, the resignation to things as they are, that was presumed to be the dominant Russian approach to public life. The elections of 1989 and 1990 showed the people of the Soviet Union to be neither respectful of nor resigned to communist rule.

Democratization also created the opportunity for the beginnings of an alternative to the communist political elite to emerge. In Russia its main orientation was anticommunism, and Boris Yeltsin became its leading figure. Outside Russia the opportunity for political participation revealed that popular political allegiance was not to socialism, or the Soviet Union, or to Mikhail Gorbachev, but rather to nationalism, which was deeply anti-Soviet in character.

IV

Glasnost and democratization were, for Gorbachev, means to an end. That end was the improvement of Soviet economic performance. Economic reform was the central feature of his program. When he came to power in 1985 the Soviet elite believed that the regime's principal task was to lift the country out of the economic stagnation into which it had lapsed at the end of the Brezhnev era. Without revived economic growth, they feared, the Soviet Union would fall ever further behind the West in economic and perhaps in military terms. Ultimately it risked being overtaken by China, where Deng Xiaoping's market reforms were producing a surge of growth.

Stagnation posed dangers at home as well. Without economic growth the regime would be unable to fulfill its part of the unofficial "social contract," under whose terms the public

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renounced any say over public affairs in return for a slowly rising standard of living. The revolt of the Polish workers in 1980–81 under the banner of Solidarity served as a cautionary example for the men in the Kremlin.

At first Gorbachev continued the approach that Yuri Andropov had begun in 1982: he tried to impose greater discipline on the work force. The centerpiece of his initial set of economic measures was a highly publicized and intrusive public campaign against the consumption of alcohol. It earned Gorbachev the title of "Mineral Water General Secretary," but did not noticeably reduce Russian drinking. Instead, by forcing people to make their own liquor rather than buying it from the state, the campaign caused shortages of sugar and deprived the government of a large chunk of its income.

This, in turn, contributed to Gorbachev's most enduring and destructive economic legacy: a severe fiscal imbalance. The center's obligations expanded as it poured more and more money into investment and tried to buy public support with generous wage increases. At the same time its income plummeted, as republican governments and enterprises, having gained more power, refused to send revenues to Moscow. In the months before the coup the republics were engaged in what was, in effect, one of the largest tax strikes in history. The fiscal policy of the Brezhnev regime had been relatively strict; Gorbachev's was extremely lax. To cover the widening gap between obligations and income the central government printed rubles at an accelerating pace. By August 1991 the economy was reeling.

In the great historical drama that is the collapse of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev was neither a villain nor a fool—although in retrospect some of the things he did came to seem foolish. He was not a Western-style democrat, but it is scarcely conceivable that someone committed to Western political principles could have risen to the top of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. His view of socialism, however muddled and contradictory, was plainly more humane than the reality of the system for which he inherited responsibility. For most of his time in power, moreover, he had to fight against the conservatism of that system, which expressed itself mainly in inertia but occasionally in active opposition to his designs. If he came increasingly to seem a political maneuverer, it was because he had to maneuver—or believed that he had to maneuver—to

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survive in power and to protect the liberal measures already taken.

Finally, and most important, Mikhail Gorbachev's character, however flawed, was marked by a basic decency missing in every previous leader of the Soviet Union and indeed in every ruler of imperial Russia before that. He abjured one of the principal methods by which his predecessors had governed. He refused to shoot. He refused—with the exception of several episodes in the Baltics and the Caucasus in which civilians were killed—to countenance the use of violence against the citizens of his country and of eastern Europe, even when what they did dismayed, angered or appalled him. For this alone he deserved the Nobel Peace Prize he received in the fall of 1990 and deserves as well the place of honor he will occupy in the history of the twentieth century.

But after August 21 Gorbachev belonged to history, not to the ongoing political life of what had been the Soviet Union. Although he was rescued from enemies who had only recently been colleagues, the act of rescue swept away the institutional platform on which he had stood. He had made his career as a reformer of communism. In the aftermath of the coup there was nothing left to reform.

V

After the coup failed Russia's second city reverted to the name it had borne before the revolution. Leningrad once again became St. Petersburg.[9] The change symbolized a larger development: everything communism had built since 1917 was now either repudiated or destroyed. It was as if all of the twentieth century had been suddenly repealed. The economic and political systems that had bound together the three hundred million people of what had once been the Soviet Union lay in ruins, leaving uncoordinated fragments. For these people 1991 was what the historian John Lukacs called 1945 for Europeans: Year Zero.

After several months of drift the two most important pieces of the former Union, Russia and Ukraine, undertook to build a new political structure in its place. On December 1 the people of Ukraine voted overwhelmingly in favor of indepen-

[9]The city had voted for the change in the June election in which Yeltsin had won the Russian presidency. Gorbachev, however, had opposed the change. After Aug. 21 neither he nor anyone else could block it.

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dence and at the same time elected Leonid Kravchuk, former leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party, as their president. Armed with this mandate, Kravchuk met Yeltsin and Byelorussian President Stanislav Shushkevich at the Byelorussian town of Brest and on December 8 formed the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The signatories were at pains to distinguish their new creation from the old Soviet Union. It was not, they emphasized, a state but rather a grouping of sovereign states, like the British Commonwealth or the European Community. Its headquarters were to be located not in Moscow but in the Byelorussian capital, Minsk. The non-Slavic republics of the old union were not included in the Commonwealth's founding meeting, and Mikhail Gorbachev learned of it only after it had taken place.

Other republics protested, and two weeks later, on December 22, in the Kazakh capital, Alma-Ata, the Commonwealth was "refounded," this time including 11 of the former Soviet republics.[10] Gorbachev also objected to the new association. Since August he had tried to assemble a new, looser union. Yeltsin had been content to let him try. In the wake of the Ukrainian referendum, however, it became clear that Ukrainian authorities would not join any entity headed by Gorbachev. Yeltsin therefore abandoned him. After December 8 Gorbachev launched a last flurry of meetings in an attempt to salvage a position for himself, issued apocalyptic warnings about the fate of the Commonwealth, then gave up. On Christmas Day, 1991, he resigned as president of a country that no longer existed.

The Commonwealth was important not for the details of its founding agreement, which were vague, incomplete and immediately subject to differing interpretations. It was significant, rather, as a compromise—or as a recognition of the need to compromise—between two powerful forces in the former Soviet Union: the impulse for independence from the all-powerful central authority of the Soviet era, which was vividly apparent in the Ukrainian referendum; and the need to cooperate so as to manage the series of issues with which none of the former republics could successfully cope on its own.

So numerous and powerful were the connections among the

[10]The three Baltic republics, having proclaimed their independence after the coup and having received international recognition, were not represented at Alma-Ata, nor was the republic of Georgia.

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former republics that, having achieved independence, they were like men roped together on a ship and then thrown overboard. To keep from drowning they would have to work together; but they did not necessarily wish to be tied to one another forever.

Among the critical questions they had to settle, which were of particular concern to the West, was who would control the huge Soviet military establishment and, in particular, its nuclear weapons. The Commonwealth agreement suggested the maintenance of a unified command structure for the armed forces. But several of the former republics announced that they would field their own armies. Ukrainian estimates of the size of its future force varied from 100,000 to 400,000. Authorities in Kiev also laid claim to the Black Sea fleet of the Soviet navy, a claim Russian leaders disputed.

On the sensitive subject of nuclear armaments Yeltsin announced that the 12,000 long-range "strategic" weapons—those capable of reaching North America—would come under Russian control. However, he added, the presidents of the three other republics where they were deployed—Ukraine, Byelorussia (renamed Belarus) and Kazakhstan—would each have a veto over launching until these weapons could be removed from their territories. As for the 15,000 shorter-range "tactical" nuclear weapons scattered throughout the former Soviet Union, several former republics, notably including Ukraine, announced that they would rid themselves of these as well. The government of Kazakhstan, however, said that it would keep some nuclear weapons as long as Russia had them.

Both positions were reversible; unlike Kazakhstan, Ukraine is big enough and rich enough to acquire its own independent nuclear arsenal should it choose to do so. The nuclear policies of the successor states of the Soviet Union will ultimately depend on relations among them, and especially the relations of the others with Russia, which will remain a large nuclear power. Of all these relationships the one between Russia and Ukraine is by far the most important.

Twelve million ethnic Russians live in Ukraine, most of them concentrated in its eastern region. The Crimean peninsula was historically part of Russia—Khrushchev transferred it to Ukraine only in 1954—and voted by only 56 percent for independence in the December 1 Ukrainian referendum that produced 90 percent majorities elsewhere. The city of Odessa,

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now also part of Ukraine, has historically served as Russia's main port on the Black Sea. As one republic after another declared independence in the wake of the coup, a statement issued in President Yeltsin's name warned that Russia would reserve the right to review its borders with any neighboring republic that seceded.[11] Yeltsin subsequently pledged that Russia would respect existing borders. But it is not difficult to imagine circumstances—friction between Crimean Russians and the Ukrainian government in Kiev, for example—that would generate public pressure in Russia for him to revoke that pledge or bring to power another leader who would renounce it.

At the formation of the Commonwealth all the new states echoed Yeltsin's promise not to dispute the borders between and among them. However, these borders were drawn by Lenin and Stalin, often with an eye to dividing and thus weakening ethnic and national groups, and thus some are likely to be challenged. Ukraine alone, for example, has potential border disputes not only with Russia but with Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and Moldova (formerly the Soviet republic, Moldavia) as well.

However the borders are drawn or redrawn, millions of people will be left in states dominated by members of other ethnic and national groups. A dispute over the rights of Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave in the republic of Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, has led to bloodshed that has claimed thousands of lives and made refugees of hundreds of thousands of people from both communities. There are dozens of potentially similar situations: Poles in Lithuania, Tatars in Russia, Tadjiks in Uzbekistan and Russians virtually everywhere outside Russia.

Even if the borders among them are settled, this will not resolve the fundamental political question that the successor states confront: How are they to be governed? The character of their governments is bound to vary. On the whole the chances for stable democracy are probably greater the farther west the new state is located. Ukraine and Russia both have governments committed to democracy, but both face obstacles in trying to establish firmly grounded democratic political systems. Neither has ever had the opportunity to develop the

[11]See *The New York Times*, Aug. 27, 1991, p. A7. The spokesman made clear that the statement referred to eastern Ukraine and northern Kazakhstan.

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institutions on which democracy depends: political parties, legislatures, independent courts. Neither has been fertile soil for the cultivation of the attitudes and values that are the oxygen of democracy: tolerance, the willingness to compromise, respect for differing opinions.

Historically, moreover, democracy is difficult to establish and sustain in pluralistic societies that include several large ethnic or national groups, and none of the successor states will be homogeneous. Democracy is also difficult to establish and sustain in conditions of economic collapse, and those were, unhappily, the conditions that prevailed in the former Soviet Union at the end of 1991.

VI

Inflation was rampant. Gorbachev's government had flooded the country with rubles. Because prices in the old Soviet Union were set by administrative fiat rather than by the market, they did not immediately soar. Instead a large "monetary overhang" of rubles was created, money held unwillingly by individuals because there was nothing on which to spend it.

One consequence familiar from inflationary episodes at other times in other places was apparent: a flight from the official currency. Channels of distribution that relied on the ruble—including government food stores in the large cities—dried up. Transactions were increasingly made for hard currency or through barter. This caused industrial output to drop, agricultural producers to withhold their crops and hoarding to increase everywhere.

There is general agreement in the West about what is needed to rescue the people of the former Soviet Union from their economic catastrophe: sweeping, simultaneous programs of stabilization and liberalization. Governments must stop printing money and reduce their subsidies to enterprises and individuals while freeing prices so that they can be set by supply and demand rather than by planners' decisions. At the same time governments must act to promote competition by breaking up the concentrations that characterized virtually every industry in the Soviet period. They must also begin to divest themselves of their societies' economic assets and put them in private hands. They must create real markets for capital and labor. They must begin the process of integrating

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their countries into the world economy, an important part of which is to make their currencies freely convertible.

None of these steps is simple. Privatization, for example, requires enacting laws that guarantee private ownership; assigning values to thousands of enterprises; setting procedures for selling those enterprises that may include distributing vouchers equal to a certain number of shares to every citizen, as the government of Poland is doing; recruiting and training managers to operate the enterprises under competitive conditions—and then actually transferring all this property to private hands.

Together the major elements of a program of stabilization and liberalization make for an agenda of staggering proportions, one without any close historical parallel. They involve a top-to-bottom revolution of the economic life of what was once the Soviet Union.While he had power Gorbachev could not bring himself to attempt the task. Yeltsin committed himself to doing so. By his order official prices on all but a handful of goods rose sharply on January 2, 1992, and Yeltsin pledged to undertake the rapid privatization of shops, farms and factories.

Yeltsin's government, however, may lack the administrative capacity to carry out the transition from a centrally controlled to a market economy. Just how far beyond Moscow into the Russian heartland his writ actually runs was far from clear as 1992 began. Ironically, after suffering for centuries from governments that were excessively, suffocatingly powerful, Russia's efforts to reproduce the institutions that have brought freedom and prosperity to the West may be fatally handicapped by the present weakness of its governmental structures.

Even if it can enact the necessary measures, moreover, the Russian government will face yet another test: enduring the political unpopularity that they are bound to produce. In the short term they will make people poorer as prices rise and subsidies dwindle. Food, clothing and shelter will become more expensive in a country where already many are barely getting by. Hundreds of factories will be unable to survive under competitive conditions, throwing millions of people out of work.

Ultimately these measures will produce a market system that will harness initiative and ingenuity and allocate resources rationally. But this will require time, time for new institutions to take root and time for people to learn new skills such as banking, accounting and marketing. Between the initial shock

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of measures for stabilization and liberalization and the ultimate benefits of a market economy lies a long and difficult passage. Along the way the temptation will be considerable to stop, to retreat, to adopt populist remedies for economic hardship, and above all to cast aside governments responsible for the hardship.

It will be especially tempting for Russians to reject a draconian program of economic transition because some of the normal features of life in a market economy—sharp inequalities of income, unemployment, the failure of efforts to launch and sustain businesses—are unfamiliar to them and indeed were anathematized in the Soviet Union for 75 years. Socialism may be dead in Russia, but socialist values live on.

It is thus difficult to contemplate the months ahead with optimism. Ugly precedents for the Russian future from the history of the twentieth century come all too readily to mind. The last time an imperial government collapsed in Russia, in 1917, there followed four chaotic and bloody years of civil war. The last time a deep economic depression struck major European countries, it brought to power a murderous government in Germany that began the costliest war in human history. The last time a great multinational empire broke apart separating two large communities after centuries of being ruled together, millions of people fled their homes on each side of the new border between India and Pakistan and hundreds of thousands died.

None of these grim outcomes is impossible in the former Soviet Union. Nor can a repetition of the events of August, this time with a less happy conclusion, be ruled out. The junta advertised its effort to seize power as a way of restoring order. The appeal evoked no response. As conditions worsen, however, it will become increasingly attractive. Where the coup-plotters of August failed, a more determined and brutal group, in circumstances of growing privation and mounting chaos, might succeed.

And yet, as they enter the postcommunist era, the successor states of the Soviet Union, and Russia in particular, carry with them three assets that give grounds for hope that the worst can be avoided.

VII

Tradition has it that in 1789 King Louis XVI of France referred to the storming of the Bastille and the events that followed as a riot, only to be corrected by the Duc de la

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Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, who said, "No, sire, it is a revolution." If the word "reform" is substituted for "riot" the exchange applies to what was once the Soviet Union. What Gorbachev wrought began as a reform but ended as a revolution. The social, political and economic processes that culminated in the failed coup were comparable in scope and importance to the two great transforming upheavals of the modern era, the French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian Revolution of 1917.

What has happened in the Soviet Union is revolutionary in the sense that, as in France in 1789 and Russia in 1917, the top layer of the old order has been removed. Communist officials remain in place all over Russia, still able to block changes, but the communist system is headless and so cannot operate in the old way.

The ruling ideology, the justification and glue of the old regime, is thoroughly discredited. Marxism-Leninism's claim to scientific status has been exposed as a fraud, the party's claim to heroic leadership as a lie. A dwindling band of believers no doubt remains, but it lacks the numbers or the depth of conviction necessary to rally broad popular support. In its public messages the junta did not even bother to refer to ideology. There was no mention in any of its statements of the October revolution, the class struggle or the leading role of the party. The coup-plotters told the world they were seizing power to restore order, not communism.[12]

The communist economic model has also lost all credibility. No one now believes, as Soviet leaders insisted for decades, that a planned, centrally controlled system is the most rational and efficient form of economic organization, one that will deliver, sooner or later, a higher standard of living than the market economies of the West.

A revolution, in short, has overthrown communism. This is the first great asset the peoples of the former Soviet Union possess. For communism imposed upon them the most repressive set of political structures devised in the twentieth century. It brought poverty and oppression to millions for decades.

[12]They were more circumspect on this subject than Gorbachev, who affirmed his socialist convictions immediately after arriving in Moscow from his Crimean captivity. A few days later, presumably having observed the tidal wave of anticommunist sentiment that was engulfing the capital, he quit the party.

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Russia and its neighbors are well rid of it. In its ruins they at least have the chance to build something better.

So thoroughly has the old order been destroyed and discredited that there is no sign of a counterrevolutionary movement, of the kind that arose to oppose the other two great modern revolutions. There is unlikely to be a post-Soviet version of the uprising in the Vendee in France in 1793 or of the White armies that fought the Bolsheviks from 1918 to 1921.

The broad and passionate internal opposition to the French and Russian revolutions contributed to their bloody, repressive character, in particular to the terror that was visited upon France in the eighteenth century and, on a much larger scale, on Russia in the twentieth. There is reason to hope that the peoples of what was once the Soviet Union can escape these horrors. In any event, while they may once again be subject to repressive governance, it will not take the form of communist rule. The fragile democratic structures in Russia and the other successor states to the Soviet Union are certainly threatened, but more by chaos and misery than by fanatical ideologies.

Russia today has a second asset, which also distinguishes it from revolutionary France after 1789 and revolutionary Russia after 1917: its relations with the rest of the world. The previous revolutions were deeply at odds with other sovereign states. The revolutionaries saw the conquest of power in their own countries as merely the first step in a campaign to overturn the reactionary, obsolete regimes outside their borders. The French and Russian revolutionaries conceived of themselves as the bearers of a set of principles that were both radical and universal. Each revolution led to a great European and, in the second case, global conflict. The wars of the French Revolution continued, in one form or another, for more than two decades. The Bolsheviks were at odds with the West for almost the entire time that they held power; the period known as the Cold War lasted 45 years.

The revolution of 1991, by contrast, was made in the name of the political and economic principles that predominate outside the Soviet Union. The revolutionaries do not aim to create a new and heretofore unseen kind of society. They wish simply to emulate the societies they see on the other side of what was once the Iron Curtain. They want to join, not overturn, the West. Alexander Rutskoi, Yeltsin's vice president, expressed their outlook: "Either we shall live like the rest

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of the world, or we shall continue to call ourselves the 'Socialist Choice' and 'the Communist Prospect' and live like pigs."[13]

The rest of the world, in turn, is well disposed to this revolution. The question that confronts the West is not how to contain the new Russian regime and the other successor states but how to help them. Just what help will be provided will be debated and decided over the months ahead. But the West will surely make certain that the condition most dangerous to the fledgling democracies, one that proved fatal to the French and Russian monarchies in 1789 and 1917, is avoided: critical food shortages in the major cities. Of the uprising of 1789 the historian Simon Schama has written: "It was the connection of anger with hunger that made the Revolution possible."[14] The West can do little to remove the multiple sources of anger that afflict the peoples of the former Soviet Union; but it can keep them from hunger.

The people of Russia face life without communism with a third asset: the coup itself, and the way it was defeated. The euphoria that its defeat produced throughout Russia quickly dissipated. Only a tiny fraction of the population of Moscow, it was noted—about one percent—actively resisted the coup. The crowd that surrounded the Russian parliament building was made up mainly of students and intellectuals; it was hardly a cross-section of Russian society. On Monday Yeltsin called for a nationwide general strike, but on that day and the two that followed most people throughout the country, including Moscow, went to work as usual.

Still the basic facts remain. A handful of brave Russians stood up for freedom. They risked their lives to prevent a return to the kind of oppressive rule their country had known for 75 years under communism and for centuries before that under the tsars.

The defeat of the coup is a potent symbol, and symbols are important in political life. Every political culture—the collection of habits, beliefs and assumptions that underlie public life—needs them. Every society needs founders, heroes and stories that embody its values and can be ritually retold and

[13]See *The New York Times*, Aug. 22, 1991, p. A14. Soon after the failure of the coup Rutskoi began to criticize Yeltsin, apparently positioning himself to inherit power should the Russian president falter.

[14]*Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989, p. 308.

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celebrated. The defeat of the coup provides all of these for something that has never before existed: Russian democracy.

Even stripped of exaggeration and myth it is a story both heroic and exemplary, and one from which succeeding generations can learn the lessons of democratic governance: the danger of tyranny; the need for individual initiative, responsibility and sometimes bravery; the power of people united in common cause. Under the eyes of eternity August 1991 may become for the people of Russia what 1688 is for the British, 1776 for Americans and 1789 for the French: the moment when they broke with the old habits of obedience, passivity and resignation and asserted their rights—and assumed their responsibilities—as citizens.

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CHRONOLOGY 1991

Edited by Patricia Lee Dorff

THE UNITED STATES
(See also country, regional and topic entries)

JAN. 3. 102nd Congress convenes.

JAN. 7. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney cancels the Navy's A-12 Stealth attack-plane project—the most expensive weapons program ever eliminated by the Pentagon.

JAN. 10. Congress debates whether to give Bush authority to go to war against Iraq. Congress 1/12 authorizes use of military forces against Iraq.

JAN. 16. President Bush addresses the nation and announces that the US and a coalition of 28 allied countries are at war with Iraq.

JAN. 26. Tens of thousands join an antiwar protest in Washington, DC, in one of the biggest demonstrations against the war.

JAN. 29. President George Bush delivers his second State of the Union address; declares that the war effort in the Persian Gulf is "on course." He reiterates that the goal of the allied effort is "to drive Iraq out of Kuwait" and not to bring about "the destruction of Iraq, its culture or its people."

FEB. 4. President Bush submits to Congress a $1.45 trillion budget for fiscal year 1992 that includes few major revenue or spending changes.

FEB. 20. President Bush unveils comprehensive national energy plan designed to increase domestic oil production, reduce overall demand and hold oil imports to current levels; Democrats criticize the plan for not doing enough to foster conservation and the use of renewable fuels.

FEB. 22. The Bush administration seeks $15 billion in Gulf War funding from Congress but says the nation could "break even" on the war effort after contributions from foreign governments.

FEB. 23. President Bush announces the beginning of the ground offensive in Kuwait.

FEB. 27. President Bush declares "Kuwait is liberated."

—Senate Ethics Committee ends deliberation in the so-called Keating Five case, finding "substantial credible evidence" of misconduct by Senator Alan Cranston (D-Calif.). Panel halts the investigation of 4 other senators with mild reprimands.

MAR. 6. At a joint session of Congress, President Bush announces end of Gulf War.

MAR. 8. Census Bureau releases the last of its population counts for the US, revealing a large increase in the proportion of minorities; total 1990 US population estimated at 248.7 million. Despite critics' charges that many people, especially minorities, were not counted in the 1990 census, Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher announces 7/15 that the 1990 census will not be statistically adjusted for a possible undercount.

APR. 4. Governor Rafael Hernandez Colon signs into law a bill making Spanish the official language of Puerto Rico.

APR. 5. Space shuttle *Atlantis* takes off from Kennedy Space Center at Cape Canaveral. During the 6-day mission the astronauts launch an astronomy satellite into orbit and practice techniques for assembling a space station. Shuttle lands at Edwards Air Force Base 4/11.

APR. 17. House of Representatives, 239–181, passes a $1.45 trillion budget resolution for fiscal year 1992 that projects a deficit of $278.8 billion, and adheres to spending limits set in 1990 in defense, domestic and foreign aid programs. Senate, 57–41, approves budget resolution 5/22.

APR. 18. President Bush issues proposals to improve American education and ensure student competence in basic subject areas. Goals include raising the nation's

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high school graduation rate to at least 90%; requiring students to demonstrate competency in English, mathematics, science, history and geography; and making American students first in the world in math and science achievement.

APR. 25. A fourth space shuttle, *Endeavor*, is unveiled by Rockwell International Corporation to replace the *Challenger*, which exploded after liftoff on 1/28/86.

APR. 28-MAY 6. US space shuttle *Discovery* carries out secret military mission devoted to collecting astronomical data for the Strategic Defense Initiative program.

APR. 30. President Bush prohibits the sale of American parts for a Chinese satellite, due to concern over China's export of potential weapons of mass destruction.

MAY 4. President Bush is hospitalized with an erratic heartbeat after experiencing fatigue and shortness of breath while jogging at Camp David. Physicians announce 5/7 that the cause of Bush's atrial fibrillation was a mild hyperthyroid condition resulting from Graves' disease; confirm 5/15 that Bush is back in excellent physical health.

MAY 8. William H. Webster retires as director of the Central Intelligence Agency; President Bush nominates 5/14 deputy national security adviser Robert M. Gates as the new CIA director. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 9/16–25 begins confirmation hearings, with allegations that Gates slanted intelligence findings the focus of questioning. Senate Select Committee votes, 11–4, to recommend Gates' confirmation 10/8; Senate, 64–31, votes to confirm 11/5; Gates is sworn in 11/12.

MAY 13. President Bush pledges that the US will not use chemical weapons, stating that Washington will destroy its entire stockpile once a chemical arms treaty is signed. Nineteen industrial nations agree 5/30 to US proposal to restrict the export of 50 common chemicals used to produce chemical weapons.

JUNE 5. Space shuttle *Columbia* is launched from Kennedy Space Center. Astronauts carry out 9-day mission to study the biological effects of space travel; return to earth 6/14.

JUNE 6. US House of Representatives, 240–173, appropriates $1.9 billion for the space station *Freedom*; Senate 7/18 votes to allocate full $2.03 billion requested by Bush for space station.

JUNE 27. Justice Thurgood Marshall announces his retirement; President Bush 7/1 nominates Clarence Thomas, a judge serving on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Senate Judiciary Committee deadlocks, 7–7, on Thomas nomination 9/27, and sends nomination to the full Senate without a recommendation. Anita Hill, a former aide to Thomas, publicly accuses him of sexual harassment 10/7. Senate agrees 10/8 to postpone until 10/15 vote on Thomas' confirmation. After Senate Judiciary Committee holds televised hearings 10/11–14 on Hill's charges, the Senate, 52–48, votes to confirm Thomas 10/15. Thomas is formally seated as the 106th associate justice of the Supreme Court 11/1.

JULY 24. Vice President J. Danforth Quayle announces that the US will not build any more space shuttles; US attention will now be directed toward unmanned rockets for payload delivery, with private industry playing a stronger role.

JULY 31. Congress approves legislation to create a new set of rules for covert intelligence action; House, 419–4, passes bill 7/31; Senate approves by voice vote. President Bush signs bill 8/15, which requires for the first time that the president report all covert activities to Congress and authorize all activities in advance with a written presidential finding.

SEPT. 5. Former Panamanian strongman Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega goes to trial in Florida on drug trafficking charges.

SEPT. 12. Space Shuttle *Discovery* is launched from Kennedy Space Center carrying a satellite to study Earth's ozone layer; lands 9/18 at Edwards Air Force Base.

SEPT. 16. All charges against Lt. Col. Oliver North are dropped, after Special

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Prosecutor Lawrence Walsh gives up 5-year legal effort to prosecute the former National Security Council aide to President Ronald Reagan.

SEPT. 17. 46th annual session of UN General Assembly opens in New York. UN delegates vote to admit 7 countries, including North Korea, South Korea, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and 3 newly independent Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Samir Shihabi of Saudi Arabia elected to 1-year term as assembly president. In speech 9/23 President Bush asks the General Assembly to repeal 1975 "Zionism is racism" resolution. South Korean President Roh Tae Woo presents 9/24 a 3-point proposal for the unification of North and South Korea. Boutros Ghali of Egypt, 12/4, is elected UN Secretary General to succeed Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

NOV. 16. Federal appeals court dismisses the 5 felony convictions against former national security adviser John M. Poindexter, highest-ranking official to be found guilty of criminal acts in the Iran-contra affair.

NOV. 25. Space shuttle *Atlantis* is launched with 6 astronauts and a military satellite; returns to earth 12/1, 3 days early, after one of its 3 navigational units fails.

DEC. 4. John H. Sununu resigns as White House chief of staff; replaced by Transportation Secretary Samuel K. Skinner. President Bush designates 1992 campaign staff; appoints Commerce Secretary Mosbacher as Republican presidential campaign chairman, Robert M. Teeter as chief strategist and Frederic V. Mallek as campaign manager.

DEC. 8. Voters in Puerto Rico reject a bill asserting the island's right to freedom from US subordination and to its cultural distinctiveness.

DEC. 10. UN General Assembly overwhelmingly endorses resolution establishing a UN conventional arms register to which all countries are asked to provide annual data on weapons imports and exports; urges members to furnish information on military stocks and procurement of domestically produced arms.

DEC. 16. UN General Assembly revokes 1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism, 111–25, with 13 abstentions.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE PERSIAN GULF

JAN. 9. US Secretary of State James A. Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz meet in Geneva, but fail to agree on forestalling war before the 1/15 UN deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Aziz refuses to deliver letter from President George Bush to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and reiterates that Iraq will strike Israel if attacked.

JAN. 10. US Congress opens debate on whether to give President Bush authority to go to war against Iraq, or to require that he wait longer for economic sanctions to work. Congress 1/12 authorizes Bush to use military force against Iraq; resolution passes in the Senate, 52–47, and in the House, 250–183.

JAN. 12. UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar arrives in Baghdad for talks; leaves the next day after failing to convince the Iraqi president to withdraw from Kuwait. US Secretary Baker, after conferring with coalition leaders in 10 capitals, says that America's major military allies agree on the need and timing for the use of force against Iraq. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens pledges, "If Israel is attacked [by Iraq] it will respond."

JAN. 14. Iraqi parliament backs Saddam Hussein for a war against the US. Iraq recalls its ambassador to the US.

JAN. 15. President Bush gives written authority for a coalition attack on Iraq unless Iraq begins to withdraw from Kuwait soon after the midnight UN deadline.

JAN. 16. At approximately 4:50 pm Eastern Standard Time, US and allied forces begin air attack on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. First official word of attack comes just after 7:00 pm, when White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater announces that "the liberation of Kuwait has begun," under the code name Operation

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Desert Storm. At 9:00 pm, President Bush addresses the nation and says that the allied "28 countries with forces in the gulf area have exhausted all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful resolution and have no choice but to drive Saddam Hussein from Kuwait by force"; says attacks are being launched at targets including Iraqi nuclear and chemical weapons installations.

JAN. 17. US military briefings indicate that 1 US and 3 other allied planes have been lost during the more than 1,000 air sorties in the first 14 hours of battle. The chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell, says that the raids have achieved a "tactical surprise" and met little air resistance. Iraq hits Israel with 8 Scud missiles: 2 missiles hit Tel Aviv, 3 explode in or near Haifa and 3 more fall in open fields; Israel reports 15 wounded but no deaths. Israel does not retaliate, accommodating US concerns that direct Israeli involvement in the war would threaten the continued cooperation of Arab partners in the international coalition.

JAN. 18. Round-the-clock bombing of Iraqi targets by allied forces continues, with special effort directed toward mobile-Scud missile launchers; President Bush praises Israel for not retaliating against Iraq.

JAN. 19. US sends Patriot antimissile system to Israel after another Scud attack.

JAN. 20. Iraqi television broadcasts videotape of 7 men identified as downed allied airmen. The first in a barrage of 10 Iraqi Scud missiles are fired on Saudi Arabia, but none hit their targets.

JAN. 21. Iraq says it will disperse captured allied airmen to potential targets of allied bombing. US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney says war could last for weeks or months. Syrian, Saudi and Egyptian officials vow that retaliatory strikes by Israel against Iraq would not make them abandon the Gulf War.

JAN. 22. Another Scud missile hits Tel Aviv, killing 3 people. Iraq sets fire to oil facilities in Kuwait; oil begins to flow into the Persian Gulf 1/23. US charges 1/25 that the spill is a purposeful act by Iraq carried out from occupied Kuwaiti offshore facilities in the gulf; Bush calls it an act of "environmental terrorism."

JAN. 23. Allied forces retake a small Kuwaiti island, Qaruh, off the Kuwaiti coast.

JAN. 28. President Saddam Hussein says Iraqi planes have been offered sanctuary by Iran.

JAN. 29. Iraq moves into Saudi Arabia in the first ground incursion of the war, but troops from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with US support, retake the Saudi town of Khafji about 36 hours later. Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh 1/29 issue joint statement that appears to offer terms for a ceasefire and to link resolution of the conflict with an effort to settle the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Bush administration 1/30 distances itself from joint statement, and White House spokesman Fitzwater denies any change in US policy. French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement resigns amid accusations that his pro-sanctions position on the war is undermining troop morale.

JAN. 30. Eleven marines become first US soldiers killed in ground fighting; US Defense Department confirms 2/2 that 11 of those soldiers were killed by a US air-to-ground missile, one of several fatal "friendly fire" incidents that occur during the war.

FEB. 8. Secretary Cheney and Gen. Powell arrive in Saudi Arabia to evaluate possibilities for an allied ground assault against Iraqi forces; return 2/11 to Washington to brief the president. After the meeting, President Bush announces that he is willing "to take whatever time is necessary" before launching a ground attack against Iraqi forces.

FEB. 10. Saddam Hussein rebuffs an Iranian peace initiative, which links a withdrawal of Western forces from the Persian Gulf to a withdrawal by Iraq from Kuwait; calls on Iraqis to show "patience and steadfastness" in the war.

FEB. 12. Soviet envoy Yevgeny M. Primakov meets with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Allies launch what is described as largest combined air, sea and land-based shelling of the war.

FEB. 13. Several hundred Iraqis are killed when US bombs destroy a Baghdad

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building where civilians have taken shelter. US says that building was being used for military communications.

FEB. 15. Iraq announces that it will consider withdrawing from Kuwait but imposes strict conditions. President Bush calls the offer a "cruel hoax," and other allied nations join in rejecting the plan; Iran and Jordan praise the Iraqi initiative.

FEB. 18. President Gorbachev meets with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in Moscow and presents Soviet peace proposal, but President Bush says the proposal "falls well short" of what is needed to end the war. USSR announces 2/21 that Iraq has agreed to proposal for "full and unconditional withdrawal" from Kuwait; US expresses "serious concerns" about the plan and says it will continue the war effort.

FEB. 22. President Bush sets a noon 2/23 deadline for Iraq to begin a "large-scale" withdrawal from Kuwait or face a ground assault by the multinational coalition.

—US reports that Iraqi forces have begun systematically to destroy Kuwaiti oil installations 2/22–26, touching off fires at some 150 oil wells. Smoke from the burning oil wells covers half of Kuwait, as well as portions of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Qatar.

FEB. 23. US officials say the deadline has not been met and accuse Iraq of "systematic" atrocities in Kuwait. US-led assault into Iraq is launched at 8:00 pm EST.

FEB. 25. An Iraqi Scud missile kills 28 US soldiers when it hits a barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Baghdad orders Iraqi soldiers to withdraw from Kuwait, and troops begin to leave Kuwait City. US says allied offensive will continue.

FEB. 26. Kuwaiti resistance leaders claim control over Kuwait City. President Saddam Hussein says Iraqi troops are withdrawing, but characterizes their efforts as a "victory." Number of Kuwaiti oil wells set on fire rises to 700.

FEB. 27. President Bush announces that "Kuwait is liberated" and that the allies will cease fire. Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz informs the UN that Iraq will accept the 12 relevant Security Council resolutions.

FEB. 28. Iraq announces a ceasefire and agrees to send military commanders to arrange terms.

MAR. 2. UN Security Council, 11–1, approves resolution 686, which sets out the terms to govern the end of hostilities in the Persian Gulf; Cuba casts the negative vote.

MAR. 3. Iraqi military commanders meet with allied commanders in the gulf, led by US Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Saudi Prince Gen. Khalid bin Sultan, to accept the cease-fire terms imposed by the multinational coalition forces. Foreign Minister Aziz sends a letter informing UN Security Council that Iraq had agreed "to fulfill its obligations" under the UN resolution.

MAR. 4. Kuwait's crown prince and premier, Sheikh Saad al-Sabah, returns to Kuwait from exile in Saudi Arabia.

MAR. 6. At a joint session of Congress, President Bush announces that "the war is over."

—Turmoil continues inside Iraq as troops loyal to Saddam Hussein fight to quell a revolt led by Shiite Muslims and other opponents of the regime. Kurdish leaders claim military gains against loyalist forces in northern Iraq.

MAR. 7. Unrest or revolts reported in more than 15 Iraqi cities; revolts in southern Iraq are led by Shiite Muslims, while in northern Iraq Kurdish rebels are engaged in large-scale fighting with loyalist Iraqi forces; Iraqi government acknowledges uprisings for first time.

MAR. 7–14. US Secretary Baker tours the Middle East seeking to promote new dialogue between Arabs and Israelis; Baker says he will seek incremental steps toward peace rather than a sweeping solution. In a meeting with Baker, Sheikh Saad promises 3/9 to move the emirate toward democracy by reconvening its suspended parliament, but refuses to commit to any definite timetable. Baker visits Jerusalem for first time; discusses 3/12 conciliatory gestures with Israeli Prime

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Minister Yitzhak Shamir that could lead to reciprocation from the Arabs. Baker also meets with Palestinian leaders not formally affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

MAR. 8. Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani calls for ouster of Saddam Hussein but denies that Iran is aiding uprising against the Iraqi president.

MAR. 10. Egypt, Syria and 6 members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait—agree in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to a plan offered by US Secretary Baker for collective security in the region. Plan includes joint exercises of air and ground forces of US and moderate Arab states and a heightened US permanent naval presence in the Persian Gulf.

MAR. 13. A spokesman for Kurdish rebel groups fighting in northern Iraq claim that two provinces, Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, are under rebel control.

MAR. 20. US fighter jet shoots down an Iraqi warplane in northern Iraq in the first aerial combat since the cessation of hostilities in the Gulf War; action follows US warnings that the use of military aircraft by Iraq violates preliminary cease-fire terms.

—Kuwait's premier, Crown Prince Sabah, resigns along with his entire cabinet, partly in response to popular displeasure with the government's inability to restore basic services to the nation.

MAR. 22. UN Security Council effectively ends embargo on food shipments to Iraq and eases sanctions on other humanitarian items.

MAR. 25–26. Kurdish leaders in Damascus claim that "the whole of [Iraqi] Kurdistan has been liberated" after fierce fighting in Kirkuk. Loyalist troops prevail against Shiite Muslim rebels in southern Iraq. Bush administration 3/26 indicates that it will not act to support or protect rebels in Iraq seeking to overthrow the government.

MAR. 28. Lebanese government of President Elias Hrawi orders all armed factions in Lebanon to hand over their weapons to the Lebanese army by the end of April.

MAR. 30. GCC cuts off all financial aid to Jordan and the PLO, which had backed Iraq in the Gulf War.

MAR. 31-APR. 10. At least one million Kurdish insurgents and civilians flee toward the mountains along Iraq's borders with Turkey and Iran, after troops loyal to President Saddam Hussein drive the Kurds out of cities they had occupied in earlier fighting.

APR. 3. UN Security Council approves resolution 687 to establish a permanent ceasefire in the Gulf War and bring a gradual halt to international sanctions against Iraq. Iraq 4/6 accepts terms for ceasefire. UN Security Council officially declares end to the war 4/11 after reviewing Iraq's acceptance of the resolution. UN resolution mandates a UN-supervised destruction of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, and a reparations fund for war damages to Kuwait and its allies.

APR. 5. UN Security Council condemns Iraqi government's repression of the Kurds and other dissidents in Iraq. Bush orders package of US aid for Kurdish refugees; US Air Force cargo planes 4/7 begin dropping food and other supplies along the Iraqi-Turkish border. US warns Iraqi government 4/10 not to undertake any military action in northeastern Iraq.

APR. 7–12. US Secretary Baker embarks on 6-day trip to the Middle East to discuss peace proposals; visits 4/8 Kurdish refugees on the Iraqi-Turkish border; in Israel, he secures 4/8 a tentative Israeli agreement to attend a regional peace conference jointly sponsored by the US and USSR. Following a meeting between Baker and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt says 4/10 it is willing to consider a regional peace conference. Baker concludes tour by meeting with Jordanian and Syrian officials 4/12, and secures conditional Syrian support for peace conference from President Hafez al-Assad.

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APR. 8. US troops and other coalition forces begin to withdraw into Saudi Arabia from occupied territories in southern Iraq.

APR. 9. UN Security Council authorizes the deployment of a 1,440-member peacekeeping force to patrol a demilitarized zone along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border.

APR. 16. President Bush announces a plan for US, British and French military personnel to build and operate refugee camps for some 850,000 Kurds in northern Iraq; US soldiers 4/17–23 begin to build first of 5 planned refugee camps, while British, French and other US soldiers secure a "safe zone" on the Iraqi side of the Iraqi-Turkish border.

APR. 17–26. US Secretary Baker returns to the Middle East in another attempt to arrange an Arab-Israeli agreement on a Middle East peace conference, but is unable to reconcile Arab and Israeli positions on participants and procedures.

APR. 18. Iraq and the UN reach an agreement allowing the UN to set up centers for humanitarian aid for refugees in northern and southern Iraq, calling for full participation by the Iraqi government in all relief efforts.

—In compliance with UN cease-fire resolution, Iraq provides the UN with what it says is a complete list of Iraq's chemical and ballistic weapons following the Gulf War. US 4/19 accuses Iraq of omitting important information about its nuclear weapons capability.

APR. 20. Kuwaiti government announces new cabinet, which does not include any members of Kuwait's opposition groups; the most important posts are filled by members of the ruling Sabah family; Crown Prince Saad retains post as premier. Members of Kuwait's pro-democracy opposition condemn the new cabinet, stating that the shuffling of ministers had "nothing to do with the people's aspirations."

APR. 24. Kurdish leaders announce agreement with Saddam Hussein to allow Kurds a measure of autonomy and enable them to return to their homes in Iraq. Thousands of Kurdish and other Iraqi refugees 4/26–5/1 leave the mountains along the Iraqi-Turkish border to return to their homes or to the "safe zone" established by US, French and British troops in northern Iraq.

—The first UN observers arrive in the Iraqi town of Safwan to begin monitoring the demilitarized zone along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border; UN peacekeeping forces 5/6–7 take full control of the demilitarized zone, marking the end of US occupation of that area.

APR. 25. Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh announces that the USSR will act as cosponsor with the US of a Middle East peace conference.

APR. 26-MAY 1. Lebanon's Christian, Druse and Shiite Muslim militias turn over their weapons in compliance with Lebanese President Hrawi's disarmament order. The Lebanese army deploys troops 5/1 to occupy territory formerly controlled by militias in the Shuf mountains and along the coast, bringing about one-quarter of Lebanon under government control.

APR. 29. Iraqi government admits in a report to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it had failed to account for all its postwar weapons-grade nuclear material.

MAY 6–9. US Defense Secretary Cheney meets with GCC officials to discuss expanded US military role in Persian Gulf region. A broad agreement is reached between the US and GCC on the storage of US military equipment in the region, and on joint training exercises that will rotate US troops in the area on a regular basis.

—A delegation of Kurdish leaders, headed by Massoud Barzani, begins negotiations in Baghdad with Saddam Hussein on the details of an agreement to end the Kurdish revolt and grant the Kurds autonomy in northern Iraq.

MAY 10–16. US Secretary Baker again tours Middle East. Syria and Israel, 5/12 and 5/15, reject proposed compromises on conference participants and procedures. GCC states announce 5/11 readiness to participate in an Arab-Israeli peace conference.

MAY 13. Officials from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees

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take over from US military personnel the administration of an encampment for the Kurds in the allied "safe zone" near Zakho, Iraq.

MAY 15. UN inspectors from the IAEA begin to inspect Iraq's nuclear installations and chemical-warfare facilities.

MAY 22. Lebanese President Hrawi and Syrian President Assad sign an accord for broad cooperation between their two countries, officially called the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination. Israeli tanks and infantry 5/21 enter southern Lebanon to reinforce positions held by the Israeli army and pro-Israeli militia forces in the "security zone" along the Israeli-Lebanonese border, in apparent opposition to the Syrian-Lebanonese accord. The Lebanese parliament votes, 59–1, to ratify broader security pact with Syria 9/26; the pact stipulates that both countries will suppress any military or political activities within their borders that could threaten each other.

MAY 29. President Bush announces several proposals to ban weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and to control shipments of conventional arms to the region. The plan, announced during a commencement speech at the US Air Force Academy, specifically calls for: a commitment from the 5 principal suppliers of conventional arms to the region—the US, Britain, France, China and the USSR—to exercise "collective self-restraint" in arms sales, and to notify others of possible sales; a freeze on the acquisition, production and testing of all surface-to-surface ballistic missiles by Middle East nations; a ban on the acquisition and production by countries in the region of separated plutonium, enriched uranium and other elements used in nuclear weapons. Israeli officials 5/30 express reservations about Bush's proposals, many of which would affect only Israel, arguing that the buildup of conventional weapons in neighboring Arab states poses a more significant threat to the region's stability than Israel's own ballistic missiles and possible nuclear weapons.

JUNE 2. Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Sabah announces that parliamentary elections will be held in Kuwait in Oct. 1992; approximately 1,000 members of Kuwait's pro-democracy opposition gather in Kuwait City 6/4 to demand earlier elections.

JUNE 7–21. US and allied military personnel begin withdrawal from northern Iraq. US, Britain and France agree 6/21 to station a military task force in southern Turkey, near the border, to deter Iraqi forces from attacking Kurds after allied forces leave the zone. US and allied forces 7/12–15 complete withdrawal from "safe zone," ending 3-month operation to provide humanitarian aid to Kurds.

JUNE 9. King Hussein and representatives of Jordan's principal political factions sign national charter that legalizes political parties in Jordan, ending a 34-year ban.

JUNE 14. An Iraqi nuclear scientist, who defected to the US, alleges that Iraq is continuing its attempts to build nuclear weapons and has concealed weapons-grade uranium and research equipment from UN inspectors. UN officials begin new inspections of Iraqi military facilities.

JUNE 18. Palestinians involved in business and industry in the city of Hebron in the Israeli-occupied West Bank elect 11 candidates to seats in the Hebron Chamber of Commerce, the first set of elections in Israeli-occupied territories since West Bank Palestinians elected municipal leaders in 1976.

JUNE 19. King Hussein announces the appointment of a new government that observers believe will be more pro-Western and support Arab-Israeli peace talks; Foreign Minister Taher al-Masri is named premier.

JUNE 22–28. Iraqi soldiers obstruct and fire warning shots at UN inspectors overseeing the destruction of Iraq's nuclear arms, preventing UN officials from gaining access to Iraq's nuclear facilities. UN 6/23 demands assurance from Iraq that inspectors will be given free access to all Iraqi nuclear facilities and documents. Iraq 6/28 reports that Saddam Hussein has ordered all authorities involved to permit UN weapons experts "to see and inspect what they wish."

JULY 1–5. After clashes, the Lebanese government seizes control of PLO-held

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territory in and around the port city of Sidon. Israeli government 7/6 asserts that Israel will not withdraw troops from "security zone" in southern Lebanon.

JULY 7. King Hussein cancels martial law in effect in Jordan since the 1967 Six Day War, lifting long-standing government restrictions on public assembly and freedom of speech and press, and ending the state's right to try ordinary criminal cases in military courts.

JULY 8. Iraq admits to UN that it had been conducting clandestine programs to produce enriched uranium but says it has stopped.

JULY 9. US, USSR, China, Britain and France reach a broad agreement to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, building on President Bush's 5/29 proposal.

JULY 11–16. US, Britain and France indicate they are willing again to use military force if Saddam Hussein fails to comply with the UN resolution demanding that Iraq destroy its nuclear weapons technology.

JULY 14. Syrian President Assad responds favorably to compromises proposed by President Bush to bridge Syrian-Israeli disagreements over terms of a possible US-Soviet sponsored Middle East peace conference.

JULY 18–21. Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, during a meeting with US Secretary Baker, accept US proposals for an Arab-Israeli peace conference. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir, who had rejected the US proposals, expresses optimism 7/22 after Arab acceptance and says he will rethink his position.

JULY 31. During first post-Cold War summit in Moscow, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev issue statement calling for a jointly sponsored October Middle East peace conference at an undetermined site. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir announces 8/1 that the Jewish state will take part in the talks, provided Israel's conditions on the composition of the Palestinian delegation to the conference are met. Israeli cabinet votes, 16–3, to support Shamir's conditional agreement to join the peace talks 8/4.

AUG. 2. US Senate votes, 97–2, to support the use of "all necessary means," including military force, to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction.

AUG. 5. UN weapons inspectors announce that Iraq admitted to conducting biological-weapons research from early 1986 to Aug. 1990.

AUG. 5–12. Turkish commandos backed by fighter planes and helicopters launch raids into northern Iraq against Kurdish Workers Party, which seeks to separate from Turkey; earlier, Kurdish guerrillas killed 9 soldiers at a border post in Turkey.

AUG. 8. Islamic Jihad (Holy War), a Lebanese Shiite group, releases John McCarthy, a British journalist kidnapped 4/17/86; the Revolutionary Justice Organization 8/11 releases Edward A. Tracy, a US citizen held hostage since 10/21/86.

AUG. 16. UN Security Council votes to allow Iraq to sell up to $1.6 billion worth of oil over a 6-month period to raise money for food and medicine.

AUG. 28. The Palestinian National Council, concluding its annual conference in Algiers begun 9/23, votes, 313–18, to endorse Palestinian participation in the October Middle East peace conference; PNC 9/28 removes terrorist leader Mohammed Abdul Abbas from its executive committee.

AUG. 29. Military leader Gen. Michel Aoun, who led a 2-year fight against the Syrian-backed government of Lebanon, is permitted to leave Lebanon and given asylum in France.

SEPT. 4. In the first concrete security agreement, Kuwait and the US agree on 10-year security pact that allows US armed forces to stockpile equipment and conduct military exercises in Kuwait.

SEPT. 6. Israel asks US for $10 billion in loan guarantees to aid in the resettlement of Soviet Jewish immigrants; President Bush asks Congress to defer consideration of new aid until Jan. 1992, claiming that debate over the loan could hamper US peace efforts. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir 9/10 insists on immediate approval of the loan guarantees.

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SEPT. 8. Iraq bars UN arms experts from flying helicopters in Iraqi air space.

SEPT. 18. Bush authorizes US Air Force warplanes to escort UN weapons inspectors into Iraqi territory.

SEPT. 21. Nine members of Iran's only legal domestic opposition party, the Freedom Movement, are convicted and sentenced to prison as "enemies of the Islamic Revolution"; opposition leaders had charged President Rafsanjani with economic mismanagement and repression of political freedom.

SEPT. 23. US officials announce that US and allied ground troops and helicopter forces based in southern Turkey to protect Kurds in northern Iraq will be withdrawn, while allied air-strike forces deployed in the area will be boosted.

SEPT. 24. The Revolutionary Justice Organization, a Shiite terrorist organization in Lebanon, frees Jack Mann, a British retired airline pilot kidnapped in May 1989.

—Iraqi troops detain a team of 44 UN weapons inspectors in the parking lot of a Baghdad building where the inspectors had found evidence of Iraqi plans to manufacture nuclear weapons. Iraq 9/25 offers to free inspectors if they will cooperate in preparing an inventory of the documents to be removed; UN Security Council agrees, but warns Iraq against interference in future inspections; US 9/26 announces that it has halted plans to send warplanes and combat helicopters to attack-ready positions in Saudi Arabia.

SEPT. 25. Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy agrees to seek government support for postponing debate on loan guarantees, after meeting with Secretary Baker. US Senate agrees 10/2 to a 120-day postponement.

SEPT. 26. President Bush releases $21 million in US military assistance to Jordan for fiscal year 1991, despite demands in Congress to stop all aid to Jordan in response to Amman's support of Iraq during the Gulf War.

SEPT. 28. Iraq frees UN weapons inspectors in Baghdad, after receiving inventory of materials taken from a building housing records of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.

OCT. 3. Israel announces that it will join 16 other nations in compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime, an arms limitation convention adopted by the US and other industrialized nations in 1987, and limit its exports of arms and missile technology.

OCT. 4. Jordan's King Hussein and Premier Masri replace several cabinet ministers with moderates favoring Middle East peace talks, after 4 ministers who opposed negotiations with Israel resign their posts.

OCT. 5–8. Fighting breaks out between Iraqi soldiers and guerrillas in and around the Kurdish-controlled city of Sulaymaniya in northern Iraq. Both sides 10/8 agree to cease fire and exchange prisoners.

OCT. 11–12. Turkish forces attack villages in northern Iraq that Turkey claims are bases for the Kurdish Workers' Party, the first attack within the "safe zone"; attack comes as an apparent reprisal for a Kurdish attack 10/7 that left 11 Turkish soldiers dead.

—UN Security Council subjects Iraq to permanent ban on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as civilian nuclear-energy projects, demanding that Baghdad dismantle its major nuclear facilities and hand over its nuclear material.

OCT. 18. US Secretary Baker, during a visit to the Middle East 10/12–18, announces that the US and Soviet Union have formally invited Israeli and Arab leaders to a conference in Madrid for direct bilateral talks. US states 10/23 that all invited parties have agreed to attend conference.

—Israel and USSR agree to renew full diplomatic relations, broken after the 1967 Six Day War.

OCT. 21. Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine releases Jesse Turner, a US professor taken hostage in Beirut 1/24/87; in an apparent link to Turner's release, Israel frees 12 men and 2 women from the Al Khiyam prison in the Israeli "security zone" in southern Lebanon, as well as Ali Fawaz, a leader of the Shiite group Hezbollah.

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Oct. 23–24. Leaders of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the PLO confer in Damascus to coordinate their positions prior to the Madrid conference; Israeli Prime Minister Shamir announces that he, and not Foreign Minister David Levy, will head Israel's delegation to the conference.

Oct. 25–28. 4,000 Turkish soldiers attack northern Iraq, in response to Kurdish guerrilla attacks that left 24 Turkish soldiers and 1 civilian dead.

Oct. 30. Middle East Peace conference opens in Madrid, with representatives from Israel, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestinians from the Israeli-occupied territories; marks the first time all major parties to the conflict have convened for discussions. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir calls 10/31 for immediate direct Arab-Israeli talks but warns that they will founder if Arabs demand that Israel relinquish its occupied territories; Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara reiterates Syria's hard-line stance on territorial issues; speeches by Lebanon 10/31 and Jordan 11/1 are somewhat more conciliatory; Palestinian delegation says that Palestinians in Israeli-occupied territories will accept an interim period of limited self-rule prior to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Nov. 3–4. Israeli officials hold separate procedural meetings in Madrid with the Syrian, Lebanese and joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to discuss sites and dates for future meetings. Israel and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation agree 11/3 to continue negotiations on Palestinian self-rule; Syrian-Israeli talks end 11/4 at an impasse. Middle East Peace conference opening session ends.

Nov. 6. The last of the Kuwaiti oil wells set on fire by Iraqi forces during Gulf War is extinguished and capped.

Nov. 18. The Lebanese Shiite Muslim faction, Islamic Jihad, releases Church of England envoy Terry Waite and US professor Thomas M. Sutherland; Waite and Sutherland had been held as hostages since 1/12/87 and 6/9/85 respectively.

Nov. 22. US invites Israel, Arab states and the Palestinians to resume bilateral peace talks in Washington on 12/4. Israel rejects the date and requests that talks be delayed 5 days and moved to a site closer to the Middle East. Israel 12/2 confirms that it will not attend the first week of talks, but says it will be ready to resume discussions with its Arab neighbors in Washington beginning 12/9.

—Jordan's King Hussein names Sharif Zeid bin Shaker to replace Masri as premier, who resigns after his pro-peace talks cabinet received a no-confidence vote spearheaded by an Islamic fundamentalist bloc in parliament.

Nov. 25. Iraq and UN agree on 6-month extension of UN relief operation, but fail to break deadlock over Baghdad's refusal to accept UN conditions for Iraqi oil sales to buy food and medicine.

Dec. 3. A pro-Iranian group, the Organization of Islamic Holy War for the Liberation of Palestine, releases from captivity 2 US hostages, Joseph Cicippio and journalism professor Alann Steen, both held since 1/24/87; releases 12/4 the longest-held hostage, American journalist Terry Anderson, kidnapped 3/16/85; thus ending the US hostage saga, during which Shiite Muslims seized 13 Americans and other Western civilians as part of a campaign to drive Western influence from Lebanon.

Dec. 4. Middle East peace conference convenes in Washington, DC, and recesses after less than an hour, when Israelis fail to show up. Israeli officials defend their absence and reiterate that they will attend 12/9.

Dec. 10. Arab-Israeli delegates meet in Washington, DC. Israel and Syria agree to meet again; Israeli-Palestinian talks hit an impasse over Palestinian representation 12/11. Talks extended 12/13. Arab-Israeli peace talks adjourn 12/18 after both sides fail to advance discussions beyond procedures and agendas—Israel wants next round to take place in or near the Middle East, while Arabs prefer to return to Washington.

Dec. 23. Persian Gulf states open first postwar summit; disagree over plans to increase military cooperation and to fund a $10 billion development package for Arab countries.

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THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

JAN. 2. Elite Soviet interior ministry troops seize buildings in the Baltic republics of Latvia and Lithuania, including the central printing plant in Riga and the Communist Party headquarters in Vilnius. In an apparent effort to ease tension, Soviet military chief of staff, Gen. Mikhail A. Moiseyev, pledges 1/4 that no additional soldiers will be based in the Baltic region.

JAN. 3. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev states that the Kremlin and the 15 constituent republics have reached an accord on the 1991 Soviet budget. Russian leader Boris N. Yeltsin claims 1/5 that the budget dispute has not been resolved, as the central government and his republic are still 27 billion rubles apart on Russia's 1991 budget contribution.

JAN. 4. Jan Krzysztof Bielecki is confirmed, 276–58, with 52 abstentions, as Poland's new premier by the lower house of Sejm (parliament). The Sejm confirms 1/12 a 19-member cabinet appointed by Bielecki.

JAN. 7. Soviet defense ministry announces plan to send thousands of army paratroopers to 7 Soviet republics to enforce military conscription and to round up draft dodgers, including the 3 Baltic republics, as well as Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia and parts of Ukraine. Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis 1/7 accuses the Kremlin of "looking for bloodshed," and calls the impending Soviet deployment "a huge provocation."

JAN. 8. Premier of Lithuania, Kazimiera Prunskiene, resigns along with her entire cabinet over the planned military deployment.

JAN. 9. Yugoslavia's federal collective presidency authorizes the Yugoslav army to disarm all "illegal armed units" in the nation's 6 republics. The Serbian-dominated presidency gives the republics until 1/19 to collect weapons of "paramilitary groups" or face military intervention; deadline is later extended until 1/22. Croatia and Slovenia ignore 1/19 deadline and extension; Croatia places its police and territorial-defense units on maximum alert.

JAN. 10. Soviet President Gorbachev warns Lithuania to adhere "immediately" to the Soviet central authority or risk the consequences. President Landsbergis rejects Gorbachev's message. Independence supporters surround the Supreme Council building in a vigil in support of the republic's leadership.

JAN. 13. Soviet army troops kill 15 protesters in Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, in a crackdown on pro-independence forces. Gorbachev 1/14 denies giving the order for the army attack, in address to Supreme Soviet; contends that military chief in Lithuania, Maj. Gen. Vladimir Uskhochnik, carried out attack on his own initiative and in response to pleas for help from republic's National Salvation Committee. Russian leader Yeltsin signs a mutual-security pact with representatives of the 3 Baltic republics on 1/13 that calls for Baltic states and Russia to respect each other's sovereignty, to refrain from recognizing any nonelected government in any of the 4 republics, and to come to each other's defense should the central government attack. Presidents of the 4 republics issue joint appeal for UN intervention in the Baltic region to prevent further bloodshed. Latvian parliament passes resolution condemning planned troop deployment as the start of a Soviet "invasion" of the Baltic region.

JAN. 14. Supreme Soviet, 279–75, confirms Finance Minister Valentin Pavlov as new premier of the USSR.

—Prime ministers of Albania and Greece, Adil Carcani and Constantine Mitsotakis, jointly announce that citizens of either country can freely cross the Greek-Albanian border. By mid-Jan., an estimated 8,000 Albanians, most of them ethnic Greeks, have fled to Greece.

JAN. 15. Supreme Soviet confirms Aleksandr Bessmertnykh as new foreign minister, to succeed Eduard Shevardnadze, who resigned in Dec. 1990 after warning of an impending coup d'état.

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JAN. 16. President Gorbachev asks Supreme Soviet to suspend the 1990 Soviet law guaranteeing freedom of the press, but withdraws demand when liberal deputies protest.

JAN. 20. A crowd estimated at between 100,000 and 300,000 marches to Kremlin to protest crackdown in Baltic states. At least 4 Latvians are killed 1/20, when elite Soviet "black beret" interior ministry troops storm the headquarters of the Latvian interior ministry in Riga.

JAN. 21. Latvian parliament adopts proposal to form special defense force made up of Latvian evaders of Soviet military draft. Soviet state prosecutor's office threatens unspecified measures if the republic does not suspend the self-defense plan. Latvian President Anatolijs Gorbunovs holds a 2-hour meeting with Gorbachev 1/22; Gorbunovs describes it as "constructive." European Parliament, in response to developments in the Baltic states, suspends $1 billion in European Community (EC) emergency food aid to the Soviet Union; President George Bush issues statement 1/21 calling for "Soviet leaders to resist using force."

JAN. 26. President Gorbachev issues decree giving KGB sweeping new powers to battle "economic sabotage."

FEB. 6. President Bush announces that US emergency medical aid, estimated at $5 million, will be shipped directly to the Baltic republics and Ukraine.

—Rallies and student strikes are reported at Enver Hoxha University in Albanian capital, Tirana. Protest leaders demand liberal economic and political reforms, resignation of major government officials, improved campus living conditions and removal of Hoxha's name from the university. An estimated 700 students and faculty 2/18 begin hunger strike to push for demands. More than 5,000 students and workers stage a demonstration in central Tirana 2/20 in support of the hunger strikers. Albanian President Ramiz Alia appoints new government 2/22 in attempt to end wave of pro-democracy protests that have shaken his regime, asserts emergency rule and dismisses the government of Premier Carcani. Opposition Democratic Party 2/23 calls for "all patriotic Albanians" to protest against "criminals and antidemocratic forces" in the country; Democratic Party boycotts the opening of the newly elected parliament.

—President Gorbachev calls for Soviet people to vote "yes" on national referendum on preserving the union. Six republics—Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldavia—announce that they will not participate in referendum. Thirty-one Soviet democratic parties meet in Moscow 3/3 and declare unified opposition to vote.

FEB. 8–22. Presidents of Yugoslavia's republics hold crisis talks, but fail to reach consensus on nation's future. The Slovene parliament 2/20 approves amendment to republic's constitution that invalidates all federal laws in Slovenia and creates legal base for takeover of federal functions by Slovenia; the Croatian parliament 2/21 passes legislation asserting veto power over all federal laws.

FEB. 9. Lithuania holds a nonbinding plebiscite, indicating overwhelming popular support for secession from USSR. Baltic republics of Estonia and Latvia vote on independence from Soviet Union 3/3 in nonbinding plebiscites; the results show a significant portion, 77.8% and 73.6% respectively, support independence.

FEB. 18. Soviet Premier Pavlov unveils plan to raise prices on most goods and services an average of 60%, beginning 3/1/91.

FEB. 21-MAR. 20. Czechoslovakia's parliament passes comprehensive legislation on land restitution, privatization and media ownership aimed at doing away with the legacy of communist rule. One measure paves way for return of land confiscated by Communist Party, the most sweeping law of its kind among the newly democratic countries of eastern Europe.

FEB. 25. The corruption trial of Todor Zhivkov; Bulgaria's former Communist Party leader, opens at Supreme Court in Sofia. Zhivkov is accused of misusing state funds by dispensing cash, apartments, foreign cars, vacations and other privileges to relatives and friends during 35 years in power; he pleads not guilty 2/25.

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FEB. 27. Greece sends troops to Albanian border, fearful that Albania's political instability could increase the flood of refugees into Greece; more than 17,000 Albanians have sought refuge in Greece since early Jan.

MAR. 1. 120,000 Soviet miners in Ukraine's Donetsk region, demanding higher pay, hold 1-day walkout that develops into an indefinite walkout as nationwide support grows. 70,000 miners in the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan, and thousands of miners in the Russian Artic Circle region also begin strikes 3/1; miners in the Kuzentsky basin of Russia's Serbian region go on full strike 3/12. Strikers demand Soviet President Gorbachev's resignation. Supreme Soviet 3/26 orders miners back to work, but they ignore the order.

MAR. 4–7. About 20,000 Albanians seek political asylum in Italy to escape political unrest and poverty. Riot police in Tirana 3/6 kill at least 1 person during clashes involving about 5,000 people seeking refuge at foreign embassies; more than 500 Albanian ethnic Slavs 3/7 cross into Yugoslavia.

MAR. 10. Yeltsin supporters, estimated between 100,000 and 500,000, stage rally in Moscow and smaller demonstrations in Leningrad, Vladivostok and other Russian cities. Crowds chant pro-Yeltsin slogans and call for resignation of Gorbachev.

MAR. 11. At least 20,000 people demonstrate in Slovak capital, Bratislava, in support of sovereignty declaration. Czechoslovak President Václav Havel calls 3/14 for referendum on Slovak independence. About 5,000 people rally for independence in Bratislava 3/14; Havel is jeered when he arrives to address the rally, and is forced to leave.

MAR. 15. US restores full diplomatic relations with Albania, broken off in 1939.

—Borislav Jović resigns from the Yugoslav federal collective presidency; Serbian President Slobodan Milošević announces 3/16 that his republic will no longer recognize the legitimacy of the federal government. Jović returns to the executive body 3/20, resuming role as Yugoslavia's nominal head of state, and Milošević agrees to attend an emergency meeting of the collective presidency.

MAR. 17. Soviet people vote on preserving the union in the USSR's first national referendum; republics of Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldavia boycott the vote. Soviet government declares victory, claiming that 136 million Soviets (out of a total of 188 million eligible voters) turned out for plebiscite, and that 105 million, or 77%, support unity.

MAR. 25. Serbian and Croatian Presidents Milošević and Franjo Tudjman hold surprise 4-hour private meeting at undisclosed site and agree to cooperate for 2 months to avert a breakup of Yugoslavia. The federal government dispatches military units to Croatia but tensions increase between the Croats and Serb-dominated military.

MAR. 28. More than 100,000 Yeltsin supporters rally in Moscow against Gorbachev's ban on all public demonstrations in the Soviet capital. Russian parliament condemns ban and Gorbachev decree that places Moscow city police under direct control of the national interior ministry. Russian republic's vice president, Ruslan Khasbulatov, meets with Gorbachev, who refuses to lift ban on protests.

MAR. 31. Ruling communist Albanian Workers' Party retains power in country's first multiparty national elections since World War II, capturing about 66% of popular vote and 162 seats in 250-seat People's Assembly. Violence erupts 4/2 in Albanian cities and towns when protesters accuse the government of electoral fraud. Interior ministry troops open fire on crowd in Shkoder, reportedly killing 4 people and wounding 30. Main opposition Democratic Party boycotts 5/15 the opening of newly elected parliament.

—In republic-wide referendum, Georgians overwhelmingly support independence. After Kremlin sends in more than 100,000 interior ministry and army troops to quell ethnic violence between Georgians and Ossetians, Georgian government threatens general strike unless Kremlin removes troops. Georgia 4/9 unani-

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mously declares independence from Soviet Union. Workers begin general strike 4/11; Georgian leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia orders 4/16 government departments to cooperate with workers.

APR. 1. Romania ends subsidies on most foods, allowing prices to soar, as part of nation's economic-reform program.

APR. 2. Retail prices on many goods and services in USSR rise as much as fivefold with scheduled relaxation of state controls on economy.

APR. 3. Agreement reached in Moscow between government and striking miners to double miners' pay in return for higher production; rank-and-file miners reject pact and continue strike.

APR. 5. Russian parliament votes, 607–228, with 100 abstentions, to give broad emergency powers to Russian leader Yeltsin; defeats no-confidence motion against Yeltsin by Russian Communist Party.

APR. 9. Soviet President Gorbachev unveils aspects of an "anticrisis program" designed to cure economic and nationalist problems by reasserting authority of central regime. He pleads for republic leaders to set aside differing ideologies, political platforms and "individual passions" in favor of unified effort to rescue Soviet Union from anarchy, urging quick approval of proposed union treaty. Supreme Soviet votes, 323–13, to pass Gorbachev's "anticrime" package 5/23, which includes: banning strikes and demonstrations during work hours; privatizing one-third of all Soviet small businesses by 1/1/92; stabilizing the ruble; and emergency measures for the distribution of essential foods.

APR. 16. Supreme Soviet gives preliminary approval to legislation banning political strikes, despite charges that law is unconstitutional and antidemocratic.

—Thousands of factory workers in Ukraine launch sympathy strike for Soviet miners.

APR. 23. President Gorbachev and leaders of 9 Soviet republics agree to cooperate on country's economic and political problems. Key provisions include: increases in role of the republics in decision-making; revision of Gorbachev's union treaty to permit secession from USSR, subject to hard-currency reparations; and pledges by republics to honor existing economic agreements with Moscow as the center power and to enforce law and order within their own boundaries.

—Vladimir Meciar, premier of Czechoslovakia's Slovak republic, is ousted by leaders of the regional parliament along with 7 members of his cabinet.

APR. 24. Hungary's parliament passes long-awaited legislation on compensating landowners whose property had been confiscated under communist rule after June 1949.

APR. 25. Soviet President Gorbachev offers to resign as general secretary of Soviet Communist Party in response to hard-line pressures in plenary meeting of the Central Committee; members reject resignation offer.

APR. 29. Romanian Premier Petre Roman reshuffles government, bringing 3 opposition figures into cabinet.

MAY 1. Russian leader Yeltsin asserts authority over all of republic's coal mines, in an apparent attempt to give miners an incentive to end strike. USSR 5/6 transfers control of Russian coal mines to Russian government. Miners 6/8 agree to end strike.

MAY 4. Roman Catholic Josef Cardinal Mindszenty, Hungarian anticommunist cleric who died in exile in Austria in 1975, is reinterred in Hungary.

MAY 9. Albanian Premier Fatos Nano unveils 25-member cabinet made up entirely of members of ruling Albanian Worker's Party, reversing promise to include opposition figures in coalition rule.

MAY 13. Soviet President Gorbachev issues decree that outlaws strikes in vital sectors of economy, but offers those sectors economic incentives.

MAY 15. Serbia blocks Croatian leader Stipe Mesic from becoming the titular head of Yugoslav state. Voters in Croatia 5/19 overwhelmingly support republican

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sovereignty within a loose confederation of Yugoslav states. Mesic 5/20 unilaterally declares himself Croatia's head of state.

MAY 20. Supreme Soviet enacts long-awaited law easing restrictions on travel and emigration by Soviet citizens. President Bush 6/3 extends waiver of Jackson-Vanik amendment of 1974 Trade Act, which curbed trade with countries restricting emigration.

MAY 22. About 10,000 members of Poland's independent trade union, Solidarity, march in Warsaw to protest country's stringent economic reforms; demand an end to wage restraints, an easing of government's tight monetary policy and removal of former communists from government and management of state-owned companies.

MAY 26. Nationalist leader Gamsakhurdia is elected president of Georgia, winning 86.5% of vote, making him the first directly elected leader of a Soviet republic.

MAY 30. Croatian parliament votes unanimously to authorize secession from Yugoslavia if Croatia fails to reach a confederation agreement with other Yugoslavian republics; agrees to declare independence by 6/30/91 if agreement is not reached.

JUNE 4. Albania's communist cabinet resigns, after facing persistent labor unrest and urban opposition to communist rule. Albanian Premier Nano announces that nonpartisan interim "government of national salvation" will be appointed to prepare for new elections in mid-1992. Albanian People's Assembly (parliament) 6/12 confirms 24-member nonpartisan caretaker cabinet led by new interim premier, Ylli Bufi, the country's first noncommunist government in 47 years.

JUNE 6. Presidents of Yugoslavia's 6 republics agree to negotiate proposal to turn country into loose confederation. A gun battle 6/6 between Croatian paramilitary special police and ethnic Serbs in Borovo Selo (northeastern Croatia) leaves 12 policemen and 3 civilians dead; fighting ends when federal army units take over town later that day. Yugoslav military goes on combat alert 6/6, and begins 6/7 calling up reserves and deploying units in western part of country, in response to increasing bloodshed and antimilitary unrest.

JUNE 9. Yugoslavia's collective presidency votes unanimously to give military sweeping powers to end ethnic fighting in Croatia; plan falls short of approval for martial law.

JUNE 10. President Lech Walesa vetoes legislation that would have established proportional system of parliamentary representation in Poland, set a strict residency rule for candidates and banned political activity in churches. The Sejm 6/13 fails to override the veto, 257–123. Walesa threatens 6/14 to dissolve parliament. Sejm passes new draft of legislation 6/15, which meets some of Walesa's demands but retains some provisions that Walesa finds objectionable. Walesa again vetoes legislation 6/26; Sejm overrides veto 6/28, obligating the president to sign legislation into law. Walesa signs bill 7/1. Sejm 7/11 votes, 258–89, with 14 abstentions, to reject attempt by Walesa to replace election law with his own legislation, thus appearing to clear way for national elections in October.

JUNE 12. Russian leader Yeltsin, campaigning as political independent, is elected to newly created executive presidency of Soviet Russian republic, with 60% of vote; his closest challenger, former Soviet Premier Nikolai I. Ryzhkov, captures approximately 18%. Col. Aleksandr V. Rutskoi is elected vice president on Yeltsin's ticket. Yeltsin is inaugurated as Russian president 7/10 at the Kremlin.

JUNE 17. President Gorbachev and leaders of 7 Soviet republics sign new draft treaty that would decentralize many powers of the central regime.

JUNE 20. Slovenia and Croatia boycott emergency meeting of Yugoslav leaders aimed at resolving crisis over federal presidency.

JUNE 21. Supreme Soviet votes, 262–24, to eliminate from its agenda any discussion over a conservative-backed proposal to transfer power from Soviet

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President Gorbachev to Premier Pavlov. Gorbachev jokes with reporters that "the coup is over."

JUNE 25. Slovenia and Croatia formally declare independence from Yugoslavia but hedge on actual secession.

JUNE 28–29. Slovenia and Croatia agree to 3-month suspension of their independence declarations in order to halt federal military intervention.

JULY 1. Supreme Soviet approves law to allow for the first time the sale of state-owned enterprises in USSR.

JULY 2. In Slovenia the ceasefire negotiated by EC members falls apart when rebel and Yugoslav military forces resume combat. EC 7/5 suspends economic aid and arms sales to Yugoslavia, in an effort to compel the federal state to accept binding EC mediation.

JULY 14. A new Bulgarian constitution drafted by socialist (formerly communist) majority parliament takes effect; guarantees human and property rights. Opponents, including the Union of Democratic Forces, charge that the constitution contains legal loopholes that will consolidate the power of the socialists. Opposition mounts protests, including attempt 7/14 to prevent deputies from entering parliament to sign the document.

JULY 20. Russian President Yeltsin issues decree banning any political activity at workplaces and government establishments in Russian republic, limiting such activity to nonworking hours and to locations outside government buildings.

JULY 22. Croatian President Tudjman walks out of high-level talks on Yugoslavia's future, after more than 20 people die in fighting between Croats and ethnic Serbs in Croatia.

JULY 24. Soviet President Gorbachev announces that he and leaders of 10 Soviet republics have agreed on disputed power-sharing provisions in the proposed union treaty, although the question of taxation remains unsolved. Kazakhstan parliament approves draft 6/24, but Ukraine 6/27 postpones debate, despite appeals by Gorbachev for quick ratification. Russian President Yeltsin tells Russian legislature 6/26 that certain parts of the treaty are in dispute.

JULY 25. In a speech during 2-day plenary session of Communist Party Central Committee, Gorbachev urges ruling party to scrap "outdated ideological dogma" and embrace "world socialist and democratic thought." Plenum 7/26 gives preliminary approval to the draft platform by voice vote.

AUG. 6. Croatian defense officials concede that Serbs occupy about 15% of Croatia. A federally mandated truce begins 8/7.

AUG. 8. An estimated 18,000 Albanian refugees flee to southern Italy. Under new tougher policy, Italian government 8/12 repatriates about 12,000 immigrants; repatriates remaining refugees 8/17–18.

AUG. 13–20. Pope John Paul II visits Poland and Hungary; urges nations to maintain Roman Catholic faith in face of increasing pressures toward capitalism and materialism.

AUG. 15. Soviet Union launches satellite equipped with US-built device for analyzing Earth's protective ozone layer, in first major space collaboration between the 2 nations since Apollo-Soyuz test project in 1975.

AUG. 19. Soviet national news agency Tass announces that President Gorbachev, vacationing at his dacha in the Crimea, is incapacitated with an unspecified illness and is being replaced by Vice President Gennadi Yanayev and 7 other officials calling themselves the State Committee for the State of Emergency. Hours later, military units, including hundreds of tanks, take up positions on key streets, intersections and bridges in Moscow. The coup leaders declare state of emergency "in individual localities" of the USSR; other decrees by Emergency Committee prohibit large gatherings of people in those localities, set curfews and ban opposition political activity and the press. Coup is condemned by Western leaders 8/19–20. While Gorbachev is held incommunicado at his retreat in the Crimea, Russian President Yeltsin 8/19 immediately denounces the coup, calling it uncon-

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stitutional and branding the Emergency Committee members as traitors. Yeltsin telephones President Bush and British Prime Minister John Major 8/20 and receives assurances that those governments will not recognize Emergency Committee as the legitimate Soviet leadership. Yeltsin addresses an estimated 150,000 people at Russian parliament building and repeats his charge that Yanayev and his allies have seized power illegally 8/20; meeting is attended by former Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and other prominent democrats, who support Yeltsin. Pavlov 8/20 abruptly resigns as premier and member of Emergency Committee, citing illness. Armored vehicles approaching Russian parliament 8/21 clash with hundreds of civilians armed with "Molotov cocktails"; 3 people are killed and several are injured, but military pulls back. Coup collapses 8/21 amid uncertainties over support of military, and with overwhelming opposition both inside and outside the country. By late afternoon, Gorbachev is released and calls overthrow of the coup plot a "serious victory for the perestroika process"; lauds Yeltsin for standing up to conspirators and hails Soviet people for having the self-esteem to fight the takeover. Bush 8/21 welcomes apparent end of coup and Gorbachev's return to power; German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Françoise Mitterrand urge the West to increase economic aid to the Soviet Union in order to preserve political stability. Gorbachev, under pressure from Yeltsin, appoints 8/23 air force Gen. Yevgeny Shaposhnikov as defense minister, Vadim V. Bakatin as KGB chief, and Gen. Vladimir Lobov as Soviet chief of staff; appoints Viktor Barannikov as Soviet interior minister, to replace Boris Pugo, who committed suicide after participating in failed coup; fires Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, and appoints Boris Pankin 8/28 as foreign minister. Russian prosecutor's office 9/11 discloses that 10 of 14 coup defendants pleaded not guilty to all counts of treason, that 3 pleaded guilty to some counts and that 1 admitted guilt on all counts.

AUG. 20. Republic of Estonia—and Latvia on 8/21—declares independence; Lithuania reaffirms 1990 declaration of independence on 8/21. Latvian and Lithuanian communist parties are banned 8/22, and their properties are expropriated in both republics 8/23. Russian President Yeltsin 8/24 issues decrees recognizing Estonia and Latvia as independent states. EC recognizes the 3 republics, and President Bush announces 9/2 full US diplomatic recognition. Soviet State Council 9/6 formally recognizes independence of Baltic republics and declares Soviet support for membership of Baltic states in the UN and in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

—Soviet coup attempt delays the 8/20 signing of the union treaty by republics.

AUG. 21. President Bush waives Jackson-Vanik amendment for Romania, paving way for restoration of Romania's most-favored-nation trade status.

AUG. 22. Croatian President Tudjman orders federal forces to leave republic and Serb rebels to honor ceasefire and lay down arms by 8/31. Yugoslav federal forces launch 8/25 full-scale military offensive reportedly in support of ethnic Serb guerrillas in Croatia. Tudjman 8/27 holds unprecedented meeting with Yugoslavia's top military leaders—the defense minister, Col. Gen. Veljko Kadijevic, and the chief of staff, Gen. Blagoje Adzic—in effort to forestall all-out mobilization of Croatian forces and an escalation of fighting.

AUG. 24. Soviet President Gorbachev resigns as general secretary of Soviet Communist Party, but does not resign from party; issues series of decrees curbing the party, such as disbanding Central Committee and placing all party property under control of the Soviet parliament. Gorbachev also dismisses remnants of the Cabinet of Ministers; replaces it with a special committee headed by Russian Premier Ivan Silayev, who assumes the role of acting premier and replaces former Premier Pavlov, one of the arrested conspirators.

—Ukrainian parliament approves declaration of independence; parliament of Byelorussia votes for declaration of independence 8/25; parliament of Moldavia votes for independence 8/27. Soviet President Gorbachev threatens 8/27 to step down as Soviet leader if republics do not halt their stampede for independence;

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urges the republics to preserve military and economic unity. Parliaments of Azerbaijan 8/30, and Uzbekistan and Kirghizia 8/31, vote independence declarations. Parliament of the Crimea region 9/5 votes declaration of independence from Ukraine. Parliament of Central Asian republic of Tadzhikistan declares independence 9/9 and calls for presidential election.

AUG. 28. Ceasefire negotiated between Croatian President Tudjman and federal army leaders collapses, as fighting breaks out again throughout Croatia.

AUG. 29. Supreme Soviet votes, 283–29, with 52 abstentions, to ban Communist Party activities for an indefinite period.

—Russian republic signs separate political and economic treaties with Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

SEPT. 2. Congress of People's Deputies approves interim government to usher in confederation of sovereign states; creates a State Council, an executive committee chaired by Gorbachev and including the heads of all republics that wish to remain in USSR, to be responsible for all foreign policy, security and law enforcement. An Interrepublic Economic Committee, subordinate to the State Council, will oversee economic and social policies and draft a treaty on economic relations between republics. Five of the 12 republics boycott initial session of the interim Supreme Soviet.

—Yugoslav federal presidency approves EC plan to end civil warfare in Croatia, but clashes continue 9/2 between Croatian forces and Serbian guerrillas backed by federal army. Peace talks open 9/7 in The Hague under the sponsorship of the EC. EC mediator Lord Carrington 10/4 brokers a cease-fire accord signed by Croatian President Tudjman and Serbian President Milošević, to take effect 10/8.

SEPT. 6. Russian city of Leningrad adopts its former name, St. Petersburg.

SEPT. 7. Croatia and Slovenia formally declare immediate secession from Yugoslavia.

SEPT. 8. Macedonia votes by significant majority to declare independence from Yugoslavia.

SEPT. 11. President Bush meets with envoys of 3 Baltic states at the White House; announces modest program of US assistance to the region, which includes unfreezing $60 million in Baltic assets seized for safeguarding by the US in 1940.

SEPT. 12–16. US Secretary James A. Baker visits USSR; attends opening of a Moscow human-rights conference sponsored by the CSCE. Baker confers 9/12 with former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and other members of the Democratic Reform Movement; holds discussions 9/13 with new Soviet Foreign Minister Pankin and announces a US-Soviet agreement to halt arms shipments to opposing sides in Afghanistan by Jan. 1992. Baker meets with Gen. Lobov, the Soviet military chief of staff, and the two agree that superpowers should begin negotiations on the removal from Europe of tactical nuclear weapons. Baker visits the newly independent Baltic states 9/14; pledges $14 million in fiscal year 1991 to be divided among Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

SEPT. 16. At least 10,000 people rally in Tbilisi against Georgian President Gamsakhurdia, demanding his resignation. Opposition forces seize the government broadcasting center in the Georgian capital 9/22, with the aid of deserters from the Georgian National Guard. Gamsakhurdia declares state of emergency 9/24 in the southern republic and urges supporters to come to the capital to "liquidate" the "nest of bandits" who oppose him. Four people are killed in a shoot-out between loyalist and rebel national guardsmen in Tbilisi 9/25. Peace talks 9/29–30 between the government and rebel factions fail.

—The State Council gives preliminary approval to a proposal by liberal economist Grigory A. Yavlinsky for a Soviet economic union. The plan calls for a strong Soviet central government, a federal reserve system headed by a dominant Soviet central bank and a free-floating ruble. Soviet President Gorbachev and the presidents of 8 republics 10/4 agree to economic union based on the Yavlinsky plan; 4 independence-minded republics—Ukraine, Georgia, Moldavia and Azerbai-

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jan—do not attend the ceremony. Ukraine signs the treaty 11/4, after Western governments indicate that Ukraine could not expect aid or investment unless it was part of the Soviet economic community; Moldavia signs pact 11/6.

SEPT. 26. Romanian Premier Roman and his entire cabinet resign amid 3 days of rioting by thousands of coal miners in Bucharest. Miners are angered by Romania's liberal economic reforms; demand higher wages, a freeze on prices and the resignation of the Roman government and President Ion Iliescu. Iliescu asks Theodor Stolojan, the privatization minister, to become premier.

SEPT. 29. Romanian President Iliescu opens negotiations with opposition parties on forming a broad-based coalition government. Cabinet is unveiled 10/15; includes members of the ruling National Salvation Front, the opposition National Liberal Party and 2 other parties. Romanian parliament 10/16 confirms 19 ministers of a 21-member coalition cabinet led by Premier Stolojan.

OCT. 6. Clashes in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi leave 2 dead and 74 injured. Georgian parliament begins an emergency debate over the volatile standoff between forces supporting and opposing President Gamsakhurdia.

OCT. 13. Bulgaria's main opposition coalition, the Union of Democratic Forces, wins Bulgaria's second national election since the fall of communism. UDF captures 34.36% of vote and 111 of 240 parliamentary seats; Socialists win 33.14% of vote and 106 seats; Movement for Rights and Freedom takes 7.55% of vote and 24 seats. UDF nominates Filip Dimitrov to become next premier, replacing independent Dimitar Popov. Bulgarian parliament 11/8 votes, 131–91, to confirm Dimitrov as premier.

OCT. 14. Soviet Union announces end of all restrictions on internal travel, to begin 1/1/92.

OCT. 19. A clandestine assembly of ethnic Albanian legislators in Kosovo proclaim Kosovo to be an independent republic.

OCT. 22. Ukrainian parliament votes to create an independent armed force of 400,000 to 450,000 men, specifically authorizing the formation of an army, navy, air force and national guard; Republican officials 11/30 reduce plans of an independent army to about 90,000.

OCT. 23. Yugoslav army attacks Croatian city of Dubrovnik and demands city's surrender. EC 11/11 orders peace monitors in Dubrovnik to leave the city.

OCT. 27. Poland holds first fully free parliamentary elections. No single party receives more than 13% of vote; center-left Democratic Union of former Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki wins 50 seats, the same number as the Democratic Left Alliance, in the 460-seat Sejm. Polish President Walesa, whose responsibilities include choosing a new premier, offers 10/29 to appoint himself to the job for a 2-year period, absent a clear-cut winner.

NOV. 1. Russian Congress of People's Deputies grants Russian President Yeltsin sweeping powers to launch and direct radical economic reforms in Russia. Yeltsin's plan includes the following: lifting most price controls in Russia by the end of 1991; the immediate privatization of small and mid-sized state farms and state industries; the creation of a convertible Russian currency; a cutoff of Russia's funding of 70 Soviet central ministries and of the Russian contribution to Soviet foreign aid. This move wins cautious acceptance from Soviet President Gorbachev 11/1.

NOV. 5. Serbia rejects the proposed EC peace proposal that had been accepted by Yugoslavia's other republics.

NOV. 8. EC imposes economic sanctions on Yugoslavia and urges the UN Security Council to order an oil embargo in the hope of cutting fuel to Serbian-led attacks on Croatia; Serbia denounces the EC move 11/9. President Bush says 11/10 that US will join with EC in economic sanctions; places economic sanctions on all 6 Yugoslavian republics 12/6.

NOV. 15–17. Yeltsin issues a series of decrees giving Russian republic dominance over the Soviet economy, taking control of Soviet natural resources, repudiating the

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role of central banking authorities and allowing the value of the ruble to float according to market rates.

Nov. 17. Croatian forces concede military defeat by the Yugoslav federal army in Vukovar and ask the International Red Cross to help its besieged citizens; Yugoslav troops take control 11/20.

Nov. 19. Former Foreign Minister Shevardnadze is reappointed to that post by Soviet President Gorbachev.

Nov. 23. In another UN-brokered agreement, Croatian President Tudjman, Serbian President Milošević and Gen. Veljko Kadijevic, head of the Serbian-led Yugoslav army, sign cease-fire agreement and allow multinational peacekeeping force into Yugoslavia; Tudjman accuses the federal army of plotting to capture more Croatian territory in final offensive before peacekeeping force arrives.

Nov. 25. Soviet President Gorbachev fails to win Soviet republic's support for union treaty; republic leaders plan to rework the treaty and send it back to their legislatures. Gorbachev blames desire of republican officials to "pursue their own political goals."

—US Senate votes to spend $500 million of Pentagon budget to help the USSR dismantle its nuclear weapons rather than risk letting them fall into the hands of terrorists.

Nov. 27. UN Security Council pledges to send peacekeeping force of up to 10,000 soldiers to reinforce the UN-brokered ceasefire in Yugoslavia, which falls apart 12/7 after several days of increasingly violent clashes.

—President Bush announces that Washington will recognize an independent Ukraine "expeditiously" if the Soviet republic breaks with the USSR in an independence referendum scheduled 12/1. Soviet President Gorbachev expresses surprise and disappointment 12/2 over US support for Ukrainian independence.

Nov. 30. After refusing to authorize another round of deficit spending, Russian President Yeltsin agrees to finance the Soviet payroll for the immediate future and to guarantee sufficient credits to meet minimal Kremlin needs; takes temporary control of the Soviet Foreign Ministry building and embassies because the Soviet government has no money to keep them running.

Dec. 1. Ukraine voters approve referendum to declare independence from the Soviet Union and create an independent nation. Russian republic recognizes Ukrainian independence 12/2. Leonid M. Kravchuk is elected president 12/1, winning approximately 61.5% of vote; sworn in as president 12/5.

Dec. 4. Albania's Democratic Party announces that it will withdraw its 7 ministers from the government's cabinet, effectively dissolving the caretaker coalition government formed on 6/12. Socialist Premier Bufi resigns; President Alia names Vilson Ahmeti as premier and instructs him to form new cabinet.

Dec. 5. Federal President Mesic resigns as Yugoslavia's leader amid renewed fighting in Croatia.

Dec. 6. Polish President Wałesa appoints former Solidarity lawyer Jan Olszewski as Poland's new prime minister; Olszewski resigns 12/17, after clashing with the president on his cabinet choices and the pace of Poland's economic reforms. Polish parliament 12/18 gives Olszewski vote of confidence to continue efforts in forming government; accepts cabinet 12/23.

Dec. 8. Leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia declare that the Soviet Union has ceased to exist and proclaim a new "Commonwealth of Independent States" open to all Soviet republics. Russian President Yeltsin telephones President Bush to explain the accord, which puts free-market initiatives and military matters under joint command of the 3 states and invalidates Soviet authority. Ukrainian and Byelorussian parliaments ratify commonwealth agreement 12/10; Russia follows suit 12/12. Surprise move preempts Soviet President Gorbachev's union treaty; Gorbachev 12/9 rejects the right of leaders of the 3 republics to dissolve the Soviet Union. Bush administration says 12/10 that while it is ready to work with the new commonwealth, it will not break relations with central Soviet government.

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DEC. 9. In elections in Romania, citizens vote to endorse a constitution for multiparty government.

DEC. 11. Albanian President Alia appoints new premier, Vilson Ahmeti; more than 30 Albanians are killed when a fire breaks out after a hungry crowd storms a warehouse in Tirana.

DEC. 12. Russian President Yeltsin meets with Soviet defense officials and army commanders to get backing for new commonwealth; expects more republics to join. US envoy to Moscow, Robert Strauss, says that with Gorbachev "in decline," Yeltsin and his ministers "are the people with whom we'll deal."

—Former East German President Erik Honecker takes refuge in home of Chilean ambassador to Moscow after being told he would have to leave Russia immediately; he is wanted in Germany to stand trial for allegedly giving shoot-to-kill orders to guards along the old border between the 2 Germanys. Russian government 12/16 backs down from threat to expel Honecker.

DEC. 14. The 5 central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan) agree to join new Commonwealth of Independent States.

DEC. 15. US Secretary Baker visits Moscow; meets with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who asks the US to recognize Russian independence and that of Byelorussia and Ukraine. Russian and Ukrainian officials 12/16 say commonwealth leaders will impose strict controls over storage and export of nuclear arms; Yeltsin announces that all Soviet republics would eventually eliminate nuclear weapons, except Russia. After meeting with Baker, Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev says 12/18 his republic would retain its nuclear missiles as long as Russia did.

DEC. 17. Soviet President Gorbachev announces that by the new year all central government structures will cease to exist; Gorbachev and Russian President Yeltsin decide that some USSR agencies, including the state bank, will come under Russian control and others will be abolished. Yeltsin 12/19 takes control of Foreign Ministry, KGB and the parliament.

—EC agrees to recognize Yugoslavia's 2 breakaway republics as independent states by 1/15/92. Serbia says it will recognize Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina; move amounts to Serbian decision to annex the territory.

DEC. 20. Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina decides to apply to EC for recognition as independent state. Yugoslavia's federal prime minister, Ante Marković, resigns.

DEC. 21. Eleven republics of Soviet Union formally constitute themselves as the Commonwealth of Independent States; sign agreement that guarantees separate sovereignties but leaves unresolved issues such as an acceptable system of command for common military policy and nuclear weapons control. Top governmental body to be a council of state and government leaders, assisted by committees of republic ministers in foreign affairs, defense and economics. Full operations to begin no later than 1/15/92 after ratification by 11 republics (Armenia, Moldavia and Azerbaijan join the 5 Asian republics and 3 founding republics; Baltic states and Georgia do not participate). Former Soviet republics decide to give Russia the permanent UN Security Council seat of the USSR.

DEC. 22. Fighting breaks out in Tbilisi between forces loyal to Georgian President Gamsakhurdia and rebels demanding his resignation; rebels 12/24 take control of the main communication building and cut off communications from the capital. Gamsakhurdia, holed up in besieged Georgian parliament building, vows 12/25 to remain till death rather than resign.

DEC. 23. Germany recognizes Croatia and Slovenia as independent states.

DEC. 24. The republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina asks the UN to send peacekeeping forces.

DEC. 25. Gorbachev resigns as president of Soviet Union in televised speech to the nation; defends his nearly 7-year term of office and says he cannot support the

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newly founded Commonwealth that is replacing the USSR. Soviet red flag with hammer and sickle is lowered over Kremlin and white-blue-red Russian flag rises in its stead. Control of vast Soviet nuclear arsenal is handed over to Russian President Yeltsin. President Bush praises Gorbachev for his role in history, biding him farewell and says US will recognize the former Soviet republics.

DEC. 26. Yugoslavia's federal government unveils plans to form new, smaller country, including territory taken during civil war with Croatia.

DEC. 28. Rebel and progovernment forces in Georgia agree to temporary ceasefire and pledge to continue talks to end fighting that has claimed at least 50 lives in 6 days.

DEC. 30. Leaders of the new Commonwealth of Independent States agree on joint control of former Soviet nuclear weapons but fail to unite behind common economic policy; each state will decide whether to build its own forces or to remain part of a common defense.

DEC. 31. UN special envoy Cyrus R. Vance wins formal agreement from Serbian and Yugoslav officials for a cease-fire plan, the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces and withdrawal of pro-Serbian federal army from Croatia.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

JAN. 7. Executive committee of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Soviet-led trading bloc, agrees to transform the organization into a purely coordinating body. COMECON is renamed the Organization for International Economic Cooperation.

JAN. 31. Hungary joins the North Atlantic Council, the parliamentary arm of NATO, as associate (nonvoting) member.

FEB. 11. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev notifies Warsaw Pact leaders that the organization will disband as a military alliance on 4/1.

FEB. 15. Presidents and premiers of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland hold summit in Visegrad, Hungary; pledge mutual efforts to overcome political and economic legacies of communist rule; sign the Visegrad agreement, which calls for informal cooperation during transition to market economies.

FEB. 25. Foreign and defense ministers of the 6 Warsaw Pact nations at summit in Budapest sign agreement to disband alliance's military structure by 3/31. Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski and Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh meet privately 2/25 to discuss withdrawal of Soviet forces, estimated at 50,000, from Poland.

MAR. 14. New round of Conventional Forces in Europe talks opens in Vienna. Discussions are suspended 2/14 over USSR's insistence that reclassified army units are exempt from formerly agreed CFE limits.

MAR. 14–16. US Secretary of State James A. Baker visits Moscow to discuss arms control, postwar Persian Gulf developments and other issues; informs Soviets that there can be no final agreement on reducing strategic, long-range nuclear weapons until CFE conflict is settled.

MAR. 27. US withdraws last of its medium-range nuclear missiles deployed on continent, under an agreement reached in 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

APR. 9. Soviet Union begins withdrawing military forces from Poland, without formal agreement on troop removal or on the financial compensation Poland is seeking for alleged environmental damage.

MAY 25. Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls agrees to loosen restrictions on export of militarily useful technology to the Soviet Union and eastern Europe.

MAY 28. NATO defense ministers meeting in Brussels approve fundamental military restructuring of alliance. Plan revises military strategy; calls for creation of

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8 NATO corps of up to 70,000 troops each (1 British-led multinational rapid-reaction force, 6 multinational "main defense forces" corps and 1 all-German force) and special units of smaller sizes. France 5/8 rejects possibility of joining rapid-reaction forces 5/28.

JUNE 1. US and Soviet Union resolve differences over CFE treaty in discussions between Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh in Lisbon, clearing the way for a superpower summit. Accord sets limits on nonnuclear weapons of NATO and Warsaw Pact nations. CFE meeting in Vienna 6/14 approves settlement.

JUNE 19. Soviet troops and their dependents withdraw completely from Hungary, and from Czechoslovakia on 6/21, earlier than the 7/1/91 deadline set by the Soviet agreements with both nations signed in 1990.

JUNE 19–20. Foreign ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe hold a meeting in Berlin, first high-level CSCE gathering since Nov. 1990 summit, which formally declared an end to the Cold War. CSCE membership rises to 35, when representatives 6/19 vote to admit Albania. Envoys issue joint declaration in support of "democratic development, unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia"; reach compromise agreement on crisis-intervention proposal, allowing member states to bring to CSCE's attention violations of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act or "major disruptions endangering peace, security or stability" involving one or more member countries.

JUNE 20. German parliament votes to move the united nation's capital to Berlin from Bonn.

JUNE 28. COMECON formally disbands at meeting in Budapest; no decision is reached regarding possible successor to organization.

JULY 1. Warsaw Pact formally disbands at summit in Prague.

JULY 17. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, at the Group of Seven economic summit in London, reach agreement on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), to reduce Soviet and American military arsenals by 30%.

JULY 30–31. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev meet in Moscow for first post-Cold War superpower summit. The two leaders sign START treaty 7/31 and announce preparations to cosponsor Middle East peace conference in October. START limits both countries to no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 strategic delivery systems, and will be in effect for 15 years, renewable afterwards at successive 5-year intervals.

SEPT. 10. CSCE foreign ministers gather in Moscow to open international conference on human rights. Soviet President Gorbachev warns that the greatest current danger to human rights in Europe is the clamor of ethnic minorities for more freedom. CSCE votes to admit newly independent Baltic republics—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

SEPT. 27. President Bush announces unilateral elimination of approximately 24,000 US nuclear warheads; asks the USSR to respond in kind. US initiative includes removal from Europe and destruction of US tactical missiles and nuclear-tipped artillery shells; removal from US ships of nuclear-armed cruise missiles; halt to the rail-basing effort for MX intercontinental ballistic missile; end to the 24-hour alert status of US strategic bombers. Gorbachev hails Bush initiative as a "major step."

OCT. 3. Soviet President Gorbachev offers unilateral military cuts that surpass President Bush's 9/27 arms control initiative. Gorbachev plan includes: taking Soviet strategic bombers off alert; deactivating 503 intercontinental ballistic missiles covered by START and preparing to remove all short-range nuclear weapons from Soviet ships, submarines and land-based naval aircraft. Bush 10/5 hails Gorbachev's announcement.

OCT. 17. NATO defense ministers in meeting in Sicily approve 50% reduction in tactical-nuclear bombs stockpiled in Europe for use on US and British aircraft.

NOV. 5. USSR agrees to open entire territory to aerial inspection, clearing the

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way for completion of a treaty that will allow all European nations, the US and Canada to fly through each other's airspace.

Nov. 7–8. NATO leaders approve new "strategic concept" for post-Cold War era, first drafted 5/28. New strategy scraps NATO doctrines of "forward defense" and "graduated response," and stresses "collective force planning, common operational planning, multinational formations . . . [and] the stationing of forces outside home territory." Key provisions include "the primacy of NATO" in European security, the reaffirmation of US and Canada in NATO's future, the maintenance of nuclear forces at minimum levels in Europe and a stronger NATO diplomatic role; also calls for strengthened diplomatic and security contacts with the Soviet Union.

Dec. 18. Leaders of 4 Soviet breakaway republics with long-range nuclear weapons—Russia, Kazakhstan, Byelorussia and Ukraine—promise to carry out all cuts in nuclear weapons made between Presidents Gorbachev and Bush; agree to accept American advisers to help dismantle warheads.

—Ukrainian officials agree on first steps for removal of estimated 4,000 nuclear arms stationed in Ukraine.

THE WORLD ECONOMY

Jan. 7. International Monetary Fund (IMF) announces $1.8 billion loan to Czechoslovakia.

Jan. 21. Economic ministers of Group of Seven leading industrialized nations (US, Japan, Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Canada) end 2-days meetings in New York City, pledge cooperation to keep world markets stable for the duration of the Gulf War. G-7 ministers forgive one-third of Egypt's foreign debt and substantial portion of Poland's foreign debt. US says significant progress was made in winning financial commitments from Japan and Germany to support allied force in the Persian Gulf.

Jan. 22. Soviet Premier Valentin Pavlov announces monetary reform to curb inflation and undermine the black market in rubles; decree causes panic among Soviets 1/22–24, as millions rush to beat the 1/25 deadline on cash exchanges.

Feb. 5. Canada announces it will join US-Mexico talks aimed at creating free-trade zone in North America.

Mar. 11–12. Oil ministers from 12 of the 13 member states of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries—Iraq is not represented—agree to cut OPEC oil production by 5% for the second quarter of 1991.

Mar. 15. Western governments agree to forgive nearly one-half of debt owed by Poland.

Mar. 26. Presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay sign Treaty of Asuncion, creating the Southern Cone Common Market, a 4-country free-trade zone, by 1/1/95.

Apr. 7. President Bush assures Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of commitment to proposed free-trade agreement between the US and Mexico. Bush outlines plans 5/1 to address the most serious concerns of the accord's critics, pledging to ensure "adequate assistance and effective retraining for dislocated workers" and to slowly remove tariff and nontariff barriers to imports of Mexican goods potentially threatening to US industries. Congress 5/23–24 authorizes Bush to negotiate an international trade agreement on "fast track" basis with Mexico and Canada.

Apr. 15. Officials from 39 countries inaugurate the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, created in 1990 to help east European nations turn toward market economies.

Apr. 18. IMF announces approval of financial package worth $2.4 billion for

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Poland; in exchange, Polish government agrees to revise targets for Poland's "shock therapy" economic program.

MAY 2. Pope John Paul II expresses support for economic concept of capitalism but warns that free-market system and business enterprises "need to be oriented toward the common good."

MAY 17. IMF approves standby credit for Egypt, allowing it to borrow up to $372 million over the next 18 months. The credit is intended to assist Egypt's implementation of economic reforms, which include steps to privatize state-owned companies and to lift controls on production and investment. Western creditors agree 5/25 to forgive 50% of Egypt's estimated $20.2 billion in government-to-government debt.

MAY 22. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev formally asks to attend July G-7 summit during news conference in Moscow with visiting Italian Premier Giulio Andreotti.

MAY 27. Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani announces readiness to dramatically increase economic cooperation with the West and Persian Gulf nations; Oil Minister Gholam Reza Aqhazadeh says Iran plans to cooperate with Saudi Arabia within OPEC to pursue policies for stable oil prices.

JUNE 11. President Bush approves up to $1.5 billion in US loan guarantees for Soviet Union to purchase US grain.

JUNE 13. British Prime Minister John Major invites Gorbachev to G-7 summit to be held in London on 7/15–17.

JULY 5. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl meets with Gorbachev near Kiev, to discuss strategies for Gorbachev's appeal for economic assistance at upcoming London summit.

JULY 15–17. G-7 leaders meet in London for 17th annual summit on world economic issues; officials 7/16 back possible use of force to prevent Iraq from building nuclear weapons and endorse US efforts to negotiate peace in Middle East. Gorbachev arrives 7/17 for "working lunch"; G-7 leaders offer Soviet Union package of technical assistance and moral support, but no direct economic aid; meeting ends with statement of optimism, welcoming "new spirit of cooperation" of the post-Cold War era.

JULY 23. IMF discloses that Soviet Union has applied for full membership in IMF and World Bank. Gorbachev and IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus sign an accord 10/5 giving the Soviet Union associate membership.

JULY 29. IMF approves $1.04 billion in standby credit for Argentina.

JULY 31. Japan and European Community announce after 2 years of negotiation an agreement restricting the number of Japanese automobiles imported to EC countries through 1999.

SEPT. 24–25. Oil ministers from 13 OPEC states, meeting in Geneva, agree on ceiling of 23.65 million barrels of oil to be produced in the fourth quarter.

OCT. 13. G-7 nations agree to help Soviet Union formulate plan for economic reform, during 3-day meeting of finance ministers and central-bank chiefs in Bangkok, Thailand. Ministers pledge to take steps to reduce debt burdens of least-developed nations and voice satisfaction with the fall of US dollar against Japanese yen.

OCT. 17. British Prime Minister Major cancels debts owed by the poorest developing countries, regardless of whether other nations suit (Britain is owed approximately $1.3 billion by Third World countries). Countries will have two-thirds of their debt canceled and receive 5-year interest moratorium on remaining third; in exchange they will have to accept IMF reform programs. Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney immediately follows British lead.

OCT. 22. After 14 months of negotiations in Luxembourg, the EC and the European Free Trade Area reach agreement in principle to establish a West European free-trade area spanning 19 nations and 380 million people, subject to ratification by national parliaments and the EC parliament, to take effect 1/1/93.

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The free-trade zone will be known as the European Economic Area and will be the world's largest in volume of trade.

Nov. 8–9. Trade officials in Europe cite limited progress in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Uruguay Round after a meeting between President Bush and EC officials at The Hague.

Nov. 16. New York Stock Exchange Index falls 120 points, biggest drop of the Dow Jones industrial since 10/13/89. Concerns are eased on next trading day, 11/19, when market rebounds slightly.

Nov. 19. During a conference in Teheran of representatives of the G-7 nations, Iranian President Rafsanjani outlines plans for sweeping economic reforms to shift Iran toward a free-market economy.

Nov. 20. President Bush authorizes nearly $1.5 billion in grain and other credits to be divided among the 12 Soviet republics.

Nov. 21. G-7 nations reach accord with Moscow and 8 Soviet republics to defer principal payments on Soviet foreign debt for up to 1 year; provide emergency fund of $1 billion in a gold swap and ask export-credit agencies to extend short-term credits; in exchange Moscow and republics agree to IMF-supervised reforms.

Dec. 4. USSR postpones repayment of principal on all commercial-bank loans made before 1/1/91; payments due to banks over next 13 months were to total nearly $4 billion.

WESTERN EUROPE AND CANADA

Jan. 1. Canada's controversial goods-and-services 7% tax goes into effect.

Jan. 20. In elections in central German state of Hesse, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is voted out of power, winning 40.2% of vote, down from 42.1% in the 1987 state elections; the Social Democratic Party increases its share of the vote to 40.8% from 40.2% in the previous election; the Green Party wins 8.8%, down from 9.4%. The SDP plans to lead a coalition government with the environmentalist Greens.

Jan. 29. Quebec's ruling Liberal Party presents plan, known as the Alliare Report, to radically revise Canadian constitution and shift power to Quebec and other provinces. Plan states that if Quebec is unable to reach agreement on the plan with the rest of Canada by the fall of 1992, it will hold referendum seeking full independence. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney makes strong plea for national unity 2/12–13, but during party convention in Montreal 3/8–10 the Liberal Party adopts nationalist platform.

Jan. 31. Council of Europe votes to accept Czechoslovakia as a member.

Feb. 1–4. Italian Communist Party officially changes its name to Democratic Party of the Left. Party's 547-member national council reelects party leader Achille Occhetto with 71.5% of vote.

Feb. 7. Mortar shells are fired at 10 Downing Street, residence of British prime minister; provisional Irish Republican Army claims responsibility. Bomb explodes 2/18 at Victoria railway station in London, killing 1 and injuring 40 others; IRA again claims responsibility.

Mar. 11. British Prime Minister John Major indicates in Bonn speech a more positive approach to the European Community (EC) than that pursued by his predecessor, Margaret Thatcher.

—Trial of former Greek Premier Andreas Papandreou and 3 former cabinet ministers on corruption charges begins in Athens.

Mar. 13. President Bush meets with Prime Minister Mulroney in Ottawa, Canada; warns Iran against annexing any territory of Iraq and reacts coolly to Mulroney's proposal for international talks on controlling weapons of mass destruction. Two leaders sign bilateral accord on acid rain, calling for both countries to

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seek independent arbitration if they are unable to agree on cross-border pollution problems. Presidents Bush and François Mitterrand of France meet on the French Caribbean island of Martinique 3/14 to discuss the Persian Gulf and other Middle East issues. The two leaders fail to agree on specific approach to Arab-Israeli peace process but emphasize their governments' close alliance in the Gulf War and importance of facilitating new Arab-Israeli negotiations. Bush meets with Prime Minister Major in Bermuda 4/16; the two announce that the UN Security Council will act soon on permanent ceasefire in the Persian Gulf.

MAR. 18. Estimated 100,000 people protest in several eastern German cities against deteriorating economic conditions in the region.

MAR. 21. British government announces it will scrap the unpopular year-old local government financing system known as the poll tax; outlines 3/23 plan for new "council tax" based on property value, rather than on per-capita basis.

MAR. 26. The Belanger-Campeau Commission, a bipartisan panel appointed in 1990 to examine Quebec's political future, urges referendum on provincial sovereignty to be held no later than Oct. 1992.

MAR. 29. Government of Italian Premier Giulio Andreotti resigns after Socialists, second-largest party in coalition, withdraw their support. Christian Democrat leader Andreotti forms another 4-party coalition 4/17.

APR. 16. British opposition Labour Party unveils policy document reflecting continued move toward political center.

APR. 21. Germany's CDU suffers severe defeat in state elections in Rhineland-Palatinate.

APR. 25. In Finland's general elections, the Center Party overtakes the Social Democrats as nation's leading party. The Center Party polls 24.8% of vote and increases representation to 55 seats from 40; Social Democrats receive 22.1% of vote, losing 8 seats in Eduskunta (parliament) for total of 48; National Coalition (conservative) Party receives 19.3% of vote and its representation falls to 40 seats from 53. Esko Aho, leader of the Center Party, forms new 4-party government as Finland's premier 4/26, which controls 115 seats in the 200-seat parliament.

MAY 15. French President Mitterrand names Socialist Edith Cresson as premier to replace Michel Rocard, who has resigned. Cresson retains leading ministers from Rocard's government.

JUNE 3. France announces intention to sign 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

JUNE 15. Mesut Yilmaz defeats Yildirum Akbulut to win leadership of Turkey's ruling Motherland Party. Yilmaz is sworn in as Turkey's new premier 6/24.

JUNE 17. Germany and Poland sign friendship treaty, reiterating Germany's acceptance of post-World War II Oder-Neisse border between the states and pledging mutual nonaggression.

JUNE 28–29. EC leaders meet in Luxembourg and draft treaty for political union; summit leaders reiterate support 6/29 for timetable for economic and monetary union adopted in 1990.

JULY 18–19. President Bush visits Greece and Turkey 6/19–21; offers military aid and help in resolving dispute over Cyprus.

AUG. 5. Italy's ruling coalition agrees to measures designed to keep the 4-party bloc together through spring 1992 elections.

SEPT. 15. Sweden's Social Democratic Labor Party suffers worst electoral defeat in 60 years amid dissatisfaction with the economic costs of the country's extensive welfare programs. Nonsocialist parties win 195 of 349 seats in Riksdag (parliament), but majority depends on 25 seats won by a new party, New Democracy. Swedish Premier Ingvar Carlsson 9/16 resigns. Moderate Party leader Carl Bildt takes office 10/3 as Sweden's premier.

SEPT. 19. A Soviet official, Yuri Luzhkov, asks EC to provide half of estimated $14.7 billion in foreign food aid and credits that USSR will need in 1991–92.

SEPT. 24. Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney presents package of far-reaching

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constitutional reforms designed primarily to convince Quebec to remain part of Canadian confederation. Opposition political leaders react with a mix of cautious approval and suggestions for further reform. Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa of the Liberal Party states 9/25 that the proposals do not meet Quebec's demands, but refuses to reject the plan outright.

Oct. 4. Representatives of 24 nations agree on 50-year moratorium on all mining activities and oil exploration in Antarctica, setting new regulations for waste disposal, marine pollution and wildlife protection on the continent. The agreement, reached at a meeting in Madrid, extends the terms of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which banned military activity and set guidelines for scientific research.

Oct. 6. Portuguese Premier Aníbal Cavaco Silva wins reelection; his centrist Social Democratic Party gets 130 seats in the 230-seat national assembly. Portuguese Socialist Party, led by Jorge Sampaio, comes in second with 69 seats in the assembly; Portuguese Communist Party wins only 17 seats.

Oct. 10. In compromise between CDU and SDP, German political leaders agree to establish large refugee camps to protect immigrants seeking asylum, after wave of violence against foreigners in Germany.

Oct. 20. In Turkish elections, the center-right True Path Party of former Premier Süleyman Demirel finishes first in general elections. Premier Yilmaz resigns 10/21 but stays on as caretaker premier.

Nov. 12–13. EC foreign ministers complete 2 days of meetings without resolving many of the issues concerning political integration among EC's 12 members; agreement also remains elusive on a treaty for economic and monetary union.

Nov. 25. In Belgian general elections, the center-left coalition of Prime Minister Wilfried Martens retains majority, though nearly all traditional parties lose ground.

Dec. 9–10. EC leaders meet for 2-day summit in Maastricht, the Netherlands; agree to political treaty pledging "ever closer union," and reach compromise agreement to establish a single currency and European central bank no later than 1999; Britain will decide which Community measures to adopt and refuses to commit to a common currency and central bank.

Dec. 16. Canadian government agrees to grant political domain over 77,000 square miles—roughly equal to one-fifth of Canada—to 17,500 Eskimos living there.

SOUTH ASIA

Jan. 31. Indian Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar dismisses elected government in the state of Tamil Nadu, which is allied with former Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh; nearly one-fifth of Indian states stand without elected governments.

Feb. 18. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ambush and kill 45 Sri Lankan troops; LTTE seeks a separate homeland in northern Sri Lanka for the Tamil ethnic minority.

Feb. 26. Khaleda Zia, widow of Maj. Gen. Ziaur Rahman who ruled Bangladesh from 1976 to 1981, wins elections to become prime minister. Zia, leader of conservative Bangladesh Nationalist Party, promises to develop capitalism in impoverished nation. BNP 3/3 enters coalition with Islamic Assembly Party, adding 17 seats to its previous 140 in 300-seat parliament; Acting President Shahabuddin Ahmed confirms Zia as prime minister.

Mar. 2. Sri Lanka's deputy defense minister, Ranjan Wijeratne, is killed in bomb blast that takes the lives of at least 18 other people.

Mar. 6. Indian Prime Minister Shekhar of the Janata Dal Party resigns, and Congress (I) Party withdraws support for his minority government. President Ramaswamy Venkataraman immediately calls for elections and asks Shekhar to stay on as a caretaker until they are held.

Apr. 10. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif submits legislation to adopt

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Islamic law (sharia) in place of current secular code, as part of his campaign promise.

APR. 30. Estimated 125,730 people are drowned and millions are left homeless when a cyclone strikes coastal areas of Bangladesh; damage is estimated at $1.4 billion. US 5/7 increases to $7.14 million its funding for disaster relief; total foreign contributions for the relief effort stand at about $150 million.

MAY 8. At least 47 people are killed in clashes between Indian army troops and pro-independence demonstrators in the northern states of Jannu and Kashmir.

MAY 12. Premier Krishna Prasad Bhattarai resigns after preliminary returns show him narrowly losing to the Communist Party candidate in Nepal's first multiparty vote since 1959. Bhattarai's Nepali Congress Party 5/18 is later declared the winner of elections; Nepali Congress Party wins 110 seats and Communist Party wins 69. Bhattarai decides to stay on as premier until formation of new house of representatives.

MAY 21. Indian Congress (I) Party leader and former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is killed by a bomb blast during an election campaign near Madras. Indian election commission 5/22 announces that second round of voting in nationwide elections will be postponed until 6/12 and 6/15. Congress Party 5/29 names P. V. Narasimha Rao as provisional chief; party wins plurality of votes in Indian general elections 5/20–6/15, receiving 218 seats, but fails to win enough support to form independent parliamentary majority, losing 2 of the nation's largest states to Hindu fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party; BJP finishes in second with 120 seats; Janata Dal (People's Party) third with 85. Rao is sworn in as prime minister 6/21. Elections are marked by violence; terrorist 6/15 opens fire on passenger train, killing at least 76 people, bringing to 400 the total number of people killed during campaign.

MAY 28. Afghan guerrilla leaders reject truce proposed by Afghan President Najibullah, whose Soviet-backed government sought to implement peace plan proposed by UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to end 12-year-old civil war.

AUG. 29. Afghan rebel leaders back UN proposal for ceasefire. US and Soviet Union agree 9/13 to discontinue military aid to sides in conflict, after more than a year of negotiations to end Afghan civil war. Najibullah and leaders of some rebel factions welcome US-Soviet agreement, but rebel leaders reject offer from Najibullah 9/16 for new ceasefire.

SEPT. 30. Afghan President Najibullah calls for provincial and local elections open to all political parties, including Afghan rebel factions, and for the formation of a "national unity government" to oversee the country during a transition period.

DEC. 11. Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng visits India, first trip by a top Chinese official to that country in more than 3 decades.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

CHINA AND NORTHEAST ASIA

FEB. 18. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung calls off talks scheduled with South Korea, citing planned annual US-South Korean joint military exercises.

—Bribery scandal among housing and other government officials results in apology and cabinet shuffle by South Korean President Roh Tae Woo. New appointments include: Choi Kak Kyu, who replaces Deputy Prime Minister Lee Seung Yun; Lee Jin Seol, who succeeds Construction Minister Lee Sang Hee; and Park Seh Jik, who replaces Rhee Hai Won as mayor of Seoul.

FEB. 23. China removes Xu Jiatun, highest-ranking official to leave the country following 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators, from his seat on the National People's Congress (parliament).

MAR. 25. Chinese Premier Li Peng, addressing opening session of National

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People's Congress in Beijing, vows to defend "socialism with Chinese characteristics," but acknowledges need to open economy through cautious reforms. Zhu Rongji, the reformist mayor of Shanghai, and Zou Jianua are both named vice premiers of China 4/8. Li 4/9 defends 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators as necessary to bring about China's current "stability and prosperity."

MAR. 26. South Koreans vote in the nation's first local elections in 30 years. Results favor candidates of ruling Democratic Liberal Party of President Roh; DLP wins 49% of the 4,304 legislative counties and municipal wards, or more than 70% when including independent candidates aligned with the ruling party; the main opposition party, the Peace and Democracy Party, led by Kim Dae Jung, wins 18% of votes.

APR. 16. President George Bush meets informally with Tibet's exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, in a symbolic move strongly opposed by China.

APR. 17–19. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev visits Japan; talks with Premier Toshiki Kaifu but the two leaders fail to resolve territorial dispute concerning future of Kurile Islands, a major obstacle to improved Soviet-Japanese relations.

APR. 27. South Korean President Roh orders resignation of interior minister a day after the killing of a student protester by riot police.

APR. 30. President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan declares end to 43-year period of emergency rule that had perpetuated state of war with mainland China. National Assembly passes other constitutional changes to reduce size of assembly and parliament and to make each more representative.

APR. 30-MAY 22. Demonstrations occur throughout South Korea demanding President Roh's resignation, in the largest turnout since student-worker uprisings in 1987. Premier Ro Jai Bong resigns 5/22; Roh names Chung Won Shik as premier 5/24.

MAY 16. China and Soviet Union sign agreement in Moscow, resolving some areas of contention regarding their border, during a 5-day visit by Chinese Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin.

MAY 27. President Bush announces, in a commencement speech at Yale University, that he will renew most-favored-nation trade status for China, asserting that continued trade with China will provide the best leverage for reforms. US Senate 7/23 extends China's MFN status for one more year but links further extensions to progress on political reforms.

MAY 28. North Korea announces that it will seek a seat at the UN, reversing its traditional opposition to separate seats for North and South Korea.

JULY 4. Great Britain and China agree to start constructing a new Hong Kong airport, seaport facility and suspension bridge; London promises that the colony will have at least HK $25 billion in reserve when Hong Kong is handed over to China in 1997, and to consult Beijing at each phase of the construction project.

JULY 20. Ruling DLP scores landslide victory in South Korean local elections, winning 564 of 866 seats. The opposition New Democratic Union wins 165 of remaining 302 seats.

JULY 26. In a visit to Asia, US Secretary of State James A. Baker addresses parliament of Mongolia, urging it to continue along the path of democratic reform and promising US aid for nation's economy as it struggles to make a transition to a free market.

AUG. 10. China announces its decision in principle to sign 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

SEPT. 10. Two largest opposition parties in South Korea announce plan to merge; the new party, made up of the New Democratic Union, and the Democratic Party, led by Li Ki Taek, will control 80 of the 298 seats in the nation's parliament.

SEPT. 19. Japanese Premier Kaifu proposes a bill that would allow up to 2,000 Japanese military personnel to be dispatched abroad for UN peacekeeping missions. The lower house of Japan's Diet (parliament) approves 12/3 legislation; opposition party blocks bill in parliament's upper house 12/10.

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Oct. 4. Premier Kaifu withdraws as leader of Japanese Liberal Democratic Party. Former Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa is elected party president 10/27. Miyazawa is appointed premier 11/5 at special Diet session; new 20-member cabinet includes 6 members of the LDP faction led by former Premier Takeshita.

Nov. 8. President Roh declares that South Korea will no longer possess or store American or any other nuclear weapons; calls on North Korea to abandon plans for nuclear capability. US 11/29 begins withdrawing nuclear weapons from South Korea. South Korean President Roh 12/18 announces that US nuclear arms have been removed.

Nov. 10–17. US Secretary Baker visits Japan, South Korea and China; meets with Premier Miyazawa and urges Japan 11/11 to take a more active role in international affairs; in Seoul, Baker meets 11/13–14 with South Korean President Roh and other officials to discuss solutions to nuclear concerns and other issues dividing peninsula. After meeting with Chinese leaders in Beijing 11/15–17, Baker concedes that no breakthrough in Sino-American relations had been achieved.

Nov. 21. During a visit to Seoul, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney says that the US will delay further troop pullouts from South Korea, as part of stepped-up pressure on North Korea to halt development of nuclear weapons.

Dec. 11. US and South Korea announce they will allow North Korea to inspect any civilian or military sites in return for reciprocal rights and an agreement that neither Seoul or Pyongyang would produce weapons-grade plutonium.

Dec. 13. North and South Korea sign comprehensive agreement governing nonagression, reconciliation, trade and other issues and pledge peaceful coexistence between the two nations, which have been on the brink of war since the armistice ended the Korean War in 1953.

Dec. 21. Taiwan's governing Nationalist Party wins first full elections since end of Chinese civil war in 1949. Nationalists win 71% of vote; main opposition group, the Democratic Progressive Party, which advocated declaring independence from China, receives 24%.

—Cambodian government tells leaders of Khmer Rouge to stay out of country as major demonstrations take place in Phnom Penh.

Dec. 25. Kim Jong Il will succeed his father, President Kim, as supreme commander of North Korea's military.

Dec. 26. North Korea pledges to sign International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard agreement and allow inspections of its nuclear research center.

Dec. 30. North and South Korea agree to make their peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

Southeast Asia and the Pacific

Jan. 5. The sultan of Brunei, Hassanal Bolkiah, releases 6 political prisoners detained since abortive revolt in 1962, as a result of political pressure from British government.

Feb. 7. Cambodian government postpones elections scheduled for 1991 in effort to encourage negotiations to end 12-year-old civil war.

Feb. 16. Talks to renew US leases for military bases in the Philippines break off with the key issues of duration and payment unresolved; more talks are scheduled for May in Washington.

Feb. 23. Premier Chatichai Choonhavan is ousted by the military in bloodless coup; new military regime is led by the armed forces' supreme commander, Gen. Sunthorn Kongsompong. The new 5-member military junta announces that 1978 constitution has been abolished and that martial law will be imposed. US condemns coup 2/23 and announces suspension of $16.4 million in development aid. Military junta says that it will draw up new constitution within 6 months and hold elections shortly thereafter; appoints Anand Panyarachun 3/3 as provisional premier;

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Panyarachun 3/6 names cabinet and 3/15 announces reformation of the National Assembly, in which the military receives nearly half of the 292 seats.

MAR. 21. Philippine President Corazon Aquino announces that Imelda Marcos will be allowed to return to the Philippines, but that the former First Lady will have to stand trial for various crimes against the state.

APR. 9. US outlines plan to normalize relations with Vietnam. The 4-step plan will lift US trade embargo in return for Vietnam cooperation with UN-brokered peace plan for Cambodia.

APR. 25. US announces that it will provide $1 million in aid to Vietnam, the first direct financial assistance since the end of the Vietnam War.

MAY 3. Talks on renewing leases on US military bases in the Philippines collapse again in Washington.

JUNE 12–13. Mt. Pinatubo, near Manila, erupts. Early warnings of possible volcanic eruption lead to a 6/10 evacuation of US Navy and Air Force personnel and all dependents from nearby bases. Worsening eruptions force US to evacuate all 200,000 miliary personnel and to close Clark Air Force Base 6/12.

JUNE 24. Four rival Cambodian factions agree to a ceasefire and prohibition on receiving foreign arms, in a new treaty signed by members of the Supreme National Council; council includes representatives of the Cambodian government and the 3 rebel factions (the Khmer Rouge; a group led by former Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk; and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, led by Son Sann).

—Vietnam holds 7th annual Community Party Congress 6/24–27. Do Muoi is named secretary general 6/27, replacing Nguyen Van Linh. During opening session Linh says the party and the government will seek to further liberalize the nation's economy while maintaining their grip on power.

JULY 17. Negotiators for US and the Philippines agree on outline of 10-year lease for Subic Bay Naval Base and announce that Clark Air Force Base will be turned over to the Philippine armed forces when the current lease expires. Negotiators 8/27 work out final financial agreement; US will pay the Philippines $363 million in aid during the first year of the new agreement and $203 million for each of the following 9 years. Agreement subject to approval by Congress and parliament.

AUG. 9. Vietnam's National Assembly elects Vo Van Kiet, the third-ranking member of the Politburo, to become the nation's new premier, replacing Do Muoi.

AUG. 27. Rebel factions fighting for control of Cambodia tentatively agree to reduce their armies by 70%, a step toward implementing a UN-sponsored political settlement.

AUG. 31. In elections in Singapore, ruling People's Action Party wins 61% of vote, but captures 77 of the 81 parliamentary seats. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong says 9/4 that due to his party's poor showing he will slow the pace of liberal reforms in order to prevent political instability.

SEPT. 15. Political parties favoring expanded democracy for Hong Kong win overwhelming majority of seats contested in colony's first direct elections in 150 years of British rule. Pro-democracy forces win 16 of 18 contested seats in the Legislative Council.

SEPT. 16. Philippine senate rejects, 12–11, treaty extending leases of US bases in the Philippines. After originally calling 9/15 for nationwide referendum to circumvent senate's expected rejection of US accord, Aquino 9/29 says she will abide by senate vote.

OCT. 23. Representatives of the Cambodian government and 3 rebel factions sign comprehensive peace treaty in Paris. Treaty specifies a transition to democracy, in which the UN shares power with the 4 factions; UN is to oversee the return of the 3 rebel factions to share power in the capital; installs Prince Sihanouk as the provisional leader of Cambodia while guerrilla disarmament, voter registration and other internal restructuring take place.

—US Secretary Baker meets with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh

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Cam and says the two nations can now begin a process leading to normalization of relations; announces US is lifting small part of its economic embargo against Vietnam, allowing US-organized tours to visit the country for the first time since end of Vietnam War.

Oct. 29. Vietnam approves plan to repatriate tens of thousands of refugees living in camps in Hong Kong, where some 60,000 Vietnamese refugees are currently housed. New settlement places all new immigrants from Vietnam under a 6-week period of scrutiny to determine whether their reasons for leaving are political or economic; those deemed solely economic will be returned immediately. Hong Kong authorities begin the first enforced deportations with 59 Vietnamese refugees 11/9.

Nov. 4. Imelda Marcos returns to the Philippines, ending more than 5 years of exile in the US. Marcos is arrested 11/5 on tax fraud charges; pleads not guilty 12/10. Trial begins 12/16.

Nov. 5. China and Vietnam normalize relations, after 13 years of perfunctory diplomatic ties.

—More than 2,000 people are killed when sudden typhoon floodwaters sweep through towns and villages in central Philippines.

Nov. 12. In East Timor, Indonesian troops fire into a crowd of demonstrators protesting Indonesian occupation of the island, killing about 50 people.

Nov. 14. Cambodia's former head of state, Prince Sihanouk, triumphantly returns to Phnom Penh, after nearly 13 years in exile. Sihanouk is declared Cambodian president by the Vietnamese installed government 11/20.

Nov. 22. US and Vietnamese officials meet in Vietnam to begin discussions aimed at normalizing relations between the two nations.

Nov. 28. Khmer Rouge military commander, Khieu Samphan, arrives in Phnom Pehn and is nearly lynched by angry mob, forcing him and his delegation to flee to Bangkok; Cambodian leaders gather 12/2 in Pattaya, Thailand, for talks aimed at preventing the peace accord from foundering in light of attacks on Khmer Rouge officials.

Dec. 1. Philippines's leading political party, the Struggle of Democratic Filipinos coalition, chooses Ramon Mitra, speaker of the lower house of parliament, to be its candidate in presidential elections scheduled for May 1992; rejects former Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos, who was supported by Philippine President Aquino.

Dec. 12. Burmese troops barricade Rangoon University and arrest students during the second day of pro-democracy protests; Burma's military junta shuts down all universities, after students rally inside Rangoon University seeking the release of Nobel Peace Prize-winning dissident Aung San Suu Kyi, who is under house arrest.

Dec. 18. Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke announces that he will quit as leader of the Labor Party but immediately seek reelection; Hawke is later ousted by Labor Party and replaced by Paul Keating 12/19.

Dec. 27. After an impasse in negotiations over bases, the Philippines inform US that it must withdraw from the Subic Bay naval base by the end of 1992; US says it will abide with Philippine request.

Dec. 30. President Bush begins 12-day visit to Australia, Singapore, South Korea and Japan.

—Cambodia's rival factions hold their first top-level talks in Phnom Penh and request immediate deployment of UN peacekeeping troops.

LATIN AMERICA

Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean

Jan. 2. Three US Army servicemen die when Salvadoran rebels, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, shoot down their helicopter in El Salvador; FMLN says 1/21 that 2 of its members shot down helicopter and that it will hold a public trial of the men before a tribunal of rebels and independent representatives.

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JAN. 6. Jorge Serrano Elías, leader of the Solidarity Action Movement, is elected president of Guatemala.

—Roger Lafontant, a former head of the Tonton Macoutes, the private militia of the deposed Duvalier family dictatorship, leads armed supporters in the seizure of Haiti's presidential palace; forces resignation of provisional President Ertha Pascal Trouillot. Loyalist army forces crush the coup 1/7 and restore the government of Trouillot, who vows that President-elect Jean-Bertrand Aristide will take office on 2/7 as planned. Lafontant is convicted 7/30 of trying to overthrow the government and sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor.

JAN. 11. Mexican government and leaders of 5 Central American countries agree to integrate their economies gradually over the next 6 years.

JAN. 15. Colombian drug baron Jorgé Luis Ochoa Vasquez surrenders to authorities near the city of Medellin.

JAN. 20. Supporters of Haiti's president-elect Aristide win a plurality in the National Assembly (parliament) in run-off elections. Aristide is inaugurated 2/7.

FEB. 11. US announces a 55% increase in aid to Haiti for fiscal year 1991.

FEB. 25. US and Colombia agree to improve trade and to fight drug trafficking in Colombia.

MAR. 10. El Salvador holds municipal and legislative elections; Central Election Council announces 3/22 that the ruling Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) party won the legislative elections but lost its majority in the National Assembly.

APR. 4. Representatives of the Salvadoran government and leaders of the rebel FMLN begin new round of talks in Mexico City aimed at ending El Salvador's 11-year-old civil war. The reforms are intended to cut back power of the military, create a nonmilitary police force, strengthen the judicial system and institute electoral reform, but do not include provisions for a ceasefire. The Salvadoran National Assembly approves reforms 4/29.

APR. 8. Panamanian President Guillermo Endara fires 5 of 12 cabinet ministers, all members of the Christian Democratic Party, splitting the ruling 3-party alliance installed in Dec. 1989 after US invasion of Panama; ends months of quarreling among coalition members over economic policy and power-sharing within the government.

APR. 11. US and Panama sign the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which gives US officials access to Panamanian banking records when investigating drug trafficking and money laundering, clearing the way for release of more than $80 million in US aid to Panama.

APR. 16. Nicaraguan President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, addressing joint session of US Congress, seeks increased economic aid to Nicaragua. Chamorro meets 4/17 with President George Bush and members of his cabinet. Bush promises to lead an international effort to restructure Nicaragua's debt, estimated at almost $10 billion.

JUNE 26. US announces plans to release $21 billion in US military aid to El Salvador. Funds are part of $42.5 million of fiscal year 1991 aid withheld by Congress since 1990.

JULY 1–4. The leaders of nations in the 13-member Caribbean Community and Common Market discuss ways to establish a customs union and to enact a common tariff on imports from countries outside CARICOM, but fail to reach agreement.

JULY 4. Colombian President César Gaviria Trujillo lifts state of siege in effect since 1984, in a move to honor the new constitution taking effect 7/5.

JULY 9. A key commission of the Nicaraguan National Assembly recommends repeal of 2 property laws passed by the former Sandinista National Liberation Front government, which had given ownership of large property holdings to Sandinista loyalists. President Chamorro 10/11 vetoes legislation intended to return property confiscated under FSLN rule; leaders of the 14-party National Opposition Union accuse Chamorro of giving in to Sandinista pressure and criticize the veto 10/12.

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JULY 18–19. Twenty-three presidents of Latin American nations and Spain and Portugal meet at the first Ibero-American Summit Conference in Guadalajara, Mexico. The presidents pledge to work together toward economic integration and to reduce poverty in their nations.

JULY 19–21. Nicaragua's FSLN elects former President Daniel Ortega Saavedra to the newly created post of secretary general; reelects him to the party's ruling 10-member National Directorate during its first party congress.

JULY 22. US and 13 English-speaking Caribbean countries sign a trade-cooperation agreement, as a preliminary step toward President Bush's plan for a hemispheric free-trade region; create a US-Caribbean Community Trade and Investment Council to monitor commercial relations between the US and CARICOM members and to foster investment and reduce trade barriers.

AUG. 14. Guatemala recognizes "the right of the people of Belize to self-determination," reversing its previous claims of sovereignty over that nation, and states its desire "to live in peace and harmony with its neighbors."

AUG. 18. Mexico's ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party wins an overwhelming victory in midterm elections, a turnaround for the PRI, which in 1988 had almost lost the presidency. PRI wins 62.6% of vote, corresponding to 300 of 500 available seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the National Congress; the conservative National Action Party wins 18.4% of vote and about 100 seats.

AUG. 22. Promoting President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative for free-market development in the western hemisphere, the administration announces that it will forgive Bolivia's $341 million official debt. US and Jamaican officials 8/23 sign an agreement canceling $217 million of Jamaica's debt.

SEPT. 11. President Mikhail Gorbachev says he will withdraw Soviet troops from Cuba and base future Soviet economic relations with Cuba on "mutually beneficial trade" rather than a barter system. US hails Soviet leader's announcement; Cuban government complains that it had not been consulted.

SEPT. 25. El Salvador's government and representatives of its 5 main rebel groups sign a broad agreement on the country's political and economic future, in first step toward a ceasefire in the nation's civil war. Pact includes provisions for the rebels to seek positions in a new civilian-controlled police force and the right to remain on their presently occupied land.

SEPT. 30. Haitian President Aristide is overthrown in coup d'état led by Haiti's military; soldiers seize control of radio and television facilities, taking most stations off the air. Coup leaders establish 3-man junta to head country, led by Brig. Gen. Raoul Cedras. Aristide leaves country for Venezuela 10/1; US suspends economic aid to Haiti and refuses to recognize junta.

OCT. 3. In a speech to the Security Council, exiled President Aristide asks the UN for help in restoring democracy in Haiti. The Organization of American States (OAS) refuses 10/4 to recognize junta and prepares to send a multinational force to Haiti; suspends economic, commercial, diplomatic and military assistance to coup leaders. President Bush meets with Aristide at the White House 10/4; signs executive order freezing assets of Haitian government and forbidding US citizens to make payments to the new regime.

OCT. 8. Haiti's parliament, under pressure from the military, elects a supreme court justice, Joseph Nerette, as interim president; OAS votes unanimously for a trade embargo. UN General Assembly unanimously adopts a resolution 10/11 calling for the restoration of Aristide and condemning the coup that overthrew him.

OCT. 10. Cuban Communist Party endorses plan to recover from worst economic crisis since the 1959 revolution; plan seeks to increase foreign investment and tourism and calls for a full-scale food production campaign to combat growing food shortages.

OCT. 30. President Bush orders sweeping ban on US trade with Haiti, to take

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effect 11/5. Haitian National Assembly, as part of accord with OAS, agrees 11/13 to discussion with Aristide, but not his return to power.

Nov. 1. President Salinas of Mexico announces plans for reforms in agriculture, education and the relationship between Roman Catholic Church and state. Mexican government 11/7 proposes constitutional amendment on land ownership to allow millions of the country's cooperative farmers to own, rent or sell their land.

Nov. 14. Salvadorian guerrilla front, the FLMN, announces a unilateral truce, suspending all military action after nearly 12 years of civil war, until an expected UN-brokered peace accord is signed with the government. Salvadoran President Alfredo F. Cristiani declares the truce a "signal of good will" and says the government will take "corresponding unilateral measures."

Nov. 15. Haitian parliament and OAS agree on process to restore constitutional government to Haiti, which could pave way for return of deposed President Aristide to power.

Nov. 18. US announces that it is sending nearly 1,800 refugees back to Haiti, resuming a repatriation program suspended after the coup. As number of boat people seeking asylum increases sharply, US prepares 11/26 to build an emergency camp for Haitian refugees at the US base in Guantanamo, Cuba, to shelter them until a decision can be reached regarding their status. US federal judge orders US officials 12/3 to devise new procedures to assure that no Haitian with a legitimate fear of persecution is sent back. US federal appeals court 12/19 lifts ban on forced repatriation.

Nov. 23. Deposed President Aristide arrives in Cartagena, Colombia, to meet with opposition leaders for first time since he was overthrown. Interim leadership in Haiti 11/29 announces elections will be held 1/5/92 to choose a successor to Aristide.

Nov. 25. Nicaraguan Catholic bishops issue pastoral letter blaming both Chamorro government and Sandinista opposition for nation's poverty and political unrest; criticize the president for not resolving property rights issue.

Dec. 16. Salvadoran officials and FLMN open separate discussions in New York with a UN mediator aimed at producing a formal ceasefire; reach 1/1/92 a peace agreement that will bring an almost immediate halt to their fighting and end of civil war. Number of points remain to be solved, but government and guerrilla forces promise to abide by formal ceasefire effective 2/1/92. Accord provides that if the two sides fail to settle their remaining differences by 1/10/92 the UN will have the power to decide them.

—In Trinidad and Tobago, the People's National Movement wins a landslide victory in national elections, gaining 21 of 36 seats in parliament. Patrick Manning is elected prime minister; defeats Prime Minister Arthur Robinson and his National Alliance for Reconstruction party, which retained 2 of its 33 seats; United National Congress wins 13 seats.

Dec. 22. Deposed President Aristide accepts Haitian Senate's choice of Communist Party leader René Théodore to be prime minister.

South America

Jan. 3. Argentine government deregulates oil industry and cuts 20,000 civil service jobs as part of economic austerity plan.

Jan. 31. Brazil announces new anti-inflation shock program that raises prices and wages and then freezes them indefinitely; new measures represent a "deepening" of the plan first instituted when President Fernando Collor de Mello took office in March 1990.

Feb. 3. Argentina unveils economic plan aimed at controlling inflation and reducing federal deficit; measures designed to improve tax collection, lower import tariffs and tighten control of financing for state-owned businesses. Argentine workers stage wildcat strikes at 2 state-owned companies 2/4–6 to protest plan.

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MAR. 4. Chilean President Patricio Aylwin Azócar issues report detailing the torture, murder and disappearances of more than 2,000 Chileans during the 17-year rule of Gen. Augusto Pinochet; attributes many human rights abuses to members of the National Intelligence Directorate, Pinochet's secret police. Corps of Army Generals issues 3/7 statement supporting Pinochet; Chilean Supreme Court sends note to Aylwin accusing him of threatening the country's political stability. Pinochet rejects the report 3/27.

MAY 17. Presidents of Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia agree to create a free-trade zone by Jan. 1992 and a common market by 1995; agree 12/6 to move up date of common market to Jan. 1992.

MAY 25. Political groups favoring renewed ties between Suriname and its former colonial power, the Netherlands, win 38 seats in 51-seat National Assembly in first election since the army installed a civilian government after a coup in Dec. 1990.

JUNE 3–8. OAS holds 21st annual general assembly meeting in Santiago, Chile; members agree to take action against any regime that takes power in a coup.

JUNE 17–20. Brazilian President Collor visits US as part of an effort to reduce Brazil's foreign debt. Presidents Bush and Collor 6/19 sign a framework agreement on relaxing trade barriers between the US and countries of the Southern Cone Common Market.

JULY 17. Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico approve a free-trade pact to take effect 1/1/92, aimed at eliminating trade barriers, creating a free-trade zone and encouraging multinational business ventures within the group.

JULY 31. US State Department says that Peru has improved its performance on human rights enough to allow US to release $94 million in aid, which is intended to help Peru fight drug trade; announcement draws sharp criticism from human rights groups and congressional committees. Congress freezes the funds 8/14 because of alleged abuses by Peruvian security forces. President Bush and Congress reach a compromise 10/30 that allows the release of an antinarcotics aid package for Peru.

SEPT. 5. Argentina, Brazil and Chile sign a declaration renouncing chemical weapons.

SEPT. 8. Argentina's ruling Judicialist (Peronist) Party is victorious in midterm elections; Peronist party members win the governors' races in 10 of 12 provinces, and receive 7 additional seats in Chamber of Deputies, bringing party's total to 119, 9 less than a majority.

SEPT. 12–21. Pope John Paul II visits Brazil; addresses 9/14 the issue of social and economic equality, attacking inequities of Brazil's land-distribution system and calling for agrarian reform.

SEPT. 28. Two Salvadoran army officers are found guilty of murder and terrorism in 1989 slaying of 6 Jesuit priests in San Salvador.

OCT. 19. Peruvian Senate votes, 38–17, to strip former President Alan Garcia Pérez of immunity from prosecution, clearing the way for Garcia's trial on charges that he had embezzled public funds while president of Peru in 1985–90.

OCT. 27. Colombia's ruling Liberal Party wins majority in Senate and House of Representatives, capturing 18 of 27 provincial governships in local elections.

OCT. 28. President Bush invites presidents of 6 Latin American countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador and Mexico) to a summit on fighting international cocaine trafficking, to be held in early 1992.

NOV. 1. Argentine President Carlos Saúl Menem announces a sweeping program to deregulate the economy and reverse decades of government intervention and protectionism; plan includes eliminating all import and export quotas, freeing all professional fees and commissions, and disbanding 10 government organizations that control critical industries.

NOV. 15. Peruvian President Fujimori issues emergency decrees increasing power of Peru's military to combat terrorism; measures allow soldiers to confiscate

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private property, draft individuals in the war effort against rebel Shining Path movement, and the right to enter prisons and universities.

DEC. 1. Paraguay's ruling National Republican (Colorado) Party wins 58% of vote in elections for an assembly to rewrite Paraguay's constitution; main opposition Authentic Radical Liberal Party captures 28% of vote.

AFRICA

JAN. 5. US and Italian forces begin separate air and sea operations to rescue foreigners from Mogadishu, Somalia, after rebel groups and government agree to temporary ceasefire to allow evacuations; civilian and combatant deaths are estimated at 1,000.

JAN. 8. In South Africa, the African National Congress calls for a conference of all the country's political parties to lay the groundwork for a new, democratic constitution. The government's chief negotiator, Gerrit Viljoen, welcomes ANC proposal, but the Conservative Party rejects it.

JAN. 9. South African government begins to initiate limited integration plan as small numbers of black students are admitted for the first time to formerly all-white public schools.

JAN. 20. In the first multiparty elections since São Tomé and Príncipe gained independence from Portugal in 1975, the ruling party, the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe-Social Democrat Party, loses majority in parliament. PCD-GR names Daniel Lima dos Santo Daio to head new government 2/8; former prime minister Miguel Lisboa Trovoada replaces Manuel Pinto da Costa as president 3/3.

JAN. 22. Up to 600 rebels invade Rwanda from the neighboring Uganda and seize part of the city of Ruhengeri.

JAN. 29. ANC leader Nelson Mandela and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi of the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party meet in an effort to end violence between the 2 antiapartheid groups; agree to end rivalry and appeal to supporters for mutual tolerance.

FEB. 12–13. Principal factions in Liberia's civil war meet for talks in Lomé, Togo; sign ceasefire 2/13 and agree to take steps to form an interim government.

FEB. 13. Citing appreciation for Kenyan support in Gulf War, US releases $5 million of $9.6 million in military aid to Kenya; aid had been held up in 1990 as a sign of US displeasure with human rights violations in Kenya.

FEB. 15. South African government and the ANC issue joint statement that they have worked out differences over ANC political and military activities.

FEB. 17. António Mascarenhas Monteiro wins Cape Verde's first free presidential elections, receiving 74% of vote, over incumbent President Aristides Pereira. Monteiro is inaugurated 3/22.

—Rwandan government signs ceasefire with rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front (FPR), after 5 months of fighting; followed by a regional conference attended by presidents of Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda at Dar es Salaam 2/19.

FEB. 22. ANC softens its long-standing goal of nationalizing key industries.

FEB. 23. Rebel Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front launches successful offensive against government troops to overrun northwestern provinces of Gondar and Gojam, and consolidates its power 3/14.

MAR. 7. Emigration of Ethiopian Jews to Israel is halted by Ethiopian government. Israel accuses Ethiopia of attempting to pressure Israel into giving it military assistance against renewed rebel activity in northwest; Ethiopian leaders 3/15 attribute halts to unspecified "irregularities" in the processing of visa applications by Jewish aid agencies.

MAR. 12. South African President F. W. de Klerk introduces a legislative package

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that will scrap all racial discrimination in land ownership and allow South Africans to live where they choose. ANC responds with "outrage and deep disappointment" to proposed land restructuring program, saying that package "presents a view of the history of black dispossession that absolves the white population of all responsibility for the existing unequal land dispensation."

MAR. 18. Sudanese military ruler Lt. Gen. Oman Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir agrees to allow UN to conduct large-scale relief efforts in the country.

MAR. 24. Prime Minister Nicéphore Soglo defeats Benin's current president, Brig. Gen. Mathieu Kérékou, in final round of first free presidential elections in nearly 30 years; Soglo wins 68% of vote.

MAR. 26. After 4 days of strikes and protests by pro-democracy supporters calling for President Moussa Traoré's resignation, soldiers in Bamako, Mali, overthrow the government and promise multiparty democracy; military junta 4/2 designates Soumana Sacko as premier.

MAR. 30. ANC leader Nelson Mandela and Inkatha Party leader Buthelezi meet in effort to stem a flare-up of violence in black townships between supporters of the 2 antiapartheid groups; leaders agree to exchange information about their respective rallies and to monitor each other's actions in carrying out peace accord signed 1/29/91.

APR. 5. ANC warns South African President de Klerk that it will pull out of negotiations on new constitution unless the government meets its demands to help stop factional violence in black townships.

APR. 9. South African government proposes draft bill to repeal the Population Classification Act of 1959, as part of President de Klerk's pledge to abolish all South African apartheid laws.

APR. 29. UN General Assembly votes unanimously to conduct referendum in Western Sahara on whether the territory should become independent or remain part of Morocco.

APR. 30. Military leader of Lesotho, Maj. Gen. Justin Lekhanya, is ousted in bloodless coup by rebel army officers.

MAY 2. South African President de Klerk announces plans to scrap certain provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1982, which the South African government had used to punish antiapartheid groups and to restrict political activity.

MAY 4. Parliament of Guinea-Bissau legalizes opposition parties, ending 17 years of single-party rule by African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde.

MAY 13. Winnie Mandela, wife of ANC leader Nelson Mandela, is convicted on charges arising from the abduction and beating of 4 black youths at her Soweto home in 1988; is sentenced 5/14 to 6 years in prison. Mrs. Mandela is granted right to appeal her conviction in higher court 7/16.

MAY 18. ANC breaks off power-sharing talks with South African government until more progress is made on demands to curb violence in black townships.

MAY 21. Ethiopia's president, Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, resigns and flees country as rebel forces, led by Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, overwhelm government troops and advance on Addis Ababa. Lt. Gen. Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan, vice president and former defense minister, is named acting president; immediately asks US to help arrange ceasefire between government and rebel groups.

MAY 24–25. South African President de Klerk convenes multiparty conference in Pretoria aimed at finding solution to unrest in black townships. ANC boycotts meeting, claiming that government's own security forces fomented unrest and that in clashes police sided with Inkatha Party.

—In massive rescue mission dubbed "Operation Solomon," Israel transports 14,087 Ethiopian Jews from Addis Ababa to Tel Aviv; Israel acknowledges 5/29 it paid Ethiopian government $35 million to free the Jews.

MAY 26–28. US sponsors peace talks in London between Ethiopia's government

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and 3 rebel armies—the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Front; parties sign ceasefire allowing rebel groups to enter capital. Representative Isaias Afwerki announces 5/29 that EPLF will form separate provisional government in province of Eritrea until UN-supervised referendum can be held on independence. EPRDF soldiers take control of Addis Ababa 5/28 and pledge to set up new democratic government comprising all political factions. EPRDF leader Meles Zenawi returns to Addis Ababa and disavows intention to install strict Marxist regime.

MAY 31. Angolan government and rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola sign peace agreement ending 16-year-old civil war and preparing country for democratic rule. US House of Representatives 6/11 votes to continue covert aid to UNITA in 1992, reducing assistance to $20 million from the $60 million received annually in recent years through the CIA. Angolan government announces 7/15 general amnesty for persons jailed for crimes against state security.

JUNE 5. South Africa's parliament approves new legislation that repeals the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 and the Group Areas Act of 1966, both considered pillars of the apartheid system.

—Algerian President Col. Chadli Bendjedid declares a state of emergency in response to 12 consecutive days of violent protests in Algiers by Islamic fundamentalists, postponing parliamentary elections scheduled for late June and dismissing the premier and his cabinet. Sid Ahmed Ghozali replaces Mouloud Hamrouche as premier; names 6/18 new cabinet, appointing Lakhdar Brahimi as foreign minister and Nordine Aït-Lahoussine as oil minister.

JUNE 10. In Madagascar, coalition of opposition parties launches campaign of strikes and peaceful demonstrations intended to wrest democratic reforms from President Didier Ratsiraka; later demand his resignation. The opposition group, Active Forces, calls for general strike 7/8, which forces banks and businesses to close. Ratsiraka declares state of emergency 7/23 in capital region; offers 7/28 to dismiss government and organize a referendum on a new constitution within the year, but refuses to leave office; opposition rejects concessions. Fifty-one protesters are killed 8/10–11 when troops open fire on demonstrators outside presidential palace.

JUNE 17. South Africa's parliament repeals the Population Registration Act of 1950, which required all citizens to be registered in one of 4 racial categories: white, black, Asian or colored.

JUNE 22. South African government, ANC and Inkatha Party meet in Johannesburg, in first talks involving all 3 sides, to discuss solutions to violence in black townships.

JUNE 25. Rioting flares up between Algerian security forces and supporters of fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front, ending several weeks of uneasy peace under a government-imposed state of emergency. FIS threatens 6/28 to call for a holy war; government arrests party's top leaders and hundreds of members. Tentative order is eventually restored, and the state of emergency is lifted 7/16.

JUNE 26. Zimbabwe's ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, announces decision to abandon Marxist-Leninist ideology, removing from its constitution phrases such as "Marxism-Leninism" and "scientific socialism."

JUNE 27. South African government announces willingness to sign 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty and to submit nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

JULY 1–5. Delegates from 24 of Ethiopia's political and ethnic groups gather in Addis Ababa to set up broad-based transitional government until free elections are held; elect an 87-seat legislature as main political authority during transition. EPRDF and allied groups take one-third of seats, members of Oromo receive 28 seats. EPRDF leader Zenawi is elected 7/21 as head of state for 2-year term.

JULY 2. ANC holds first national conference in South Africa. Mandela is elected

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ANC president 7/5, replacing ailing Oliver Tambo; Cyril Ramaphosa is elected secretary general, and Walter Sisulu replaces Mandela as deputy president.

JULY 11. President George Bush lifts US trade and investment sanctions against South Africa, saying that President de Klerk's reforms have fulfilled the 5 conditions required by US Congress in the Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act of 1986; many in Congress criticize action as premature.

JULY 19. South African government admits making secret payments to Inkatha Party to bolster the moderate Zulu movement against the growing popularity of the left-wing ANC. South African President de Klerk announces 7/30 that secret aid to Inkatha has stopped.

AUG. 9. US increases military assistance to Sierra Leone to help it repel guerrillas from neighboring Liberia.

AUG. 16. South African government announces general amnesty for political exiles who fled country after antiapartheid organizations were banned in 1960.

AUG. 27. In Lomé, Togo, national conference on democracy elects Joseph Kokou Koffigoh as premier of interim government; Togo President Gnassingbé Eyadéma accepts the appointment 8/28, ending autocratic rule begun in 1967.

SEPT. 14. South African government, ANC and Inkatha Party sign comprehensive plan aimed at ending factional violence in black townships. Features of accord include establishment of special courts to deal with the violence, a ban on carrying weapons at demonstrations and formation of special units to investigate police misconduct.

SEPT. 23. Contingent of paratroopers, protesting against low wages, engage in 2-day looting spree in Kinshasa, Zaïre. Belgium and France 9/24 dispatch troops to protect foreign residents.

SEPT. 29. After a week of rioting in Zaïre's major cities, in which 117 people are reported killed, President Mobutu Sese Seko agrees to form a "government of national crisis" with opposition parties. Mobutu appoints leader of the opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress, Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulamba, as premier; the arrangement leaves Mobutu as president until free elections can be held.

—UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi returns to Luanda, Angola, for first time since civil war broke out in 1975, as part of his presidential campaign for elections scheduled for 1992.

OCT. 16–20. Commonwealth holds its biennial national leaders' conference in Zimbabwe; drafts revised stance on political liberty and adopts schedule for lifting punitive sanctions against South Africa.

OCT. 20. Zaïrean President Mobutu fires Premier Tshisekedi after dispute over composition of his new cabinet, in which the president insists on naming 11 of 22 cabinet seats, including defense and mining portfolios; rioting breaks out in major cities 10/21–27, and European governments continue to evacuate nationals. After opposition refuses to select new premier, Mobutu 10/23 names Bernardin Mungul-Diaka to replace Tshisekedi.

OCT. 31. Kenneth Kaunda, president of Zambia since its independence from Britain in 1964, is soundly defeated in Zambia's first pluralistic presidential balloting. Frederick Chiluba, leader of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions, wins 80% of vote to Kaunda's 20%. Chiluba is inaugurated president 11/2.

NOV. 19. Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi dismisses Industry Minister Nicholas Biwott, who was named as a suspect in Feb. 1990 slaying of Kenyan Foreign Minister Robert Ouko. Biwott and Hezekiah Oyugi, former head of internal security, are arrested 11/27.

—Gen. Mohammed Farrah Aidid announces overthrow of Somalian President Ali Mahdi, after 2 days of fighting between rival forces of ruling United Somali Congress. Fighting continues in Mogadishu between forces loyal to Madhi, who claims to retain power, and those under Gen. Aidid.

NOV. 25. Zaïrean President Mobutu appoints opposition leader Nguza Karl-i-

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Bond as prime minister and former Prime Minister Mungul-Diaka as minister of state; main opposition party condemns the appointments.

Nov. 28. In Lomé, Togo, soldiers loyal to former dictator Eyadéma surround the palace of Prime Minister Koffigoh. After 300 French troops come to the aid of the prime minister, Eyadéma urges soldiers to give up 11/30, but soldiers refuse to retreat. Koffigoh 12/3 agrees to bring backers of the former dictator into interim government but refuses to restore presidential powers to Eyadéma.

Nov. 30. South Africa's governing National Party, the ANC and 20 other political organizations lay groundwork for formal negotiations on post-apartheid South Africa; open preliminary talks on new constitution to extend equality to black majority and establish steering committee consisting of a representative from each group.

Dec. 2. Kenyan President Moi announces that his government will allow multiparty politics, after Kenya African National Union agrees to scrap 1982 constitution legalizing one-party rule.

Dec. 3. Togo Prime Minister Koffigoh is captured by rebel soldiers. While in custody Koffigoh meets with former dictator Eyadéma; the two leaders agree to form a coalition government 12/4.

Dec. 6. President Mobutu of Zaïre vows that he will continue as head of state until new elections are held, despite opposition demands that he step down.

Dec. 9. US sends additional $19 million to Somalia for medical help, food and logistical support for humanitarian agencies; US joins relief operation in Mogadishu 12/9 as heavy fighting continues between rival factions seeking to oust each other from the capital, where an estimated 4,000 people have been killed and more than 8,000 wounded during 5 weeks of fighting.

Dec. 15. Nigeria's Social Democrats suffer huge losses in state governorship elections, while right-of-center opponents gain; elections are viewed as key step in the military government's plans to restore civilian rule in 1992.

Dec. 18. Inkatha leader Buthelezi announces he will not attend 12/20 talks with the South African government on ending apartheid, because Zulu King Goodwill had not been invited.

Dec. 20. The 2-day Convention for a Democratic South Africa opens in Johannesburg; President de Klerk says he is ready to negotiate constitutional amendments that would create an interim government and an expanded parliament that includes blacks. ANC leader Mandela expresses optimism and predicts that within a year South Africa could have a new constitution providing political equality for nation's black majority.

Dec. 26. Islamic Salvation Front wins overwhelmingly in Algeria's first free parliamentary elections. The militant Muslim party wins 189 seats in 430-seat parliament; the Front for Socialist Forces, a secular party with support from the Berber minority, takes 20 seats; and ruling National Liberation Front, which has governed since independence 30 years ago, wins 16 seats.

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

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

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